The Ahdath Prison: The Shortest-Lived Yet Most Lethal of ISIS Prisons in Mosul

 

 

 

 

ISIS seized the Ahdath Prison building ten days after taking control of Mosul. The organization continued its previous employment as a prison, using it to hold those it considered security threats. This definition included any Shia Muslim, anybody affiliated with or suspected of collaborating with the Iraqi Army or Police Force, and anybody who opposed ISIS in any way. The Ahdath Prison was used by ISIS for only 46 days, but in that short span, hundreds of prisoners lost their lives, by torture, execution, or as a result of Global Coalition airstrikes.

The history of the Ahdath (or Bash Tapia) Prison begins in 1968, when the Iraqi government built an orphanage in a residential area of Mosul on the western bank of the River Tigris, near the historic Bash Tapia Castle. The building became the headquarters of the Department of Juvenile Correction in 1982. Then it became a juvenile detention center in 1986. After the 2003 invasion, US troops used the building to detain those accused of “terrorism.”

Under US occupation, the building became an incubator for extremism. Many of the men detained here were later mobilized by Jihadist factions. Some even became core members of ISIS. So in some cases, those who had once entered the building as prisoners later returned as prison guards.

The ISIS Prisons Museum (IPM) has studied the different phases of the building’s history, and has focused in particular on the phase of ISIS control. Specifically, the testimonies of 11 people imprisoned there in 2014 have been recorded and analyzed. But the period between 1991 and 2008 has also been examined, through the testimonies of prisoners of that period, along with the accounts of former prison workers and lawyers who defended some of the detainees.

The IPM’s architectural team, meanwhile, constructed a model of the prison to illustrate the building’s structure and the changes it underwent, marking the parts destroyed by the Global Coalition airstrike on August 6, 2014.

From Orphanage to Juvenile Prison

The Iraqi government constructed an orphanage on a one-dunum plot^[1] located in a densely populated residential area on the western bank of the River Tigris. According to a former orphanage worker, its population never exceeded 50 children. The authorities closed the orphanage in 1978, and repurposed the building as the Department of Juvenile Correction.

The building consisted of two group cells and an “observation center,”^[2] which contained an area for medical examinations. The Department of Juvenile Correction was a temporary detention center in which the young detainees were investigated and sentenced before their transfer to correctional prisons.

The Department of Juvenile Correction was expanded in 1986 and converted into a juvenile prison. From then on, it held juveniles convicted of criminal offenses as well as those still awaiting sentencing. That prison consisted of three solitary confinement cells, two rooms to detain those under 12 years old (known as al-Hajz, literally, “the detention”), and two group cells, one for those detained temporarily and the other for the convicts. It also contained 13 rooms for use by the warden and staff, a dining hall, restrooms, and an exercise yard.^[3]

During the rule of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, the prison operated in accordance with Iraq’s Juvenile Welfare Law No. 76 of 1983.^[4] This law aimed at “restricting the phenomena of juvenile delinquency by protecting juveniles from deviance and socially adapting them in accordance with the values and moral norms of the socialist construction stage society.” The law defined a juvenile as anyone over the age of 9 and under the age of 18.

Until 2018, the prison was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, supervised by its Juvenile Correction General Directorate. Following the issuance of Law No. 14 on Adult & Juvenile Prisoner Correction,^[5] the prison was detached from the Juvenile Correction General Directorate and placed under the Ministry of Justice. The prison’s security was entrusted to the “Procedural Force” affiliated with the Ministry of Justice.

According to the testimonies documented, the prison administration during the 1990s and early 2000s appeared strict, yet it tolerated things such as cigarette smuggling. It also showed favoritism toward certain prisoners with powerful families.

Sami Abd Khalil, who was detained in the Ahdath Prison in 1991 for his involvement in a fight at the age of 17, recalls that the inmates included juveniles charged with smuggling contraband or cigarettes, as well as those convicted of theft, fighting, and murder related to tribal disputes. Sami confirms that cigarette packets were smuggled into the prison. Prisoners would exchange their breakfast boiled eggs for a couple of cigarettes.

The IPM’s documented testimonies remark that the circumstances resulting from the First Gulf War and the economic blockade on Iraq^[6] forced many juveniles and children to become involved in smuggling and even theft to support their families.

Among them was Saad Salim Abdullah, who entered the Ahdath Prison in 2001 at the age of 14 on charges of smuggling rice. He had become involved in smuggling in order to support his family. Like many other vulnerable or orphaned children, he suffered discrimination inside the prison. Such children were forced to clean the facility or to wash other prisoners’ clothes. Saad stayed a month longer in prison than necessary due to his family’s poor economic situation; he had to wait until they had managed to pay 450,000 Iraqi dinars^[7] to secure his release.

Bassem Muhammad Ali Rashid was arrested in 2000 at the age of 14, charged with smuggling fuel. He spent 30 days in the Ahdath Prison, and was released after his family had paid a fine of 350,000 Iraqi dinars. Bassem recalls how a prisoner charged with raping and murdering a girl received special treatment because he was the son of a powerful official. He was allowed to wander about inside and even outside the prison.

The testimonies indicate that neither the detainees nor the inmates at the Ahdath Prison received any social or psychological support. Officials from organizations concerned with child rights never visited the facility to oversee the living conditions of the detainees, even when renovations and expansion work in 2001 resulted in up to 200 inmates being crammed into a single group cell.

 

 

Chaos: The US Occupation

US forces seized control of the Prison following the US invasion of Iraq in April 2003. The prison continued to be administered by Iraqis, however. There was general turmoil in Mosul city in the aftermath of the invasion, and this extended to the prison. Just as various armed factions sought to impose themselves on Mosul’s inhabitants, so they sought to control the wardens and inmates of Ahdath Prison.

Between 2004 and 2005, the Ahdath Prison was dubbed the Tasfirat (Transfer) Prison, and for a short period, it received adult prisoners. Abdul Basit Shaker Mahmoud recounts how US forces arrested him and sent him to the Ahdath Prison in 2004, when he was 40 years old. The prison administration allowed his three-year-old son to spend a week with him in the group cell, surrounded by the other prisoners.

Abdul Basit recalls an incident that reflects the state of chaos in those days. Unidentified armed men broke into the prison, he says, firing their guns and unlocking some of the group cells, allowing several prisoners to escape.

During this period, Iraqi officials were targeted by armed factions. One notable incident was the assassination of Salim Ayyub Selo, the director of the Ahdath Prison, along with his driver, by a group of unidentified armed men on October 6, 2005.

Jumaa Salah Kadir spent six months in the Prison in 2008 when he was 13, charged with involvement in a fight. He says that the charges brought against inmates included murder, fighting, and involvement in terrorist acts according to criteria determined by the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Act of 2005.^[8]

Jumaa was later transferred to Badush Central Prison, where he completed his sentence, which totaled one year and four months. He compares the two prisons, stating that the conditions in the Ahdath Prison were “the worst.” He describes these conditions, noting that his group cell housed 70 prisoners, and that they were allowed only one hour of sunlight per day. Favoritism prevailed; only some inmates were permitted to grow their hair as they liked, while others hid razors and smuggled cigarettes, breaching prison rules. Despite this, Jumaa considers that in terms of security, the Ahdath Prison was well managed, unlike Badush Prison, where prisoners managed to seize control.

As security degenerated, the prisoner population increased. Consequently, the Ahdath Prison began incarcerating individuals charged with or convicted of acts of terrorism in the same group cells as those charged with criminal cases. A significant testimony in this regard comes from a former prisoner who chooses to remain anonymous. He was detained in the Ahdath Prison on charges of armed robbery from March 19, 2009 until the prison’s closure and the transfer of its headquarters to Badush Prison in 2011. The witness experienced three different prison administrations, which allows him to provide important and detailed observations about the prison during that period.

This witness describes the decision to house those prisoners facing criminal charges with those accused of terrorism as a decision to “sell them to al-Qaeda.” As an example, he narrates the story of a Yazidi juvenile inmate around whom “al-Qaeda members gathered.” Initially, “they threatened him, but eventually, they managed to indoctrinate him to pledge allegiance to them,” he says. He continues, “I heard that he was killed in the Battle of Mosul in 2016, after he had joined the ranks of ISIS.”

Those arrested under the Counter-Terrorism Act included some involved in “terrorist acts” as well as some “undermining the capacity of the security apparatuses,” along with their accomplices. The group cells became overcrowded, housing over 160 prisoners on both criminal and terrorism charges. According to witness testimonies, several unusual occurrences became ordinary at that time; prisoners had their own cell phones, al-Qaeda flags hung on the walls, and Islamic anthems played around the clock. Furthermore, anyone who opposed the prisoners convicted of terrorism was reported to al-Qaeda members outside, and would face threats or even murder on their release.

The increasing influence of al-Qaeda within the Ahdath Prison enabled the escape of four prisoners convicted of terrorism on April 4, 2010. Three were later recaptured. This escape prompted the authorities to relocate the prison to a designated area within the heavily fortified Badush Prison. Badush Prison was the second-largest prison in Iraq, after Abu Ghraib Prison on the outskirts of Baghdad. The prisoners were moved on November 23, 2011.

 

 

The Prison Administration, 1982–2011

Based on the testimonies of former prisoners, the IPM managed to identify the names of five wardens who ran the prison successively between 1982 and 2011. It has not been possible to verify these dates from official sources, so they may not be accurate.

 

Date	Warden
1982–1996	Salim (…)
1996–2003	Leith Rabii Ali
2003–2005	Salim Ayyub Selou
2005–2010	Yousef Hormuz Toma
2010–2011	Samir Mahjouba

List of wardens at the Ahdath Prison.

 

According to witness testimony, the first warden of the Ahdath Prison was named Salim, but his surname is not known. Salim oversaw the transformation of the facility from a correctional center into a prison, and held his position until 1996. He was succeeded by Leith Rabii Ali, who managed the prison from 1996 to 2003.

After the 2003 invasion, Salim Ayyub Selo became the warden. He held the position until his assassination in 2005. He was succeeded by Yousef Hormuz Toma, also known as “Abu Rafil.” Witnesses praised Toma for his diligence and attentiveness to prisoners’ needs.

Toma stepped down in 2010, and was replaced by Samir Mahjouba. Unlike Toma, Mahjouba’s tenure was marked by food shortages and harsh treatment, including punishment with whipping on the feet and beating with batons.

An ISIS Security Prison for 46 Days

On June 20, 2014, ten days after ISIS had entered Mosul, the organization took control of Ahdath and converted it to a security prison. This new incarnation of the building lived for only 46 days, until August 6, 2014, when it was targeted by an airstrike. After that its inmates were transferred to other prisons.

By combining witness testimonies with architectural analysis, the IPM has outlined the features of the Ahdath Prison in the ISIS period. The confinement spaces included two main group cells for male prisoners, another group cell that was likely designated for female prisoners, and three solitary confinement cells. ISIS also built metal cages in the yard in which to confine prisoners under the heat of the sun. There was a sharia judge’s office and several interrogation rooms – although their exact number has not been determined. In addition, there were a couple of rooms used for administration, a rest and recreation room for the guards, and a room for storing prisoners’ belongings.

 

 

Some witnesses say that they heard sounds of construction and metalworking constantly throughout their detention. ISIS modified the building in various ways. This included reinforcing the doors and windows of the group cells with extra rods, blocking the group cell windows, through which prisoners had formerly talked to their visitors, and constructing metal cages in the yard.

Several challenges arose during the IPM’s investigation into the building. In most former ISIS prisons, evidence such as writing on the walls, abandoned documents, and remnants of torture tools hanging from the walls and ceilings indicate how ISIS used the various spaces. Such clues were scarce in this case. Furthermore, the strict security measures ISIS employed against prisoners, such as the use of blindfolds, made it difficult for witnesses to form visual images of the spaces they experienced, especially the investigation rooms and the corridors. Of course, the building’s earlier use as a prison had to be taken into account, so as to distinguish between what existed before ISIS took control and what existed after the organization had modified the structure.

 

The Prisoners

ISIS used the Ahdath Prison to detain those implicated in what it considered security issues. This means people accused of being collaborators or spies for the enemies of ISIS, as well as such members of civil society as politicians, former army officers, and journalists.

Even before it gained control of the city, ISIS had deeply infiltrated Mosul society with a network of informants. It had built a comprehensive database of information on its rivals and potential opponents. This facilitated swift and widespread arrest campaigns that crammed its prisons in a matter of days.

Nayef Ahmad Hasan al-Hamdoun was arrested on June 29 and detained for 12 days because of a conversation he had had with some of his acquaintances, during which he had defended the Iraqi Police. He recounts that among the detainees he found the brother of Nineveh’s police chief, journalists, tribal leaders, and relatives of Iraqi politicians.

Saddam Hazem Matar, who was detained for 19 days on the charges of “collaboration” and for being a former employee of the Interior Ministry, remarks that most of his fellow inmates were government employees, lawyers, and former army officers.

Muhammad al-Attar al-Obeidi, a scholar of Islamic political jurisprudence, was arrested for refusing to pledge allegiance to ISIS or to work for the organization. He spent 30 of his 105 days of detention in the Ahdath Prison (the remainder were spent being transferred between other ISIS prisons). Muhammad recalls the specific number of fellow inmates in his group cell, which would later be hit by an airstrike. Upon his arrival on July 14, there were 148 prisoners; that number reached around 166 on August 6. He says that most of the detainees were local and federal police officers, election candidates, and those accused of collaboration. He recalls that one of the detainees was a municipal employee arrested for refusing to hand ISIS the maps of the city.

In addition to those political prisoners, a significant number of detainees were arrested for being rafida (or “rejectionists,” i.e., Shia Muslims)^[9] or Shabak.^[10] These people came from various areas around Mosul, particularly from eastern Nineveh, including al-Tawafa and the Northern Garage, as well as from the towns of the Tal Afar District. The IPM has documented five testimonies of former prisoners who were detained in the Ahdath Prison purely for sectarian reasons.

Sabah Jassim Muhammad was arrested along with his two sons and daughter for two reasons. The first was because his son, Raid, was married to a Shia woman, and the second was because his daughter had distributed harissa – a local dish – as an act of religious offering. This practice was enough to make ISIS arrest the whole Sunni family, in addition to some of their neighbors, for being Shia.^[11] Sabah and his relatives were later accused, in addition, of having friendly relations with officers in the Iraqi Army.

In a similar incident, Thamer Elias Hussein, along with his mother, wife, and children, were detained for seven days for being Shia. They were in fact Shia Muslims, but they hid the fact. Later, their neighbors intervened on their behalf and managed to mediate their release, while also concealing that they were Shia.

Witness testimonies confirm that women were also held at the Ahdath Prison, in a designated women’s section. Unfortunately, the IPM has not been able to interview any female former prisoners.

Interrogation and Torture

Prisoners were usually handcuffed and strung up from the cuffs as soon as they entered the investigation room. Some were questioned while kneeling. Interviewees disagree on whether or not the interrogation sessions were filmed; this may be because the interrogators recorded sessions only occasionally in order to show the judge, who was not always present at the prison.

According to the witness testimonies, prisoners were able to identify a number of foreigners among the interrogators by their dialects. Others were local Iraqis.

The interrogation methods and the nature of the questions varied according to the two types of prisoner: the political prisoners accused of collaboration, and the prisoners arrested for sectarian reasons.

For those accused of collaboration, the main goal of the questioning was to gather as much information as possible about political or military figures in Mosul society. Saddam Hazem Matar confirms this, noting that his interrogation focused on extracting information about the officers, affiliates, and members of the Iraqi Police and Armed Forces. He was asked if these people prayed regularly and what weapons they possessed. He was also asked about his brother, who worked at the Interior Ministry. Saddam was suspended from the wrists and flogged for refusing to disclose information. This resulted in a dislocated shoulder and fractured metatarsal.

The interrogations of those arrested for religious reasons, on the other hand, were more general and random. Groups of prisoners in this category were usually interrogated together. In this way, the interrogators could exploit familial or personal connections between the prisoners to intimidate them into disclosing information. The primary goals of interrogators were to assess the prisoners’ religious knowledge, to ascertain their true sect, and to gather information about their relatives and acquaintances.

Sabah Jassim Muhammad was interrogated with his two sons, Raid and Muhannad, and their neighbor, Faris Marwan Ziyada, who had been arrested both on charges of collaboration and for sectarian reasons. Interrogators took advantage of their relationships to terrorize them; Raid and Muhannad were tortured in front of their father, and were tricked into thinking that their neighbor, Faris, had been shot dead. Raid reports that interrogators drilled holes in his feet with an electric drill, focusing on parts of his feet where he had previously had surgery for an arterial embolism. The traces of this torture were still visible at the time of his interview, and the complications risked developing into gangrene.

The testimonies list various methods of torture, including applying electric shocks to genitals, pulling out fingernails, applying salt to wounds, and pushing a spiky tool into the rectum. Prisoners often had to be carried back to their cells, covered in blood, following these torture sessions.

 

Device	Function
Electric drill	Boring holes in parts of the body such as the feet
Cables, hoses and pipes, sticks	Flogging on different parts of the body
Electric apparatus	Shocking different parts of the body, including the genitals
Nail extraction tools	Extraction of fingernails or toenails
Wooden cross, metal chains	Suspending and immobilizing prisoners in order to flog them
Spiked tools	Insertion into the rectum

The most common torture devices and methods in the Ahdath Prison.

 

Prisoners were tightly blindfolded during interrogation sessions. The jailers wore masks after realizing that the cloth blindfolds didn’t completely block the prisoners’ vision. Nevertheless, the IPM has relied on witness observations to determine which spaces in the prison were used for torture and interrogation. As prisoners were moved from the group cells to the investigation rooms, they counted the number of steps taken, and tried to establish in which direction they were turned. Sometimes the witnesses remember the presence of a balcony or a small garden next to the group cell, and a nearby bathroom from which ISIS members brought water to pour on prisoners’ wounds.

 

 

Prison Administration and the ISIS Prison Network in Mosul

The administrative structure of the Ahdath Prison was similar to that of other ISIS prisons in Iraq and Syria. It consisted of judges, interrogators, and jailers responsible for various prison affairs, including food distribution, receiving belongings, and escorting prisoners to and from interrogations.

 

Position	Nom De Guerre
Judge	Abu Dujana (Saudi national)
Judge	Abu Zaid
Interrogator	Abu Hajar
Interrogator	Abu Nizar (From the region of Nabi Sheet)
Interrogator	A. S.
Jailer	Abu Aisha
Jailer	Abu Hadid
Jailer	Abu Raad
Jailer	Muhammad Abu Musaab
Jailer	Abu Aisha
Jailer	Abu Talha/Talhat
Jailer	Abu Jabal (from the Hadidiyin tribe)
Food provision	Abu al-Baraa
Death squad leader	Abu Barzan
Blood judge (i.e., responsible for homicide cases), Qaimaqamiya	Bashar al-Sumeidai

List of some ISIS members operating in Ahdath Prison as mentioned by witnesses.

 

The IPM was not able to gather sufficient information about the sharia judges who were responsible for hearing prisoners’ cases and giving verdicts. It did establish, however, that one of them was a non-Iraqi Arab who spoke in classical Arabic (Fusha), and that another was called Abu Zaid. The judges – who, it seems, were only present in the prison on certain days – likely instructed the interrogators to record the interrogation sessions when they were away.

There were many interrogators. They carried out group interrogation sessions, and witnesses speak of hearing the voices of multiple individuals being questioned at once. Some interrogators were Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, or Libya. These were assisted by local interrogators from Mosul. Two interrogators’ noms de guerre were frequently heard in the prison: Abu Nizar and Abu Hajar.

The noms de guerre of the jailers were Abu Raad, Abu Jabal, Abu Hadid (who was known for his massive physique), and Abu al-Baraa, who was responsible for distributing food to the prisoners.

Although the Ahdath Prison held a very important position in the ISIS security apparatus, it was merely one part of a coordinated network of prisons and security bases in Mosul. ISIS leaders and judges moved between those bases as required. When the Ahdath Prison was bombed, its inmates were transferred to other prisons and were summoned before different judges before their release.

Among those other nearby prisons were the Qaimaqamiyaiya Prison, which had been taken over by ISIS within seven days of its invasion of Mosul and was used as both a prison and a court; the prison of the former Veterans’ Association building, located near al-Hurriya Bridge in central Mosul; and the prison of the former Mosul Municipality building. In addition, there were detention centers based in civilian homes that had been seized by ISIS, about which we have no further information. It seems that ISIS resorted to these secret locations to avoid the airstrikes that targeted more prominent buildings.

When they were first arrested, some prisoners were taken directly to the Ahdath Prison, while others were transferred there after interrogation in Qaimaqamiyaiya Prison. It was the same when they were released. Some prisoners – like the witness Saddam Hazem Matar – were released directly from the Ahdath Prison. Beforehand, Saddam underwent interrogation by a sharia judge, and then a flogging. Other prisoners were transferred to the Qaimaqamiyaiya Prison, where a judge heard their cases before they were released.

According to some testimonies, a rumor spread among the prisoners concerning an amnesty supposedly granted by the ISIS “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to survivors of the airstrike that targeted the Ahdath Prison. The amnesty reportedly led to some death sentences being reconsidered, and to the release of some people whose charges were unproven. It was also said that al-Baghdadi, surprised by the large number of detainees in Ahdath, dismissed the Saudi judge in charge of the prison along with some of his assistants. However, none of these rumors could be confirmed.

But some kind of unexpected leniency was indeed shown by the judges in the Qaimaqamiyaiya Prison late in the day. They decided suddenly to dismiss the charges against some of the prisoners due to a lack of evidence. For example, Faris Marwan recalls how the judge told him, “May Allah forgive what has passed,” before releasing him. Faris attributes this to the alleged amnesty. Fadaam Khazal Ali, who was charged with collaboration, recalls a similar situation. A judge released him, saying that the witnesses who had accused him had failed to show up in court to deliver their evidence, and that “this absence proves that they are the liars, and Fadaam is truthful.” The judge swore he would bring the false witnesses to justice for framing Fadaam on false charges.

Tribal and local mediation played a significant role in the release of a number of detainees, particularly those arrested for sectarian reasons. Amir Ali al-Asghar says that the Jawarin tribe mediated his release. The release of Sabah Jassim and his two sons also resulted from the mediation of locals from their region, Tawafa.

Detainees on political charges, however, were often released in exchange for monetary or in-kind fines. Ali Ahmad Hasan, who was charged with collaboration, was released after ISIS had confiscated his car. And Nayef Ahmad Hasan, charged with collaborating with the Iraqi government and talking about ISIS members in a negative way, was released after paying a fine of 800,000 Iraqi dinars – the equivalent in 2014 of 686 US dollars, enough to buy a rifle.

The “Death Squad”

As in all ISIS security prisons, many of the Ahdath Prison’s “dangerous” prisoners were sentenced to death. Witnesses speak of hearing gunshots during their interrogations, as if people were being executed nearby. Most likely, this was ISIS aiming to terrorize the prisoners, deceiving them that their relatives or friends were being killed. The actual executions were carried out in designated places outside the prison.

Many prisoners were taken from the prison to unknown destinations, never to return. Their fates remain unknown, though it is assumed that they are dead. According to witnesses, a specific group of ISIS members took victims from the prison and executed them outside; this became known as the “Death Squad,” or the “Execution Division.”

In his testimony, Muhammad al-Attar al-Obeidi says the Death Squad would arrive after midnight. It was composed of members of a single family: Abu Barzan (the leader), his son, his son-in-law, and another relative. Muhammad recounts, “When the door opened and we saw Abu Barzan, we were stunned and silent, waiting for him to pull a piece of paper from his pocket and read the names of those who would be executed.”

As the days went by, the prisoners became certain that those taken by Abu Barzan’s squad were not being transferred to another prison, but were being led to their deaths. The Death Squad always used plastic restraints to handcuff those it took. The prisoners believed this was so that the executioners would not have to retrieve them after the job was done. This was especially the case if the execution was to be carried out in the Khasfa, a natural sinkhole located about twenty kilometers south of Mosul, which is believed to be the largest mass grave in Iraq.

During its rule over Mosul, ISIS published a list of 2,070 people who had been executed and their bodies thrown into the Khasfa.^[12] Muhammad al-Attar recalls hearing the word “Khasfa” from Abu Jabal, a member of the Death Squad. Abu Jabal remarked that his clothes still retained blood stains in the morning from the executions they’d carried out the night before.

Fadaam Khazal Ali provides an account of the Death Squad that is almost identical to that provided by Muhammad al-Attar al-Obeidi, despite the fact that he was detained in a different group cell. He recalls that some members of the Death Squad arrived in the morning with blood stains on their clothes. He also recalls men among the Death Squad members using the noms de guerre Abu Aisha, Abu Jabal, and Abu Hadid.

 

 

Daily Life

Inmates of the Ahdath Prison lived in constant anxiety and apprehension, fearing they might be summoned for interrogation during the day or taken away for execution at night. Consequently, they gathered in small groups, speaking mostly in whispers to avoid infuriating the jailers. Thamer Elias Hussein describes the state of suspicion and isolation he found himself in, saying, “Since they learned we were Shia, our fellow inmates avoided us, as if we were outcasts or infested with scabies.”

Muhammad al-Attar al-Obeidi, meanwhile, recounts the tension that emerged between the elderly and the young inmates, as well as disputes over hygiene, especially when some prisoners began to neglect their personal hygiene out of despair. But Muhammad describes these disputes as temporary. They didn’t stop the inmates from cooperating. Sometimes they even “invented games, like children” to relieve the burden of time. The prisoners also designated specific corners in the cell where those who had been tortured severely could lie down, while other fellow inmates took care of them and dressed their wounds with torn clothes and the water available.

 

 

 

The survivors came out of the Ahdath Prison with painful memories. Nayef Ahmad Hasan recalls looking through the window of his group cell and seeing a man in flames in the ruins of the other group cell after it was hit by the airstrike. And Ali Ahmad Hasan recalls the story of two brothers arrested by ISIS for being Sufis. The judge made them choose whose life would be spared and whose would be taken. One brother voluntarily chose to be executed, sacrificing his life to spare that of his brother, who had a family and daughters to look after. Ali recounts how the surviving brother, mourning his sibling, kept reciting the Quran in his beautiful voice until he was released.

The 30 days of Ramadan, followed by the three days of Eid al-Fitr, fell during the prison’s 46-day use by ISIS. This affected the meals the prisoners received. During Ramadan, they were served two meals: suhoor, the meal before dawn, consisting of cheese, bread, and lentils; and iftar, the sunset meal, consisting of rice and broth, sometimes with pieces of chicken.

The witnesses believe that in the first days of the Ahdath Prison the meals were brought from the Military Hospital and were divided and packaged in individual portions. Since two or three inmates had to share one portion, the meals never satisfied their hunger. Fadaam Khazal Ali mentions that elderly and ill inmates, who only ate a little, sometimes gave him parts of their meals. Water was distributed to the inmates in small containers at mealtime.

There were frequent water shortages and cut-offs. As a result, the guards ordered the prisoners to perform ‘dry ablution’ by wiping their hands on the walls. The toilets often overflowed and became clogged. But cleaning products were usually available. Queues for the toilets were organized, because the demand was great, particularly after meals and prayers.

While two of the witnesses mention that a nurse once came to their group cell, all the others report a complete lack of any kind of health care, even for those suffering from asthma or heart disease.

 

The Airstrikes: Death or Salvation

August 6, 2014 was a crucial date for the prison and its inmates. On that day the Global Coalition targeted the building with several airstrikes, leading to its closure.

According to inmates who witnessed the strikes, one missile fell on a house near the prison walls, by the shore of the River Tigris, while another hit Group Cell One, which was connected by a corridor to the metal cages in the yard. Therefore, those concentrated in that group cell and the cages were hit, as were those in a hall used by the guards either as a break room or for administration. The testimonies differ slightly as to the exact time of the strike, but they all agree that it occurred right after the prisoners had finished their dawn prayers and gone back to sleep.

Nashwan Muhammad Kamil, who was charged with fighting against ISIS, is one of the few survivors of the airstrike that hit Group Cell One. His testimony is significant in that it depicts the horrifying moments of the airstrike as it was experienced by the prisoners.

Nashwan was unable to sleep after dawn prayers on that day due to the coughing of the man lying next to him in the middle of the group cell. He asked one of the guards who came to check on the prisoners if he could be moved to a corner of the room far from the coughing man. He didn’t know that this would save his life. Shortly afterwards, “I felt the ground shaking beneath my feet,” he says. “I opened my eyes and all I could see was darkness. I inhaled, and it was the smell of dust and smoke. All I could hear were cries and wailing.”

 

He recounts how he managed to free his body, which had been covered by rubble, and then moved with great difficulty, with a few other survivors, toward a hole in the wall through which light was filtering. “Everybody in the group cell had died, except for a few survivors. I made my way through the rubble and dead bodies,” he says. He doesn’t know what happened to those who remained under the rubble. It was unclear if ISIS dug them out. But it was said that some of the injured were taken to the Republican Hospital. After the airstrike, ISIS members took Nashwan and other survivors to a nearby house belonging to the al-Ani family, where they washed their faces and eyes. They were then transferred to Dar al-Diyafa Prison, where they were given underwear and food. Finally, they were moved from there to Qaimaqamiyaiya Prison.

Detainees in the other group cell experienced no less horror than those in the cell that was hit. The guards had left the prison fearing another airstrike, leaving the prisoners behind locked doors with no one to answer their pleas for help. Amir Ali al-Asghar shares what he observed through a window partially destroyed by the airstrike, allowing him to see the group cell that had been hit. “I witnessed the ceiling completely collapsing on the victims, and I could see the dismembered parts of their bodies flying and falling in the yard and in the corridor separating the two group cells,” he says.

ISIS members returned to the prison some hours later when they were sure the danger had passed. Heavily armed, they entered the group cell, tossed handcuffs to the prisoners, and instructed them to handcuff each other. This began the evacuation of prisoners from the building.

The testimonies provide similar descriptions of the evacuation process. ISIS fighters were deployed all over, particularly on the roof of the building, and they appeared to be in a state of fear and confusion. The detainees were ordered to board buses and cars that were parked in the yard. Their movements were closely monitored to prevent escape. Raid Sabah Jassim, who lost four friends in the airstrike, says ISIS members accused the prisoners of sending the location coordinates of the prison via GPS.

While ISIS hid the casualties among its members, announcing only that 96 prisoners had burned to death, media outlets aligned with the Iraqi government reported the deaths of 60 ISIS members, and claimed 300 prisoners had managed to escape.^[13]

It is very probable that ISIS abandoned the building at that point and left it empty thereafter. The structure remained neglected for some time following the organization’s defeat in Mosul. Eventually, it was reassigned to the Ministry of Justice. Its future use has not been determined. Some say it will serve as a warehouse for the ministry. Others say it will be demolished to make way for an apartment building for ministry employees.

 

1. The Iraqi dunum is equivalent to 2,500 m², unlike the Levantine dunum, which is 1,000 m². ↑
2. Article 10 of the Juvenile Welfare Law No. 76 of 1983 defines an ‘observation center’ as “a place designated for the detention of a juvenile by order of the court or the competent authority, where the juvenile is physically and mentally examined and their personality and behavior are studied by the Personality Study Office in preparation for their trial.” ↑
3. This information was obtained through interviews conducted by the IPM with a former director of the prison, and a lawyer who handled the affairs of some detainees. ↑
4. See https://juvenilejusticecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/juvenile-welfare-law-Iraq-76-of-1983.pdf, last accessed September 23, 2024. ↑
5. See https://bit.ly/3zkXfnQ, last accessed September 23, 2024. ↑
6. The blockade was implemented as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 661. The resolution was adopted on August 6, 1990 as a response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. ↑
7. Following the First Gulf War, inflation continued to rise. In 1995, one American dollar was the equivalent of 3,000 Iraqi dinars. ↑
8. The original Arabic text of the Counter-Terrorism Act (No. 13 (2005)), and its English translation on the website of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. ↑
9. The term rafida or rawafidh is a term historically used by Sunnis as a designation for Twelver Shia Muslims. It has been resurrected by Salafi-Jihadi movements in recent decades in a more derogatory manner and is frequently employed in ISIS propaganda. ↑
10. The Shabak are an Iraqi minority residing in over 60 villages scattered across the Nineveh Governorate, specifically in the Nineveh Plains. Most are Shia Muslims, and the majority speak the Bajelani Shabaki dialect, which is closely related to the Gorani Kurdish dialect. ↑
11. A distinction can be made between those who are primarily Shia and those who are Sunni but converted to Shiism or practice religious rituals associated with it. ↑
12. An Al Jazeera report on the Khasfa mass grave can be found here (in Arabic). ↑
13. “Airstrike in Mosul kills ‘dozens’ of Islamic State fighters,” BBC News Arabic, August 6, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2014/08/140806_iraq_mosul_raid_isis last accessed September 23, 2024. ↑