This investigation reveals in detail the workings in both theory and practice of the ISIS Hisba Diwan.
Hisba is an Arabic word meaning ‘accountability’. During ISIS rule, the Hisba Diwan was a religious or moral police force which sought to control the minutiae of daily life. It was primarily through the Hisba Diwan that ISIS imposed its rule over society at the popular level. Hisba patrols closely monitored the population, and arrested and detained people for mild infractions of the new dress and behavioral codes. It was the Hisba Diwan, therefore, that gave not just a repressive but a totalitarian character to the ISIS regime.
The first part of the investigation focuses on the historical background of the Hisba concept, as well as the context in which ISIS rose to power in Syria and Iraq.
The next part focuses on the organizational structure and hierarchy of the ISIS Hisba Diwan.
Then the investigation covers the procedures followed by Hisba operatives, from arrests and inspections to detentions and confiscation of goods.
The investigation moves on to explore the various punishments imposed on those who violated the new regulations – from drug dealers to tobacco salesmen; from men who wore tight trousers to women who revealed their eyes.
The investigation is illustrated by example documents retrieved by the ISIS Prisons Museum. These include arrest reports and confiscation reports, as well as various circulars and other correspondence concerning Hisba affairs.
In the earliest Islamic states, the primary concern of Hisba officials was to monitor trade in marketplaces – for example, to assure that weights and measures were fair and accurate. Similar market policing had been applied in Greek, Roman and Byzantine polities, and some have even argued that Islam inherited the system from them.
The Prophet Muhammad, in any case, appointed officials to monitor trade. He tasked Omar ibn al-Khattab with supervising the market in Medina, and after the conquest of Mecca, he made Saad ibn Said ibn al-Aas supervisor of the market there. The first four Caliphs after Muhammad, known as ‘the Rightly Guided Caliphs’, continued the practice. They appointed market supervisors to combat various types of fraud, and apparently toured markets themselves.
The violations acted against by Hisba officials expanded gradually over the centuries to include other reprehensible acts in the marketplace, and then activities in the larger public sphere that were considered contrary to Islamic regulations.
During the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, the jurisdictions of judges, the police, and Hisba officials overlapped. The Abbasid caliph al-Mahdi (ruled 159-169 Hijri, 775-785 CE) gave the Hisba apparatus greater formal power by institutionalizing it as an independent governance department. He was in part motivated by a desire to enforce religious orthodoxy in the face of rising dissent. (Al-Mahdi also appointed a minister titled Sahib al-Zanadiqa, or ‘the Handler of Heretics’.)
Most often, Hisba officials continued to focus on economic affairs. In the many and diverse Islamic polities that followed the Abbasids, the muhtasib and his various assistants were usually associated with securing commerce and the smooth working of the public sphere. They checked the quality of goods for sale, prevented hoarding, policed transactions at the ports, ensured the roads were kept in good condition, and maintained cemeteries.
As for the Hisba role in disciplining individual and social behavior, precisely what was or wasn’t tolerated depended on the legal rulings followed by the authorities of the time. The scholars often disagreed on these matters. The Hanbali judge Abu Yala, for example, inclined towards the necessity of the muhtasib punishing any act which a consensus (ijma) of scholars held to contravene sharia law, while Ibn Taymīyya – a jurist of the same Hanbali school – argued that punishment in such cases wasn’t necessary, that private advice and public preaching would suffice. The thirteenth century jurist Qarāfī believed that authorities should intervene against violations only if a definable public interest (maslaha) demanded they do so. In other words, punishment should be applied only in order to prevent harm to society, not simply because religious rules had been contravened.
The Islamic states ruled over very diverse societies, and their governance systems often recognized this. So while there were common spaces – like markets – operating under a single set of rules, there were usually also legally protected spaces for non-Muslim and other minority groups. For instance, both Imām Mālik and Abū Hanīfa – eponyms of two of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence – ruled that someone who destroyed wine belonging to a non-Muslim could be sanctioned for doing so, and should, at the very least, pay compensation for the damage. Mālik also ruled that punitive measures could not be taken against a non-Muslim who committed a sexual offense, even if the offense were committed with a Muslim. Such flexibility meant that in theory, and often in practice, diverse interpretations within Islam, as well as other religious traditions, were able to coexist.
Ideas about punishment changed across time, and according to the circumstances. One example: the Ottoman penal code specified that the punishment for repeated theft or assault with a knife should be amputation of the right hand. Ottoman court records show, however, that from the second half of the sixteenth century, convicts were sent to hard labor in the galleys instead of to the chopping block.
In the nineteenth century, the rise of modern states in the Muslim heartlands – both indigenous and western-colonial – greatly reduced the relevance and reach of Islamic law. Modern state structures demanded centralization and codification. The flexibility of Islamic jurisprudence was now seen as problematic, considered too arbitrary and unpredictable, leaving too much to community dynamics and the discretion of the judge. In some countries – those of French-occupied north Africa, for instance – Islamic criminal law was abolished. In others, it was reformed, or it cohabited with a civil legal code.
Western distaste for punishments involving mutilation, and painful means of execution like stoning, meant these practices were banned in areas under western rule – in British-occupied India, for instance, though other aspects of sharia were maintained there. (The distaste was reserved for the means of execution, but not for execution in general – the British increased this practice in the Muslim lands they administered.)
The Ottoman Empire also abandoned amputation and stoning in the nineteenth century. This seemed to happen by general consensus, as no government decree was issued to explicitly stop the practices. But corporal punishments such as whipping and caning were abolished by official decree in 1858. Semi-independent Egypt followed the Ottomans by banning these penalties in 1861.
By the dawn of the twentieth century, Islamic criminal law had largely been eclipsed. The roles previously played by muhtasibs had been inherited by civil police forces and other branches of the nation state.
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(written in consultation with Rashad Ali and Professor Sabah al-Sheikhli, and with reference to Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century, Rudolph Peters, Cambridge University Press, 2005)
The legal pluralism of pre-modern Islamic societies differs significantly from modern and contemporary forms of Islamic rule, and particularly from contemporary Hisba systems, which seek to impose religious mores and beliefs according to a single and often singular interpretation of sharia. Contemporary ‘Islamic policing’ tends to intervene in matters of individual dress and behavior, rather than in the regulation of commerce.
Since 1969 – when Colonel Gaddafi seized power in Libya – at least five countries have legislated to reintroduce some form of Islamic criminal law – Libya, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan and northern Nigeria. In several other states, the reintroduction is keenly debated, and is sometimes demanded by Islamist oppositionists.
Islamists often call for the establishment of Islamic states. In general, they consider the application of a strict form of sharia to be the key feature characterizing and authenticating the Islamicity of the state.
And in some quarters, adopting traditional sharia law became a popular demand. One reason for this was the perceived failure of modern state machineries to provide justice. “The doctrine of Islamic criminal law is attractive in societies where private justice or revenge prevails,” writes Rudolph Peters, “because it combines the idea of private prosecution with orderly judicial proceedings.”[1] Islamic jurisprudence may provide a level of community participation, expediency, and simplicity, which state courts have often failed to do.
Unstable regimes seeking legitimacy – often those who had arrived in power as a result of a military coup, as was the case in Libya, Sudan, and Pakistan – decided to consolidate their rule by applying some aspect of sharia law.
‘Hisba’ policing – most often of personal behavior – was formalized in modern Saudi Arabia (though the powers of the kingdom’s ‘Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice’ were dramatically curtailed in 2016). And ‘morality police’ appeared in various forms at various times in other countries, from the Gaza Strip to Indonesia.
The Hisba Diwan organized by ISIS in Syria and Iraq was the most authoritarian version of the concept yet seen.
Before ISIS, Raqqa’s population was mainly Muslim, and sometimes conservative. Nevertheless, the totalitarian ‘Islamic rule’ imposed by ISIS came as a shock to local people. Men in Afghan clothes wielding swords and machine guns, riding on horseback or in pick-ups, forbidding traditional customs and even cigarettes – all this was culturally alien to Raqqa.
The ISIS incarnation of the Hisba Diwan was the most severe and extreme version of the concept the world had seen. Like the Baathist police states in Syria and Iraq, the Hisba relied on a network of informers, a rule of fear, routine torture, and multiple prisons. Its punishments were remarkably harsh, combining the most severe Islamic penalties with Baathist interrogation and torture techniques.
ISIS and its Hisba Diwan didn’t come out of nowhere. They arose in a context of dictatorship, revolution, and two civil wars – in Iraq as well as in Syria.
Early in 2011, a revolution erupted in Syria against the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad and the Baath Party. In Raqqa – a city in north eastern Syria – many people joined the demonstrations.
At first the uprising was peaceful, centered around mass protest and civil resistance. But it was met by extreme counter-revolutionary violence. The Assad regime arrested and tortured tens of thousands of unarmed protestors. Many were killed in prison. Towns which joined the revolution were attacked, looted, put under siege, and shelled.
In this context, the revolution militarized. The first militias were local self-defense outfits, but these were soon swallowed by larger, more efficient actors. The Assad regime released over a thousand Jihadi prisoners in 2011, even as it rounded up democracy activists. Some of these men set about building military fiefdoms. Meanwhile, Jihadi fighters from other battlefields – Iraq, in particular – were moving to Syria.
The regime was also drawing on foreign help. The Islamic Republic of Iran helped Assad with advice, intelligence, financial credit, and weapons supply. Increasingly it sent ground troops too. These were Shia-Jihadi militiamen from as far away as Afghanistan. By early 2013, for instance, the Lebanese Shia militia Hizbullah was fighting large-scale battles against Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters, and expelling Sunni civilians from their villages.
These factors added a sectarian element to the spiraling war. Sectarianism was already entrenched in neighboring Iraq, where the civil war which followed the American invasion had pitted Iran-backed Shia militias against Sunni identity formations, chief among them the hyper-violent Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). The top leadership of the ISI was largely staffed by ex-officers of the deposed Saddam Hussein Baathist regime.
Raqqa fell out of regime control in March 2013. Assad’s troops withdrew as a rebel coalition approached the city. Though some non-Islamist Free Syrian Army brigades were involved, the two largest militias in the coalition were Ahrar al-Sham, a Syrian Salafi outfit, and Jabhat al-Nusra, the local branch of al-Qaida, which had a more international membership.
In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the ISI, went against the al-Qaida leadership to try to force Jabhat al-Nusra to merge with his organization. He failed, but at this point most of the Nusra fighters in Raqqa did defect to join the ISI, which now rebranded itself as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. By November 2013, reinforced by foreign fighters, ISIS had become the dominant power in the city. Its position was still disputed in battle by other factions, but by early 2014, though the FSA was pushing ISIS out of western Syria, the organization had cemented its control over Raqqa. Now it described itself not as a militia or an insurgency, but as a state. It recruited fighters from around the world, settling these foreigners in confiscated homes.
Three years earlier, the inhabitants of Raqqa had marched for “freedom, dignity and social justice”. Now they were subjected to another type of dictatorship. The new rulers brought together two totalitarian traditions. On the one hand, the authoritarian Salafi-Jihadism of al-Qaida honed into ever more extreme forms on the battlefield. On the other, the bureaucratic Baathist surveillance and detention state.
This was the context in which the Hisba Diwan was formed.
Sections of this investigation draw information from “The General Regulations of the Hisba Diwan”, a 106-page text written by and for ISIS members as they set up their governing mechanisms in Raqqa.
Published at the beginning of 2015 – so early in the ISIS ‘state’ project – the text depicts the Hisba at work in a society which is at once dystopian and idealistic. It is dystopian because of the severity of its punishments as well as its totalitarian nature – mosque imams are turned into spies, for instance. And it is idealistic in that it describes a well-regulated, carefully documented mechanism of repression.
Of course there was a divergence between theory and practice. The text prescribes harsh treatment, but the reality was often even worse. Further documents found by the ISIS Prisons Museum, as well as witness testimony,reveal the ways in which Hisba members strayed from the official guidance.
Authored by Yusuf bin Saleh al-Arabi and published on 1/7/1436 Hijri (corresponding to 20/4/2015 in the Gregorian calendar), the “General Regulations” reveals an insurgency eager to take on the trappings of a state. ISIS understood statehood in a very similar way to its Baathist predecessors in Syria and Iraq. Like them, it paid a totalitarian attention to the population’s thoughts, words and deeds. Like them, it showed an obsessive concern for bureaucracy. Though the laws enforced by the Hisba department were inspired by ancient religious texts, the mania to record and document belonged to the overbearing modern nation state.
The text lays out the organizational hierarchy and tasks of the Hisba Diwan. It also instructs the Hisba operative, or muhtasib, in the bureaucracy of the Hisba judicial system, specifying which forms and reports he should write in various cases, which details should be included in the reports, and the recommended punishments for various crimes.
The insistence on recording and filing continued throughout a victim’s detention. Long files were compiled during the interrogation process. Sometimes – in Rumaila prison, for instance – interrogation sessions were also audio taped.
The “General Regulations” attempts to translate every aspect of the Hisba Diwan’s intimidatory tactics into bureaucratic language, sometimes with very strange results. When arresting a suspected drinker of alcohol, for instance, the muhtasib is instructed to perform “sniffing operations” to ascertain that an alcoholic smell is emanating from the suspect’s mouth. The muhtasib should then note his findings in the arrest report.
The text also emphasizes the ISIS claim to statehood by frequently calling for coordination between the Hisba Diwan and other branches of government, including the Education Diwan, and of course the Dawa (Preaching) Diwan. In this regard, city and neighborhood mosques are considered part of the state too. It is their responsibility to promulgate Hisba rules and regulations, and to inform Hisba members when the rules are violated. Mosques and ISIS governance departments cooperated with the Hisba Diwan in various public propaganda campaigns – against TV satellite dishes, for example, or for the niqab and other forms of ‘Islamic’ dress.
The “General Regulations” often specifies punishments for violations of Hisba rules. For first offenses, violators were usually ordered to pledge in writing that they would change their behavior. After that, the most common penalties were flogging and imprisonment. The Hisba Diwan had its own dedicated prisons and detention centers – the prisons section of this investigation focuses on three of these.
Another punishment prescribed by the “General Regulations” is compulsory attendance at a sharia course, sometimes known as a “repentance course”. Those sentenced were expected to attend daily classes at a city mosque in order to be educated in correct behavior. Usually their ID card was held at a Hisba center until they had completed the course.
In many cases, the text instructs muhtasibs to refer prisoners to a sharia court of the Judiciary and Grievances Diwan for punishment. At other times, prisoners were sentenced in Hisba prisons by a qadi, or judge, who would rule according to his interpretation of Islamic scripture, and often according to his mood. Punishments included fines, property confiscations, floggings, amputations, and beheadings. Some of the punishments applied in practice but not mentioned in the “General Regulations” – mock executions, for instance – had no Islamic justification or precedent.
The text appears to be a work in progress. It sometimes includes typographical errors, and omits some information. In its opening pages, it addresses the Emirs (or top officials) of the other ISIS Diwans, and seeks their comments and corrections. It says it is to be used for a trial period of five months (from 1/7/1436, corresponding to 20/4/2015). In that time, high officials in the Hisba and other departments could add their corrections and updates.
Hisba is an Arabic word meaning ‘accountability’.
Diwan is an Arabic word which has been borrowed by various other languages including Turkish, Persian, and English. It has a range of meanings, including ‘a collection of poetry’ and ‘a type of couch’. But here it means ‘an administrative office, department, or governing body’.
The “General Regulations” states that, “The Hisba in the Islamic state is considered a legitimate supervisory authority, whose mission is to govern the people by enjoining them to do good if they have abandoned it, and to rebuke them from doing wrong if they have indulged in it.”
The text adds that the Hisba Diwan’s purpose is to make the people “do what is in accordance with sharia law” in terms of “beliefs, acts of worship, dealings, and etiquette.” It acts through “individuals charged by the imam to perform the task.” The ‘imam’ here means the ISIS ‘caliph’ or his representative.
The text quotes Ibn Khaldun and other historical authorities, and includes in the Hisba’s jurisdiction the tasks of “monitoring the markets, testing the quality of the goods and the occurrence of fraud”, “monitoring roads and preventing obstructions”, “preventing porters and ship owners from carrying too much”, and “ordering the people of dilapidated buildings to demolish them”. But the focus is on “the main mission” – that is, “encouraging prayer … and preserving public morals.”
The hierarchy of Hisba institutions rises from the local neighborhood branch through the office, then the center, to the central Diwan.
The Emir – or commander – of the Diwan was appointed by the Caliph or his representative. His tasks included nominating a deputy, drawing up the Hisba Diwan’s general policy, supervising the work of the provincial Hisba branches, submitting a monthly budget to the treasury for approval, and conducting periodic tours to supervise Hisba centers. He was also expected to submit reports to the Caliph, and to correspond with various heads of departments and committees regarding Hisba issues.
The Emir’s deputy assisted the Emir, and stood in for him in his absence.
The administrative officer, financial officer, follow-up officer, and case officer reported to the Emir or his deputy, as did the Emirs of the Hisba centers.
The Sharia Officer supervised the work of sharia legal experts in Hisba offices and organized sharia courses for Hisba employees.
The Machinery Officer was primarily responsible for maintaining the Hisba Center’s vehicles.
The local Hisba office reported upwards to the Hisba center, which in turn reported upwards to the central Hisba Diwan. A superintendent managed the office. The hierarchy of roles in the Hisba office is shown below.
The Prisons Officer was responsible for receiving those arrested by the field teams, along with their arrest records, and any confiscated goods. We know that certain of his other responsibilities were fulfilled in practice. For instance, the text says the Prisons Officer is responsible for “preparing a designated place for the interrogation of prisoners,” and every Hisba prison did indeed include an ‘investigations room’. Yet other responsibilities were ignored. The text requires the officer to “keep the prisoners in a place equipped with full services,” including “ventilation,” but in Hisba institutions such as the Wadi Street Prison or the Muawiyah School Prison, detainees were crammed into unventilated basements.
The Monitoring and Inspections Officer was responsible for combating commercial fraud and malpractice, as well as for verifying correct procedures in slaughterhouses.
The text concerning the Women’s Division is hedged with qualifications. A “clarification” on the female Hisba officials states: “They have no guardianship [or authority of their own]. Rather, they are the man’s sister in enjoining good and forbidding evil.” The text says that “a suitable headquarters for the Women’s Division” should be found, “completely isolated from the main and subsidiary Hisba headquarters.” The Women’s Division is responsible for “following up on everything that concerns women and any legal violations that they commit, for example in dress or manners,” and for “conducting sniffing operations” on women accused of drinking alcohol.
The Coach (or Garage) Office was dedicated to ensuring that women did not travel unless accompanied by a male relative. In certain cases it provided travel documents to women who did not have any surviving male relatives. It closed travel agencies which sold tickets to unaccompanied women, and arrested and punished the women concerned.
The Hisba branch reported upwards to the Hisba office, which reported upwards to the Hisba center.
The “General Regulations” states that violators should be detained in Hisba branches for no more than two days. The branches served as temporary holding centers, therefore. After the two-day period, detainees were either released or transferred to Hisba prisons.
Under the title “General Relations”, the text urges constant consultation and coordination, between the Hisba Diwan and the various other governance branches. These include the Caliph or his representative; the Dawa (Preaching) Diwan, and the mosques; the Judiciary and Grievances Diwan; the Research and Studies Diwan; the Education Diwan; the Health Diwan; the General Military Administration of the Army; the State Media; the Immigration Authority; the Real Estate Office; the Public Security Office; and the Provincial Governors.
As well as instructing Hisba members to advise and seek advice, and to present and receive reports from these authorities, the text makes some specific suggestions. For example, it says the Hisba and Education Diwans should coordinate to organize seminars on the work of the Hisba Diwan. And it recommends that the Hisba and Health Diwans coordinate in “combating evil in public and private hospitals and clinics.”
Task | The Provincial Governor’s Role | The Diwan’s role | Notes |
---|---|---|---|
Establishing a Hisba center in the province | Duty of the province | Supervision | |
The center’s administrative structure | Must be followed | Setting it up is mandatory | |
Work regulations | Must be followed | Setting them out is mandatory | If the governor finds that the regulations contradict the province’s sharia policy, the matter is submitted to the General Supervisory Committee for deliberation and a final decision |
Monitoring and supervision | Duty of the province | Duty of the Diwan | The power to issue orders lies with the governor. The Diwan keeps the records and corresponds, via the governor’s office, with the center to point out failures in compliance |
Monitoring and accountability | Duty of the province | Has the power to notify the governor and report failures to the Committee | |
Performance improvement | Offering suggestions | Duty of the Diwan | The province shall abide by what is authorized by the Diwan after approval from the General Supervisory Committee |
Securing centers | Duty of the province | ||
Recruiting staff | Duty of the province | Cooperation for suitable selection | |
Financial expenses
[grants, bonds, overhead, etc.] |
Duty of the province | ||
Grants and bonds | Duty of the province | ||
Center’s staff bonuses | Duty of the province | ||
Armament | Duty of the province | ||
Vehicles and cars expenses | Duty of the province | ||
Vehicles and cars transportation
(Within the province) |
Responsibility of the center’s Emir | – In coordination with the governor and precincts’ Emirs
– In the case of mobilization, it becomes the responsibility of the precincts’ Emirs who shall inform the center’s Emir in writing |
|
Center’s staff military duties | Duty of the province | ||
Necessary equipment
electronics – computers – walkie talkies |
Duty of the province | ||
Appointing the center Emir | In coordination with the Diwan | In coordination with the governor | In case of disagreement, and if the matter is not resolved within ten days, it shall be referred to the General Supervisory Committee |
Dismissing the Center Emir | Within the governor’s powers | If the dismissal is done without notice, a complaint can be submitted to the Committee | The Diwan shall be notified in writing a month in advance of the dismissal |
Vacations of the center Emir | Within the governor’s powers | Has the power to deny and delay vacations for work necessities | |
Appointing the center deputy Emir | In coordination between the governor
and the center’s emir |
Offering recommendation and advice | The governor has the power to make the final decision even if the center’s emir objects |
Dismissing the center deputy Emir | Within the governor’s powers | The center Emir should be notified ten days in advance | |
Vacations of the center deputy Emir | Within the center Emir’s powers | Requested from the governor if the vacation is outside the province | |
Appointing the center’s staff | Within the center Emir’s powers | ||
Dismissing the center’s staff | Within the center Emir’s powers | The governor is informed in writing of the reason for dismissal | |
Vacations of the center’s staff | Within the center Emir’s powers | Requested from the governor if the vacation is outside the province | |
Establishing offices in the precincts | Duty of the precincts’ Emirs | The Diwan should be informed in writing | |
Appointing office Emirs | Duty of precincts and center Emirs | In cases of disagreement, the matter is referred to the governor | |
Dismissing office Emirs | Within the governor’s powers | The office Emir should be informed five days in advance of the dismissal | |
Vacations of the offices Emirs | Within the precinct Emir’s powers | Requested from the governor if the vacation is outside the province | |
Appointing office staff | Within the center Emir’s powers | In coordination between the Emirs of the center and precinct | |
Dismissing office staff | Within the center Emir’s powers | In coordination between the Emirs of the center and precinct | |
Vacations of office staff | Within the office Emir’s powers | After approval of the precinct Emir. In cases of vacations outside the province, requests are submitted to the governor | |
Center correspondence | Within the governor’s powers | An official memo shall be sent to the province / center | The governor is responsible for its delivery within three days |
Diwan correspondence | Within the governor’s powers | The center corresponds with the Diwan via the governor. It can correspond with the Diwan directly while keeping the governor informed. | |
Training courses | Within the governor’s powers | Must be approved by the Diwan | The governor shall ensure members join the courses after their approval by the Diwan |
Mobilizing the center staff | Within the governor’s powers | ||
Mobilizing the office staff | Within the precinct Emir’s powers |
ISIS inherited a highly bureaucratic approach to statehood from the Assad and Saddam Hussein regimes. Every move required a great deal of paperwork.
The “General Regulations” states in detail the bureaucratic procedures required if a Hisba employee wished to transfer to a new area or role.
The employee had to make a formal transfer request stating where he wished to move, and why. The request had to be commented on, then signed and sealed by his superior officer. If the employee wished to be transferred to a Diwan other than the Hisba, he also had to win the approval of the provincial Hisba center. And he had to include the written approval of the officer under whom he intended to work in his new role. This officer too had to sign and seal the transfer request. Then the governor of the city or province had to approve it.
A copy of the request had to be lodged with the governor once it had been approved, and a copy of the approval had to be lodged with the Emir of the Hisba center.
The “General Regulations” also states that new recruits should not be enrolled in the Hisba Diwan without a document officially approving their transfer from their previous office.
A section of “The General Regulations” is dedicated to the tools available to the Hisba operative, or muhtasib. These ‘tools’ include everything from the building used as Hisba headquarters to the stamps and seals used on official correspondence.
The Hisba headquarters had to be located in a place well-known to local people.It needed a courtyard and enough parking spaces to accommodate Hisba vehicles. It was forbidden to install televisions or satellite receivers in Hisba headquarters.
The Hisba HQ in Raqqa was located at the Muawiyah School. Previously a secondary educational institution, the location fitted the text’s conditions very well – the school was well-known to everybody in the city. It consisted of three buildings around a large courtyard which provided spacious car parking.
The text describes various vehicles available to Hisba employees. These included motorcycles and small cars to be used for administrative or surveillance work, as well as large capacity cars and large capacity passenger buses (seating 15, 25, or 50 people) to be used in the field.
The vehicles had to be a uniform color, preferably white. The Hisba logo was printed on the back and both sides of Hisba cars and buses. Motorcycle windshields were printed with the logo.
Hisba vehicles had to be well maintained and periodically inspected, driven by qualified drivers only, and were not to be used for personal business.
Only work matters were to be discussed on these ‘walkie-talkie’ devices. The names of those arrested were not to be mentioned during these discussions.
Pistols could be distributed to Hisba members by the center Emir or the office superintendent, according to the circumstances. The pistols had to be handed back in when the task was completed.
The “General Regulations” specifies that the numerals used in the Arab world – as opposed to those used in Europe – should be used in official correspondence. The text states, wrongly, that “there is no truth to the claim that they are of Indian origin.”
All correspondence had to be written in classical Arabic, though it was permitted to write explanations in local dialect, so long as these words were placed between brackets. Even the font size was specified – no less than 14. When writing by hand, only blue or black pens could be used. And all correspondence had to adhere to a system of documentation which used serial numbers as well as lettered code for each province – e.g. ‘F’ for Furat (Euphrates) Province.
In the central Hisba Diwan, the Emir and the deputy Emir used their own respective red stamps, while the top financial and administrative officers used blue stamps. The various officers of the Hisba centers in the provinces used blue stamps only.
Each Hisba employee also carried an official card.
The Hisba Diwan’s logo is a calligraphed design in the shape of a ship. The ship’s hull is formed by the words ‘Hisba Diwan’, and the sail is formed by the words ‘the Islamic State’.
The design is inspired by a hadith related by al-Nu‘mān ibn Bashīr, which describes a ship on a river: “The example of the one who abides by the limits prescribed by Allah and the one who transgresses them is like the example of a people who boarded a ship after casting lots. Some of them were in its lower deck and others were in its upper deck. When those in the lower deck needed water, they had to go up and pass by those above them. So they said: ‘If we could make a hole in our share of the ship, we would not bother those above us.’ If those in the upper deck leave them to do as they wish, they will all perish, but if they stop them, they will all survive.”
Hisba Diwan employees, therefore, are likened to the upper deck passengers who must prevent the lower deck passengers from damaging the ship (or society) by their misguided acts.
In this photo released on April 17, 2015 by a militant website, which has been verified and is consistent with other AP reporting, a member of the Islamic State group’s vice police known as “Hisba,” patrols a market in Raqqa City, Syria. The Arabic words on the vest read, “The Islamic State – Hisba (vice police).” (Militant website via AP)
“The Best Nation” was a quarterly magazine issued by the Hisba Diwan. Its title was taken from the Quranic verse – “You are the best nation produced [as an example] for mankind. You enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and believe in Allah.” (3:110)
The magazine published topics related to Hisba jurisprudence, reports on the causes of evil behavior and how to suppress it, reports on the achievements of the Hisba centers in the provinces, and fatwas issued by the Research and Fatwa Committee.
The text states:
“There are other authorities in the Islamic state which act alongside the Hisba in establishing the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil, such as the Judiciary and Grievances, Dawa (Preaching), and Education Diwans, and others…”
These governing mechanisms work together for the general purpose of Hisba – holding people to account – and their work may therefore overlap.
But members of the Hisba Diwan interact with society more closely than the other branches. It is the muhtasib’s duty to order the public to pray on time, and to punish those who don’t with beatings and imprisonment.
As well as ‘the public’, the word ‘aam’ could be translated more pejoratively as ‘the generality’, or ‘the commoners’. Former detainees report that ISIS prison guards and fighters made a clear distinction in their speech between ‘the brothers’ and their families affiliated to the organization, on the one hand, and ‘the commoners’ – meaning everybody else – on the other.
According to the “General Regulations”, the tasks of the Hisba Diwan are “based on the requirements of public interest.” These requirements are “determined by the Imam” – not by consultation with the public itself.
The text quotes the medieval scholar al-Ghazali, who states that the muhtasib should prosecute every sin “which is apparent to him without spying,” and which “is known to be a sin without independent reasoning or interpretation (ijtihad).”
To be “apparent without spying,” the text says, a sin must be seen or heard by the muhtasib, or reliably reported to him. He is not permitted to search out sin by entering homes without permission. To be considered a sin unambiguously and “without independent reasoning,” the behavior must be clearly forbidden by the Quran, or described as a sin in “correct legal texts or by the consensus of the Muslims.”
In practice, the term “the consensus of the Muslims” meant the consensus of a select group of Salafi-Jihadi authorities. The application of severe punishments for smokers and cigarette dealers, for instance, departed from usual practice in Syria and other majority-Muslim societies in the region.
To distinguish between a debatable sin and a sin which is clearly forbidden, the text gives the example of a man who exposes his knees in public in contrast to a man who exposes his thighs. The sinfulness of exposing knees is debated by scholars, so this man should be rebuked gently. But scholars agree on the sinfulness of exposing thighs, so a man who does so should be “beaten and treated violently.”
“The Hisba Diwan,” the text declares, “is an independent authority in terms of organizing itself, defining powers, and distributing roles.”
It had its own budget, but the provincial authorities were responsible for managing the Hisba centers in their jurisdiction financially and administratively.
The Emir of the Hisba Diwan had his own headquarters in which to perform his tasks. He selected the Emirs of the provincial Hisba centers in consultation with the provincial governors.
These Emirs then selected the members of the Hisba offices and branches under their jurisdiction.
Hisba employees worked in one of four divisions:
The surveillance division was responsible for patrolling roads and markets, for arresting violators and transferring them to the Hisba branches and centers.
This division produced the interrogators and other officers responsible for ascertaining the guilt of those brought before them. The division’s “qualified students” decided on punishments and documented each case.
These operatives – including the guards in Hisba prisons – implemented the sentences and other orders issued by the Control and Investigations division.
This division was responsible for administrative and financial affairs.
“It is necessary for the muhtasib,” states the text, “in addition to guiding and directing people, to punish and discipline those who sin.” The purpose of punishment is “to deter wrong-doing and to suppress those with sick hearts.”
The Imam, or Caliph, has the right to impose ta‘zeer, or discretionary punishment. And the Caliph can transfer this right to others, including Hisba operatives.
On this basis, the muhtasib is authorized to impose the following punishments.
1. Beating, Corporal Punishment
2. Exile, temporary or permanent
3. Imprisonment
4. Monetary Fines
Fines were particularly recommended against those found in possession of forbidden items, such as musical instruments or alcoholic drinks.
5. Crucifixion
This involved tying (rather than nailing) the victim to a cross “for a period not exceeding three days.” A sign explaining the nature of the crime committed was pinned to or placed beside the victim.
6. Public Shaming
This involved denouncing the victim, parading him in marketplaces, and announcing his crime to the public.
7. Reproaching, Rebuking
8. Prohibiting Trade
The muhtasib could close the shops of violators, either temporarily or permanently.
9. Confiscation
Hisba officials confiscated not only contraband but also the cars used to transport it, and often the homes and land of those who bought and sold it.
The muhtasib, says the text, is obliged to order good and forbid evil. As he does so, he may seek help from volunteers, but there are important differences between the muhtasib and the mere volunteer.
1. The obligation to order good and forbid evil is specific to the muhtasib.
2. It is the right and duty of the muhtasib to hold people to account, and nobody can divert him from this purpose.
3. He is responsible for following up to ensure that sins have been properly suppressed.
4. He has the right to seek helpers in his work.
5. He has the right to impose discretionary punishments (ta‘zeer).
6. He has the right to draw a salary from the treasury.
7. He is permitted to produce his own rulings or interpretations (to perform ijtihad) concerning matters of custom or social behavior which are not legislated for by sharia.
In order to qualify as a Hisba operative in the first place, the candidate had to fulfill the following conditions.
– He had to have pledged allegiance and absolute obedience to ISIS.
– He had to have been tested in the arenas of jihad and rabat – in other words, in offensive and defensive fighting.
– He had to be known for good conduct and good reputation among his fellow mujahideen.
– He had to be enrolled in a course in Hisba etiquette, and then sit an examination.
– He had to avoid “everything that degrades his chivalry and reputation … such as eating in markets, laughing out loud, going out bareheaded, or the like.”
– He had to be over the age of twenty-five in order to work in the field, though administrative staff could be younger.
“The muhtasib,” says the text, “must have certain tools at his disposal so as to perform his tasks in a way that will gain him time, performance and prestige.”
The following tools are listed:
1. Special communication units in Hisba centers, so that extra men and vehicles can be deployed if necessary.
2. Official seals cast for high officials and offices.
The Hisba headquarters was provided with seals reading “Emir of the Hisba Diwan” and “Deputy Emir of the Hisba Diwan”. The provincial Hisba centers were provided with a seal reading “Emir of the Hisba Center in the Province of…”, and another reading “Administrative – Financial”. At the office level, there were “Hisba Superintendent”, “Office of Monitoring and Inspection”, and “Garage Office” seals. In the local branches, there were seals reading “Hisba Official”.
3. Official Hisba Diwan branded writing paper for correspondence.
4. Printers and paper provided in Hisba centers.
5. Vehicles provided in Hisba centers.
6. A standardized uniform for Hisba employees.
This was a dark brown gilet, with the official Hisba logo on front and back.
When arresting an offender, the muhtasib was required to collect and carefully document all the relevant information.
Specifically, he was instructed to listen to and record witness statements, as well as statements sought from “experienced doctors and others.” The confession of the person accused, if forthcoming, was also to be recorded, as was any evidence of the crime. The accused was to be closely observed, and prevented from concealing or destroying evidence.
Muhtasibs had the right to prevent those present from leaving the scene of the incident until statements had been made and recorded, and to prevent other people from entering the scene. They could also summon others who might have relevant information.
Male muhtasibs were forbidden from touching female suspects. In these cases, they were instructed to call on the Women’s Division to assist in the arrest. The “General Regulations” states that, “it is not permissible to handcuff a woman, whatever the reason.”
Only official Hisba vehicles were to be used to transport the arrested suspect.
When those arrested were suspected of involvement in “resistance, or tribal or clan subversion,” Hisba officials were instructed to coordinate with the governor of the province. Presumably these suspects were investigated for ‘security offenses’ as well as Hisba violations.
Once a suspect had been arrested by a Hisba patrol, he or she was taken to a Hisba center for further investigation. Each Hisba center had at least one dedicated investigations room. The investigators appointed for the task were usually local people who knew the environment well, rather than foreign ISIS members. While some investigations were brief, in other cases witnesses testify that sessions were lengthy and often repeated. Sometimes – particularly in Rumaila prison – they were conducted during the night.
The investigator was expected to interrogate the accused, to record their confessions, and to hear relevant witness statements. Indeed, the investigator was directed to confront the accused with these statements.
The “General Regulations” specifies that “a stick” is the only permissible tool with which to beat suspects during investigation, and that they can only be beaten on the feet. Women should not be beaten. Suspects should not be insulted during investigation.
The reality was somewhat different. In Relations with Society, the investigative standards required by the “General Regulations” are compared with the experiences described by former prisoners.
The muhtasib was granted the right to search suspected violators, as well as anyone suspected of concealing a crime or any instruments related to a crime. Specifically, he was granted the right to search a suspect’s body, clothes, wallet, and belongings.
He was also permitted to enter and search private homes – though not unannounced. In such cases the muhtasib was generally accompanied by the accused, though this was left to his discretion. The search had to be limited to areas of the home where instruments of a crime were suspected to be present. If it appeared to the muhtasib during his search that another person present (other than the accused) was concealing something, he was granted the right to search him too. He was instructed to carefully document any forbidden items discovered during the search.
It was necessary to obtain a search warrant before raiding a private home.
It was not permitted for a woman to be searched, regardless of the justification, except by another woman. In such cases a member of the Hisba Women’s Division was called in. If women who were not suspected of criminality were present in the home being searched, Hisba agents were instructed to allow them time to cover themselves, or if necessary to leave the building, before the search began.
Typical ‘instruments of crime’ discovered during Hisba raids included cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, stereos and musical cassettes, and articles of clothing.
Raids on homes and searches of suspected offenders often resulted in the confiscation of prohibited goods. These ranged from satellite dishes to forbidden books, from cartons of cigarettes to the cars used to transport cigarettes.
The muhtasib was instructed to carefully document the nature and quantity of the seized items. The relevant weights and numbers were to be recorded, as were the names of the owners of these items, and any confessions made.
If the confiscated items were not necessary for the process of a legal case, they had to be destroyed. Such items included tobacco, alcohol, narcotics, and banned audio, visual and printed materials. The type and quantity of materials thus disposed of had to be carefully documented in a ‘destruction report’. Muhtasibs were expected to ensure that the confiscated goods were destroyed completely.
Confiscated items were not to be destroyed in a way that would harm people, their property, the roads, or the air quality. If confiscated goods were burnt, this should be done outside city limits, and not in a residential area. Yet – as so often – practice diverged from principle. On several occasions, for instance, huge piles of cigarette cartons were burnt at Raqqa’s al-Naim roundabout, polluting the city air.
Some seized items were not destroyed immediately, but were to be put in a closed bag and placed in the keeping of the head of a Hisba center or a sharia official, until a destruction order was issued. Confiscation orders were issued for larger items which ISIS could use – cars which had been driven by smugglers, for instance.
Hisba prisons usually contained areas dedicated to the storage of contraband. In the Muawiyah School Prison, for example, entire rooms were filled with confiscated goods.
The “General Regulations” text details the characteristics required of a Hisba prison or detention center. These conditions were generally fulfilled in practice. Prisons had to be fortified, for instance – and Hisba members did indeed fortify the buildings they seized. They barred up windows and installed bars, concrete slabs, and metal doors in order to more closely confine detainees.
And the text says prisoners should be carefully monitored. This was done in practice by installing surveillance cameras, by guards looking through openings in cell doors, and by guards bursting into cells without warning. In some cases, informers were planted in cells to report on prisoners’ speech and behavior.
In terms of basic prisoner welfare, the text specifies that a minimum of two meals a day should be served, and that drinking water should always be available. These conditions too were met, though in the latter period of ISIS rule a ‘meal’ sometimes consisted of a mere two wraps of bread. Relatives of prisoners were permitted “to bring the prisoner what he needs in terms of clothing or treatment, etc.” Again, this did actually happen. In many cases relatives were able to send food and other items to detained family members, but in other cases, medical treatment was deliberately withheld from prisoners, even if their relatives had brought the necessary medicine. No mention is made in the “General Regulations” of prison visits by medical professionals, and indeed many witnesses testify that the guards refused to allow doctors to visit seriously ill prisoners. And in some cases Hisba officials refused to inform relatives of their loved one’s whereabouts. They told at least one mother that her son had been executed, though he was still alive and being held in a Hisba prison.
Some of the text’s directives are concerned with controlling the prisoner’s psychological state. It says, for instance, that television screens should be installed in prisons to display visual and audio material provided by “state media”. In most Hisba prisons, for most of the time, prisoners were indeed obliged to watch ISIS propaganda videos. These featured battle scenes as well as graphic recordings of beheadings and floggings performed in public places. Several witnesses attest that these videos greatly increased their feelings of terror and despair.
The text also asserts that the prisoner should not be told how long his imprisonment would last. This is described as “a form of punishment for him.” And witness testimonies accord with this. Prisoners were not informed how long their detention would last, when they would be released, or if they would be released. This added to their psychological discomfort.
Hisba prisons were also designed to control prisoners’ religious observance. The “General Regulations” explains that prisoners should be compelled to perform the obligatory acts of worship, such as prayer and fasting, and that preachers from the ISIS Dawa (Preaching) Diwan should visit prisons to teach religious lessons. Witness testimonies attest that this did indeed happen. The prisoners all prayed at prayer time, either out of conviction or because they knew they were being carefully watched. ISIS-approved religious books were made available to the prisoners, and in some prisons religious lessons were given regularly by ISIS preachers.
While most of the “General Regulations” directives were closely observed, some were clearly not. One directive stated that children and adults should not be detained in the same place, yet witnesses attest that children were often held in the same cells as adults. Another directive stressed that a prison or detention center had to be “spacious and well ventilated.” Yet often the opposite was true. In the Muawiyah School Prison and the Wadi Street Prison, for example, prisoners were crammed into basement rooms where there was no ventilation at all. The experience of detention in these spaces was defined by intense humidity and foul smells as well as a lack of natural light.
The term ‘ta‘zir’ refers to punishments which are not clearly specified by Islamic scripture. In these cases, punishments were to be decided at the discretion of “he who possesses knowledge of sharia” – in other words, one of the sharia officials.
Strict standards of evidence are required for the ‘hadd’ sentences specified in scripture to be carried out, but not for ta‘zir punishments. So, for example, a man who spends time alone in a house with a woman of bad reputation – and who is therefore suspected of fornication – cannot be punished under hadd regulations unless there are four male witnesses to the actual sexual act. But the man can be imprisoned and flogged at the discretion of a qadi, or judge.
‘Discretionary’ flogging was only to be performed in the Hisba headquarters or subsidiary Hisba centers. If, however, a sharia official or an office superintendent decided there was a good reason to do it elsewhere – in a public place, for instance – then the provincial governor’s permission had to be sought. A “whip” had to be used for flogging. In practice, this could mean a variety of objects, including electrical cables and hosepipes.
If the Hisba officials wished to impose discretionary punishments other than flogging – such as ordering the demolition of shrines – then they had to coordinate with the provincial authorities.
The “General Regulations” warns Hisba operatives not to resort to shaving a violator’s head as a discretionary punishment, unless the violation is related to his hairstyle. This is because “cutting the hair unnecessarily is a pre-Islamic practice which should be avoided.”
In the month of Ramadan, Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset. Even before ISIS seized power, almost everybody in Raqqa was careful not to eat, drink or smoke in public during Ramadan. Many people chose to fast. Others didn’t, but they ate in private so as not to disturb their neighbors. And almost every Muslim in Raqqa understood the regulations concerning fasting. These were things they learnt from their families as they grew up, as well as in the local mosques. Yet ISIS felt it needed to launch a campaign to enforce fasting, and to legislate against fast-breaking. This work fell to the Hisba Diwan.
Hisba officials patrolled the streets looking for people breaking the fast. If they caught anyone, the “General Regulations” instructed them to “seize evidence indicating the crime (such as food remains, or smell),” and to record the testimony of witnesses present.
The fast-breaker would then be questioned. It was necessary to determine if he had broken the fast for a legitimate reason. Muslims are exempt from fasting if they are traveling, ill, or mentally incapable. The very young and very old are automatically exempt. Muslim women are exempt while menstruating, and during pregnancy and breastfeeding.
If the Hisba officials decided someone had broken the fast with good reason, they simply “advised” the person not to eat or drink in public. But the penalty for someone who broke the fast publicly and without a recognised excuse, was to make “a written pledge of repentance to God Almighty”, to attend a compulsory sharia course, and to be flogged with 70 lashes.
The Hisba superintendent or sharia official could decide whether to flog the fast-breaker in the Hisba center or in public. It was sometimes considered ‘in the public interest’ to flog miscreants in front of a crowd.
If someone repeatedly broke the fast, he was arrested and referred to a sharia court for further punishment.
As for restaurants, cafés, juice shops, and snack shops, these were strictly prohibited from operating during the daytime in Ramadan, even from serving “non-Muslims from among the people of the dhimma.”
(The phrase ‘people of the dhimma’ suggests Jewish or Christian communities receiving protection in return for payment of a special ‘jizya’ tax. In practice, there was no Jewish community in Raqqa, and most Christian residents fled as soon as ISIS took over.)
The Hisba Diwan warned all vendors of food and drink not to serve customers during fasting hours. Hisba patrols followed up by raiding restaurants unannounced in search of violations. Those guilty of serving customers were ordered to write pledges of repentance. If they repeated the offense, their restaurants were closed for three days.
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The Hisba Diwan took it upon itself to monitor people’s observance of the five daily prayers. It focused on three kinds of violators: merchants who continued to trade at prayer time, those who missed congregational prayers in the mosque, and those who failed to pray even at home.
Shops were ordered to close as soon as the prayer was called from the mosques. Hisba vehicles also circulated, broadcasting the call over loudspeakers. Around 20 minutes passes between the call and the commencement of prayer. This time was to be spent in ablutions and other preparations for worship, not in commercial activity.
Shops were prevented from opening again until 20 minutes had passed after the start of the prayer. The time was shortened to 15 minutes after the maghrib (sunset) prayer.
Punishments for violators are listed as follows:
For a first offense, the shop would be closed for two days. For a second offense, the shop would be closed for a week. For a third offense, the store would be closed for 15 days. If the trader continued to open during prayers after that, his shop would be closed for three days each time, and he would be fined “a gram of gold or its value in local currency” for each accumulated violation. Each time the shop was closed, the trader had to mount a sign on the shop front confessing the reason for the closure.
Several hadith encourage Muslim men to pray in congregation with others. (Women are permitted to pray at home.) This recommendation was interpreted by ISIS as an obligation to be enforced. To this end, neighborhood mosque imams were given a police role. It became their responsibility to take a tally of the men present at prayers, to record those absent, and to visit them in order to ‘advise’ them that they should pray in the mosque. If the absentees didn’t then mend their ways, they would be reported, and summoned to the local Hisba office for questioning.
Those found after investigation to have been saying their prayers at home would be shown scriptural backing for congregational rather than solitary prayer. Then they had to provide a written pledge that they would pray in the mosque thereafter.
Those found after investigation to not have been praying at all would have to make a written pledge to pray in future. They would also be obliged to attend a sharia ‘repentance’ course.
Those who continued to miss congregational prayers after pledging to attend were sentenced to 30 lashes and three days in prison, as well as attendance at another sharia course. If they were recorded as absent from prayers for a third time, they were referred to a sharia court for sentencing.
As well as forcing men to pray, ISIS organized campaigns to stress the necessity of congregational worship. The “General Regulations” calls on the Hisba and the Dawa (Preaching) Diwans to coordinate to this end. It also recommends coordination with “state media” in order to post banners in public places to promote prayer in mosques.
A section of the “General Regulations” deals with what are called “creedal crimes” – that is, crimes against correct belief. They divide into three categories: blasphemy, sorcery, and heresy.
These offenses are described by the “General Regulations” as “Cursing God Almighty”, “Cursing the Prophet”, and “Cursing Religion.”
If someone was charged as a result of a complaint made by an informer or a member of the public, Hisba operatives were instructed to record all the relevant details, including the time, date and place of the complaint, the names and addresses of witnesses, and the names of arresting officers. The statements of witnesses and of the accused were to be recorded verbatim.
If, on the other hand, the accused was caught in the act of blasphemous speech, Hisba members were to carefully record what they had heard him or her saying, and how they had heard it. The mental state of the accused was also documented. (Though this didn’t necessarily help his case. In 2016, for instance, a man called Majid was sentenced to death for “cursing God” during a family argument. During investigation, he said he had been in a state of despair when he spoke. Nevertheless, in the document recording the death sentence, the judge writes, “His repentance is not accepted.”)
The accused in these cases were always referred to a sharia court for punishment..
People could also be arrested for “swearing by other than God.” The Hisba Diwan worked with the Dawa (Preaching) Diwan and the mosques to ensure that the public was made aware of the seriousness of this violation.
First-time offenders were sentenced to 30 lashes, three days imprisonment, and compulsory attendance at a sharia course. Second-time offenders were sentenced to 90 lashes and ten days imprisonment. If they continued to offend after that, they were referred to a sharia court for further punishment.
In Raqqa’s traditional culture, a few people practiced magic in order to bring luck or love, or to curse their enemies. ISIS did its best to stamp out these customs.
When people were accused of practicing magic or sorcery, the muhtasib, as usual, was required to write a detailed report. This included information on the origin of the case – whether it had been opened following an informer’s report, for example – as well as a description of the “crime scene” and any paraphernalia found. The accused and the crime scene were to be searched, and the accused’s statement was to be recorded. Then any ritual items (such as necklaces, amulets, or veils) were destroyed, and the accused was referred to a sharia court for judgment.
ISIS persecuted its religious rivals as fiercely as its political opponents. As well as other Muslim sects, these included all expressions of Sunni Islam not aligned to the organization. Non-ISIS Salafi-Jihadists were considered political enemies – and therefore were detained in ‘security’ rather than Hisba prisons, but Sufis were often persecuted by the Hisba Diwan. This is because ISIS identified Sufism with sorcery.
Sufism – a term covering various mystical currents in Islam – was the dominant form of religion in Raqqa before the rise of Salafism. Because Sufis traditionally visited the shrines of holy men, ISIS referred to them as ‘qubouriyeen’, or grave worshippers. ISIS destroyed Sufi shrines. Its most serious act of repression against a Sufi figure was the execution of 90-year-old Sheikh Muhammad Tawfiq Ajjan al-Hadid in December 2014.
Muhtasibs were instructed to monitor and arrest those suspected of “deviant beliefs”, and to search their homes if necessary. The accused were then referred to a sharia court for judgment.
The “General Regulations” dedicates a section to shops and services designed for women. It instructs muhtasibs to make an inventory of such ‘salons’, which could offer sewing, hairdressing, cosmetics, and henna services. Anything else was prohibited
The text worries that women’s salons provide opportunities for various sins. These include the following:
Eyes, feet and arms are given as examples of body parts which women must cover in public, even amongst other women. Most Islamic scholars state that a woman’s face, hands and feet do not need to be covered in public, so ISIS is imposing its own interpretation here, as so often.
Muhtasibs would close the salon for three days for a first offense, and ten days for the second. The owner was ordered to place signage on the shop front explaining the reason for the closure. In the event of a third offense, the salon was closed permanently.
The offending clothes were confiscated, and the woman’s male guardian (her father, for instance, or husband) was obliged to buy her a suitable cloak. The guardian was also subjected to corporal punishment: “Whoever brought her [to market] or knew that she was going out in this manner will be punished by being flogged with 20 lashes in front of the woman.”
Public bathing was forbidden, presumably because it involved a degree of nakedness. The facility owner was obliged to produce a written undertaking that the hammam would be removed or dismantled within three days. Otherwise, the facility was closed until the hammam was removed.
Pictures of models were permissible only if they were blurred.
Shops that sewed gowns in a way that violated Hisba standards were closed for three days for a first offense. This rose to a month’s closure for a fourth offense. After a fifth offense, the shop was closed permanently.
Shop owners were ordered to hang a sign prohibiting women from entering unescorted. This was not necessary if the shop was open to view so those inside could be seen by passers-by. Women were permitted to shop in groups, or if they were accompanied by a male child.
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The male shop owner had to provide a written pledge to not sell women’s underwear. He could, however, appoint a woman of his family to do so, so long as he hung a sign on the shop front prohibiting men from entry.
Fitting rooms were banned on the basis that women should only dress and undress in the privacy of their homes. Hisba officials were expected to coordinate with “the state’s media” to hang signs at market entrances explaining that fitting rooms were prohibited.
These were banned.
The text advises muhtasibs to prevent offending women from entering markets if they were “caught red-handed” breaking the rules. Such women had to be “advised” and “rebuked.” If it was deemed necessary, they could be arrested and brought to the nearest Hisba center or office. Hisba officials were responsible for obliging women to wear “full hijab.” Then the women had to provide a written pledge that they would not offend again. Their male guardians also had to pledge to better control them in the future.
Shop owners were required to pledge in writing that they would obey the rules. Their shops were closed if they failed to do so. If they violated Hisba regulations repeatedly, they were closed permanently.
The text recommends surprise field patrols to ensure compliance. It stresses the important role played here by the Hisba Diwan’s Women’s Division, as well as “cooperating sisters.” It recommends that patrols consist of at least two muhtasibs. The muhtasibs are advised not to raise their voices when they discipline women, nor to rebuke them through the loudspeakers of their vehicles.
The text also recommends establishing a women’s-only market under the supervision of the Women’s Division.
Muhtasibs patrolled and policed parties in private homes as well as in rented halls. When it came to wedding receptions, however, they were required by the “General Regulations” to act tactfully while carrying out their work, “so as not to create chaos … taking into account people’s joy on such occasions.” If the groom was found guilty of a violation, the text recommends summoning him for investigation later rather than arresting him during the reception itself. It seems ISIS recognized that ruining weddings – enormously important social events in Raqqa – might provoke resistance.
The text lists three types of violation connected to parties and receptions which were of particular concern:
Both the owner of the wedding hall and the person who hired the space had to pledge in writing to keep men and women separated at all times. If men and women did mix, they were arrested, and the wedding reception was moved to another location.
In the event of a repeat violation, the wedding hall was closed for three days. For a third offense, it was closed for a full month. If there was a further violation, the hall owner was forbidden from managing the space again. In addition, he was imprisoned for three days and flogged with 30 lashes.
Again, the hall owner and the person hiring the space had to pledge not to allow music or singing. This applied equally to live and recorded music. If anyone did play music or sing, they were arrested, and the reception was moved to another location. The “tools used for sinning” – cassette or CD players, speakers, musical instruments, and so on – were confiscated.
This category covered birthday parties as well as celebrations of Christmas and other “infidel festivals.” The owners of event halls had to pledge not to host such parties. If a party was discovered in a private home, it was immediately stopped, and the owner or renter of the house was summoned for investigation. All the paraphernalia of the party – Christmas trees, musical equipment, decorations, and so on – was confiscated.
The strict Salafi brand of Islam followed by ISIS held that a grave should be marked only by a stone no more than a hand span in height.
The Hisba Diwan – in coordination with the mosques and the Preaching Diwan – campaigned to raise awareness of this ruling. What had been a matter of personal and family preference now became law.
Shrines were to be destroyed where at all possible, and as quickly as possible. ISIS bomb squads were called in for the purpose. If a shrine keeper or attendant could be located, he was referred to a sharia court for sentencing. So too was anyone caught visiting a shrine.
Shrines were associated by ISIS either with Sufism or Shi’ism, and – because shrines focused on particular holy men rather than on God alone – with polytheism.
It was forbidden to build structures over graves, plaster them, or embellish them by writing names. As for already existing grave structures, sharia officials began a campaign to remove them.
The “General Regulations” recommends coordination with the Financial Authority to “profit from the marble” removed from graves. Meanwhile, marble merchants and workshops were ordered not to produce or sell grave structures. Calligraphers and carvers were ordered likewise not to write names on gravestones.
Placards were raised at graveyard entrances prohibiting structures and adornments, as well as grave stones higher than a hand span.
The penalties for metal workers, marble merchants, and calligraphers who helped build up or adorn graves were as follows:
The first time, a warning, and a written pledge. For a second offense, the business was closed for three days. For a third offense, the business was closed for a month. If the business continued to offend after that, it was closed down permanently.
If the mosque had been built before the grave was added, then the grave was exhumed and the remains reburied in a graveyard. But if the grave preceded the mosque – then the mosque was demolished.
Crosses were permitted in Christian graveyards, but only so long as they were not visible to passersby. This applied to Christians who were “people of the dhimma” – those who received protection in return for payment of the jizya tax. But crosses on the graves of “muharabeen” – Christians who had not submitted to ISIS, or who lived in areas outside ISIS control – had to be destroyed.
The Hisba Diwan banned the common practices of families pasting funeral notices to walls, or erecting banners or mourning tents in memory of the deceased. The text directs muhtasibs to coordinate with the Traffic Department to stop people setting up mourning tents on the roads.
Calligraphers and print shops were obliged to sign pledges that they wouldn’t write or print obituaries.
Like many states, ISIS banned narcotics absolutely. Unlike some, its approach to addicts was entirely punitive, never therapeutic.
The Hisba Diwan was responsible for pursuing, arresting, and punishing drug users. The “General Regulations” divided narcotics-related crime into the following categories: abuse, possession, dealing, cultivation, and smuggling.
If a drug user was caught while consuming drugs, or under the influence, his mental state and behavior had to be noted in the muhtasib’s arrest report, along with the amount of the drug consumed. The muhtasib seized any relevant residues or tools. The drug user was then referred to a sharia court for punishment.
Anyone found in possession of drugs was arrested and detained. The arrest report detailed the type and amount of drugs seized.
There was a standard punishment for first-time offenders: 90 lashes, a month’s imprisonment, and compulsory enrolment in a sharia course. Repeat offenders were referred to a sharia court for further punishment.
Drug dealers were arrested and detained. The arrest reports had to detail the type and amount of drugs seized. In these cases, further property searches were sometimes called for.
The standard punishment for first-time dealers was the same as for those found guilty of possession – 90 lashes, a month’s imprisonment, and compulsory attendance of a sharia course. But there was an extra penalty too. The Hisba Diwan confiscated any vehicle used to deal drugs. Repeat offenders were referred to a sharia court for further punishment.
If Hisba officials discovered a narcotics plantation (presumably of hashish, or opium), they were tasked with recording the size of the crop, and then assigning someone to uproot and destroy the plants.
The punishment for first-time cultivators was the same as that for dealers – 90 lashes, a month’s imprisonment, and compulsory attendance of a sharia course. The extra penalty in this case was that ownership of the land used for cultivation – if it belonged to the cultivator – was
transferred to “the Muslims’ treasury” – that is, to ISIS. Repeat offenders were referred to a sharia court.
As well as arresting smugglers, Hisba operatives were tasked with recording the method and means of smuggling as well as the type and quantity of drugs seized. Any vehicles or other property (such as warehouses or storage units) used in the smuggling operation were to be reported and searched.
Once again, first-time offenders were sentenced to 90 lashes, a month’s imprisonment, and compulsory attendance on a sharia course. Any vehicles used in smuggling were confiscated. Repeat offenders were referred to a sharia court for further punishment.
The consumption of alcohol is one of the few things expressly forbidden by the Quran, and ISIS strictly enforced the rule. Raqqa’s bars were closed, and its drinkers monitored. Society had previously left the matter to discretion and a person’s conscience. Now the Hisba Diwan fielded informants to track suspected offenders.
As with narcotics, the Hisba Diwan divided alcohol-related crimes into: abuse, possession, dealing, and smuggling. Instead of cultivation, the crime of manufacture was added.
Punishments were similar to those for narcotics offenses, but a little less severe. If drinkers were driving when apprehended, their cars were impounded.
In the event of a drinker being caught red-handed, the muhtasib was instructed to conduct a “sniffing operation” to confirm the smell of alcohol on his breath. If the accused was a woman, women appointed by the muhtasib carried out the “sniffing operation.”
Any “tools of the crime” – such as beverages or bottles – were seized and documented. The mental state of the miscreant was also noted.
In every case, drinkers were referred to a sharia court for punishment. If they were driving while drunk, their cars were impounded for 15 days on a first offense, and for a month on a second offense. For further offenses, drink drivers were fined in gold.
Anyone in possession of alcohol was arrested and detained. Beverages, bottles and any other paraphernalia were confiscated. The types and amounts of alcohol were carefully recorded.
A first-time offender was sentenced to 70 lashes, 10 days imprisonment, and compulsory attendance on a sharia course. A second-time offender was sentenced to 90 lashes, a month’s imprisonment, and compulsory attendance on a sharia course. Those who offended three or more times were referred to a sharia court for further punishment.
Those accused of manufacturing alcohol were arrested and referred to a sharia court for punishment. Any tools and machinery used in manufacture were confiscated.
The muhtasib was responsible for documenting the location and characteristics of the winery, as well as the quantities of materials found there. He was required to distinguish between the amount of finished alcohol and the amount of liquid still in manufacture. A detailed statement was taken from the accused before his transferral to a Hisba detention center, and then to court.
Once it had been thoroughly searched, and every detail noted, the winery was totally destroyed.
The procedures recommended for use against alcohol traders show the importance of informers to the Hisba Diwan’s surveillance system. The “General Regulations” explains how an informer should be provided with money in order to purchase alcohol. The amount provided had to be carefully recorded, because it would be used as evidence. Every detail of the conversation between the informer and the trader had to be recorded.
Once muhtasibs had gathered sufficient evidence, they made arrests. Those charged were referred to a sharia court. Any vehicles used to transport alcohol were confiscated.
Smugglers bringing alcohol into ISIS territory were arrested as a result of informers’ reports, or sometimes after ambushes by Hisba agents. As usual, the muhtasib was instructed to write a detailed and thorough arrest report.
The “General Regulations” only specifies the punishment for a first-time offender: 90 lashes, and a month’s imprisonment. The vehicles used for smuggling were confiscated. Presumably repeat offenders were referred to a sharia court for judgment.
ISIS banned tobacco absolutely. This presented a huge challenge to the many smokers living in areas controlled by the organization. Those who continued to supply Raqqa and nearby areas with cigarettes could therefore make a reasonable living, but also faced enormous risks, including imprisonment, flogging, and the confiscation of wealth and property. Those who took the risks usually did so because they had no other economic options. While cigarette smugglers and large-scale dealers were generally men, the small-scale traders were often women, particularly widows and single mothers in desperate need.
Whenever cigarettes were found – whether they belonged to a smoker, a possessor, a dealer or a smuggler – they were confiscated and destroyed. The offender was punished according to the crime:
Anyone smoking in public was arrested immediately. They were obliged to provide a written pledge not to reoffend, and they were flogged with ten lashes. They were ordered to reveal who had sold them the tobacco. A sharia official or superintendent could also fine offenders if they chose.
The penalty for a second offense was 30 lashes and enrolment in a sharia course. For a third offense, it was three days’ imprisonment, 50 lashes, and enrolment in a sharia course. For a fourth offense, it was ten days’ imprisonment, 90 lashes, and enrolment in a sharia course. For a fifth offense, it was a month’s imprisonment, 90 lashes, and enrolment in a sharia course. For a sixth offense, it was three days’ imprisonment, 90 lashes, and a fine of a quarter gram of gold for each cigarette found in the offender’s possession.
The penalty for a first offense was 30 lashes, enrolment in a sharia course, and a fine of a quarter gram of gold for each carton of cigarettes. For a second offense, it was seven days’ imprisonment, 70 lashes, and a fine of a quarter gram of gold for each carton. For a third offense, it was a month’s imprisonment, 90 lashes, and a fine of a quarter gram of gold for each carton. If a smoker was caught in possession of tobacco after that, they were referred to a sharia court for sentencing.
The penalty for a first offense was ten days imprisonment, 50 lashes, enrolment in a sharia course, and a fine of a quarter gram of gold for each carton of cigarettes found. If a car was used for trading cigarettes, it was impounded. For a second offense, the penalty was a month’s imprisonment, 90 lashes, and a fine of a quarter gram of gold for each carton. This time the car was permanently confiscated, even if it didn’t belong to the offender. If a dealer continued to trade after that, they were referred to a sharia court for sentencing.
The penalty for a first offense was a month’s imprisonment, 50 lashes, enrolment in a sharia course, and a fine of a quarter gram of gold for each carton of cigarettes found. Any vehicle used to smuggle more than 20 cartons of cigarettes was permanently confiscated, no matter who owned it. For a second offense, the penalty was two months’ imprisonment, 90 lashes, and a fine of a quarter gram of gold for each carton. Once again, any vehicle used for smuggling was confiscated. If a smuggler offended a third time, they were referred to a sharia court for sentencing.
All sexual relations outside of marriage were strictly prohibited. In all cases, the accused were referred to a sharia court for sentencing.
The text states that “fornication is proven by two things, either confession, or the testimony of a witness – and the second has not been successfully used as proof since Islam’s first emergence.”
The offender’s confession was therefore necessary for conviction. According to the text, the confession of only one party to a sexual relationship was sufficient to convict the other partner too. The text stresses the importance of “precisely recording the confessions of those arrested.” It also tells the muhtasib to use “legal, sharia language” in his report as he describes the state in which he has discovered the suspects, and any “evidence of the crime.”
If there was video evidence of the fornication, it had to be watched carefully, but not by an unmarried official and not by only one person. Three married muhtasibs had to watch the video together. The details of what was seen were added to the report. The video and any other evidence was then kept in a sealed archive by the center superintendent, and was destroyed once the case had been concluded.
The text calls this “the act of Lot’s people” – referring to the Quranic (and Biblical) story of the Prophet Lot and the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah.
Again, as well as taking statements from the parties to the case, the muhtasib is instructed to gather as much evidence as possible, including letters, pictures, and witness statements.
The text says cases of lesbianism are generally not proven unless a video recording comes to the attention of Hisba officials, or unless a complaint supported by visual evidence is made. If there is video evidence, then the muhtasib should mandate women of his choice to watch the video to ascertain if the woman accused is the same woman as in the video.
When arresting a pander (or pimp), the muhtasib was responsible for documenting the means by which he had committed the crime – by using the telephone or the internet, for example, or by bringing the customer to a brothel or a private home.
Muhtasibs watched out carefully for illicit relations between men and women. That is, for any unaccompanied contact between unrelated men and women.
If a man was found to be taking advantage of his work to pursue illicit relationships, then he was stopped from working in that field.
The “General Regulations” advises muhtasibs against writing such phrases in their arrest and referral reports as “the person detained has fornicated, or committed sodomy.” This reflects the social sensitivity of such accusations.
The text appears to make no distinction between unwanted harassment and consenting relationships – though it is left to Hisba officials to decide whether or not to summon a woman for investigation and punishment.
Any man talking to an unrelated woman was arrested. The muhtasib had to record all the details of the case, and any evidence, in his arrest report.
If the case resulted from a complaint, the muhtasib had to carefully record every detail, including the telephone numbers involved, the number of calls, what was said during the calls, and so on.
A sharia official or office supervisor could summon the woman in question for investigation if they chose.
If an unrelated man and woman were found together in a car, the muhtasib arrested them. He noted all the relevant details in his report: how the offenders had sat in the car, how their relationship had begun and how long it had lasted, whether the offenders had pictures of each other on their phones, and so on.
Offenders had to be arrested immediately, unless they might lead the Hisba patrol to a “house of corruption,” in which case they were followed.
If an unrelated man and woman were discovered walking together in a public place, they were to be immediately arrested.
All the violations listed above led to the same set of punishments. The penalty for a first offense was three days in prison, 30 lashes, and enrolment in a sharia course. For a second offense, it was ten days in prison and 70 lashes. For a third offense, it was 15 days in prison and 90 lashes. These punishments could be increased if a sharia official or office superintendent saw fit.
Anyone who offended for a fourth time was sent to a sharia court for sentencing.
If a man entered a house where a woman was alone, it was better to arrest him before he could commit any crime. But “if it is necessary to raid the house, precautions must be taken.”
So the man, or the couple, were apprehended. If repeated meetings between them were proven – or if a muhtasib simply decided it was necessary – then one or both of them were referred to a sharia court for sentencing. But if it was the first time they’d been alone in a house, the penalty for the man was ten days imprisonment, 90 lashes, and enrollment in a sharia course. The offending woman and her male guardian were summoned to the Hisba office, where she was flogged with 30 lashes before pledging not to offend again.
If the illicit sexual act was recorded on video, the muhtasib had to mandate a woman to watch the clip in order to ascertain if the accused woman was the woman involved.
In such cases, muhtasibs were instructed to carefully document all relevant details, to arrest the suspect as soon as possible, and to seize whatever incriminating material was in his possession.
The text doesn’t specify penalties for this offense. This omission may have been made in error.
Various sins were associated with buses and coaches:
Drivers were forbidden from decorating their vehicles with veils, amulets, or other objects that might be identified with sorcery.
Destination information and certain religious texts were permitted. Everything else was not.
Drivers were not permitted to hang toys or other such statues or pictures of people or animals in their vehicles.
Music was prohibited on public transport, whether it was recorded or broadcast on the radio.
Vehicle owners were obliged to separate male and female seating.
It was strictly prohibited for women of any age to leave their province without a mahram – that is, a male guardian, such as a father, brother, or husband. Only those in possession of a transit document stamped by the garage office were exempt from the rule.
Female teachers, students and workers were absolutely forbidden from traveling to “the areas of the Nusayri regime” – in other words, Assad regime territory. On the other hand, women traveling from “the land of disbelief” (“dar al-kufr” – a reference to any territory beyond ISIS control) were permitted to enter ISIS lands even without a mahram.
If a woman’s mahram turned out to be a foreigner, both she and the foreigner were arrested.
Muhtasibs were responsible for explaining the rules, and for obtaining written pledges of obedience from drivers. They were also advised to set up awareness-raising boards and banners to inform the public of the new regulations.
Drivers found guilty of violations could be imprisoned, and their vehicles could be impounded. The number of days of imprisonment extended with each repeat violation. The fourth offense, for instance, led to a week’s detention and a month’s confiscation of the vehicle. On the fifth occasion, the driver was prohibited from working again.
Hisba operatives manning checkpoints on the roads were tasked with enforcing these rules.
The policing of taxi drivers and their passengers was a joint effort conducted by the Hisba Diwan, the Public Services Diwan, and ISIS checkpoints on the roads.
Every taxi was obliged to post a document prominently inside the vehicle. This had to state the vehicle type, both the driver and the owner’s personal data, and details of any previous violations. It had to be signed by the owner.
If a driver was proven to be exploiting his work “in order to establish forbidden relationships, whether with boys or women,” he was prevented from working as a driver again.
Hisba agents were on the lookout for six offenses in particular:
Amulets or similar objects associated with magic had to be taken down immediately, and then destroyed. If a driver hanged another such object in his taxi, he was detained for three days and flogged with 30 lashes. The taxi was impounded for 15 days. A third violation led to a week’s detention and 90 lashes. If he offended after that, the miscreant was referred to a sharia court for sentencing.
Except for women over 45 years old – and then only in the daytime – taxi drivers were forbidden from carrying unaccompanied female passengers
If a woman was caught traveling alone in a taxi, a muhtasib accompanied her and the driver to her destination, and then took “the necessary measures with her.”
For the driver, violations led to detention and flogging, starting at two days and ten lashes. On his fourth offense, a driver was detained for a month, and banned from working again.
Any writing on or in the vehicle which did not conform to the Hisba Diwan’s understanding of sharia was to be immediately removed.
It was forbidden to hang curtains or any other thing that would hide the people in the vehicle from the sight of people outside.
Drivers guilty of hanging curtains, pictures of animate beings, or illegal writing, were first warned of the sinfulness of their behavior. If they did it again, they were detained for three days and flogged with ten lashes. The penalty for a third offense was a week’s detention and 50 lashes, with the taxi impounded for 15 days. Drivers were fined a gram of gold for each violation after that.
This was absolutely forbidden. First drivers were to be cautioned, but if they offended again they were sentenced to two days’ detention, ten lashes, and attendance on a sharia course. A third offense led to three days in detention and 50 lashes, and the taxi impounded for 15 days.
After that, drivers were fined a gram of gold for each violation.
Muhtasibs made surprise visits to sports facilities to ensure that no regulations were being violated. They were primarily concerned with the following issues:
The owners of gymnasiums, sports halls and swimming pools were responsible for ensuring that no representations of people or animals were visible.
All states other than the ISIS state were considered ‘infidel’. Therefore the flag or slogan of any team from beyond ISIS territory was forbidden.
Before organizing any sports contest, the owners of sports halls had to seek approval from the Research and Fatwa Committee. This body would determine if the proposed contest was legal or illegal in terms of sharia law.
Older men and youths had to be kept separate, whether in stadiums or swimming pools. This was presumably to prevent homosexual contact.
If the owners of sports halls violated these regulations, they were cautioned, and ordered to provide a written pledge that they wouldn’t violate again. Sports halls were closed for a day for each subsequent violation. Owners were obliged to mount signs on the front of their establishments explaining the reason for the closure.
As well as policing these spaces, muhtasibs were instructed to coordinate with the Dawa (Preaching) Diwan in order to organize preaching sessions in sports halls.
Hisba patrols made unannounced visits to Raqqa’s gaming halls and arcades, and held violators to account.
The “General Regulations” lists several infringements likely to occur in arcades.
Any representations of living beings on the machines had to be erased.
Game hall owners were responsible for providing separate facilities for men and women, and for ensuring that the sexes remained segregated at all times.
Arcade owners were responsible for preventing women from playing any games which might expose any part of their bodies.
For the crimes listed above, arcade owners were cautioned for a first offense, and had to sign written pledges not to reoffend A second offense led to a one-day closure of the arcade, and a third offense to a three-day.closure Offenses after that resulted in three-day closures as well as fines of one gram of gold for each previous violation.
Arcade employees were to direct their customers to prepare for prayer a few minutes even before the call to prayer sounded. Games had to be switched off from then until 15 minutes after the maghrib (sunset) prayer, and until 20 minutes after the other four daily prayers. Arcade owners were obliged to provide separate prayer areas for men and women.
Games hall and arcade owners found open at prayer time were cautioned at first, and ordered to pledge in writing not to repeat the behavior. A repeat violation led to a two-day closure of the games hall, and a third offense to a week’s closure. Violations after that resulted in three-day closures, as well as fines of one gram of gold for each previous violation.
If the owner of a games hall was found to be hosting circus or magic acts, he was cautioned and ordered to pledge in writing not to do so in future. If he did book such acts again, the games hall was closed down permanently.
ISIS banned internet connections in private homes, and on at least one occasion imprisoned a child (in the Stadium Prison) for this offense. Internet cafés were permitted, however – no doubt because they were easy to monitor.
The “General Regulations” warns of four evils likely to arise in internet cafés:
An internet café owner or employee who sold pornography to customers was imprisoned for one month and flogged with 90 lashes. After his release he was obliged to attend a sharia course. He was also forbidden from working in an internet café again, and all of the café’s contents – including computers and furniture – were confiscated.
The muhtasib was responsible for gathering the following information for inclusion in his report: the pornography’s type (audio, video, or photographs) and source (whether downloaded, transferred, or filmed live), and details of the sales process (summaries of phone calls or text messages). If the person arrested, or a person close to him, had performed the pornography themselves, then it was necessary for muhtasibs to examine it carefully and to record the details of the people and places involved.
If pornography was discovered on a computer or laptop, the device was confiscated. If the pornography had been filmed or photographed on a mobile phone, the phone was confiscated. If pornography was found a second time, the café was closed for three days and its owner was whipped with 70 lashes. If it happened a third time, the café was closed permanently.
Internet cafés had to stop broadcasting a Wi-Fi signal as soon as the prayer was called. Owners were warned the first time they failed to comply. The second time, their café was closed for a day. The third time, it was closed for two days. After that, the owner would be fined a gram of gold for each previous violation
The text orders the confiscation and destruction of computer games which contravene the ISIS understanding of sharia law. It warns that the games may include violations of “both creed and morality,” and cautions that it may be necessary to seek expert help, as sometimes violations are revealed only in the advanced stages of the game.
This section of the text refers to material which ISIS considered pornographic. Hisba operatives were responsible for seizing and destroying pornography. Sometimes it was also necessary to inspect the pornography in order to ascertain who was involved and what exactly they were doing. The text specifies that in these cases the inspection had to be carried out by at least two muhtasibs, and that they should be married rather than single. And it states that if the pornography is “not foreign” – in other words, if it’s locally produced – then it is sufficient for the muhtasibs to watch only parts from the beginning, middle and end.
Sometimes the pornography was stored and not immediately destroyed – for instance if it was needed as evidence. In that case, it had to be kept by an office superintendent, a sharia official, or a prison official in a closed and sealed safe.
Punishments are detailed for those who deal in, possess, or simply watch pornography.
Pornography dealers were imprisoned for ten days and flogged with 30 lashes for a first offense. For a second offense, they were imprisoned for a month and flogged with 90 lashes. If they continued to offend after that, they were referred to a sharia court for sentencing.
The muhtasib was responsible for gathering the following information for inclusion in his report: the pornography’s type (audio, video, or photographs), source (whether downloaded, transferred, or filmed live), length, and quantity, as well as details of the sales process (summaries of phone calls or text messages). If the person arrested, or a person close to him, had performed the pornography themselves, then it was necessary for the muhtasib to examine it carefully and to record the details of the people and places involved.
The pornography itself had to be destroyed. The text notes that, during its destruction, the pornography “should not be benefitted from in any way at all.”
Those found in possession of pornography once had to pledge in writing not to do it again, and were flogged with 30 lashes. If they had filmed or photographed the pornographic images themselves, then they were flogged with 90 lashes, and their camera or phone was confiscated. For a second offense, they were imprisoned for 10 days and flogged with 90 lashes. The device on which the pornography was stored was confiscated. If they continued to offend, violators were referred to a sharia court for sentencing.
For a first offense, those found watching pornography were flogged with ten lashes. They also had to attend a sharia course, and to pledge in writing not to commit the crime again. For a second offense, they were imprisoned for three days and flogged with 50 lashes. If they continued to offend after that, they were referred to a sharia court for sentencing.
When Hisba patrols inspected bookshops, they were concerned by two evils in particular.
Lewd pictures labeling products or on book covers were to be erased before the product was put on display. These included all pictures of women and other “immoral images”.
A first offense led to the bookshop owner being cautioned, and providing a written pledge not to offend again. A second offense led to the shop being closed for a day. A third offense led to a three-day closure and a fine of an unspecified amount of money. Offenses after that were punished with three-day closures and fines of one gram of gold for each previous violation.
In order to identify which books contained false beliefs – or which “contradict the methodology of the Sunni Muslims” – muhtasibs consulted the Research and Fatwa Committee. The text also refers to “the books of the misguided” – in other words, books containing Shia or Sufi material.
A first offense was punished with a three-day closure of the shop, and the whipping of the bookshop owner with 30 lashes. A second offense was punished with a seven-day closure and 90 lashes. A third offense resulted in the permanent closure of the bookshop. Offending books were confiscated and destroyed.
As always, in the event of closures, it was incumbent on bookshop owners to mount signs on their shop fronts explaining their guilt as the reason for the closure.
The Hisba Diwan worked alongside the Public Service Committee and other authorities to regulate gold shops and currency exchange offices.
It enforced this regulation by surprise patrols and inspections.
The Hisba Diwan coordinated with the Research and Studies Office to ascertain exchange rates and the buying and selling prices of precious metals. It coordinated with the Treasury (Bait al-Mal) on matters concerning the governance of commercial transactions.
The muhtasibs demanded written pledges that offending shop owners wouldn’t charge riba, or interest, on transactions in the future. The penalty for a repeat offense was three days’ closure, and every time after that, three days’ closure added to a gold fine of one gram for each previous violation.
The direct touching of women by employees was specifically forbidden. The owner of the shop or office had to write a pledge not to touch women under any circumstances, and had to bear responsibility for his employees’ compliance too.
The penalty for a first offense was a day’s closure of the shop, and 70 lashes for the offending shop worker. A second offense led to a three-day closure and a one-gram gold fine. The guilty worker was sentenced to 90 lashes, and was no longer permitted to work in the shop.
On a third offense, the shop or office was closed down permanently.
Only two hairstyles were acceptable for men – short, or long but unlayered. All others were considered ‘western’, and were therefore banned. Men were also forbidden from shaving their beards. Barbers as well as their customers could be held to account for violations, and so were particularly threatened by ISIS.
The Hisba Diwan issued statements concerning the new regulations, and followed up with awareness-raising campaigns. Leaflets were printed and publicity banners raised at roadsides to explain the rulings – all in coordination with the state media, the Education and Dawa (Preaching) Diwans, and the mosques.
Hisba patrols made unannounced visits to barbershops to enforce the rules.
Men were expected to wear a full beard.
The qazaa is a hairstyle in which the sides of the head are shaved clean while the hair grows long on top. At the time of the Prophet, some of the Quraishi enemies of Islam wore their hair like this. As a result, it became associated with unbelief. The Hisba Diwan forbade it, as it forbade all “infidel hairstyles.”
This was forbidden for both men and women.
The violations listed above led in the first event to a caution. The owner of the barbershop pledged in writing not to reoffend. The penalty for a second offense was a three-day closure. For a third offense, the barbershop was closed for a month. If the barbershop continued to offer prohibited haircuts after that, it was closed permanently, and its contents were seized.
Hisba patrols inspected the reading matter available to customers in barbershops. They confiscated newspapers and magazines containing “obscene” images – pictures of women, for instance. Hisba officials coordinated with the local branch of the Dawa (Preaching) Diwan to provide the barbershop with religious pamphlets, a more suitable alternative.
If a violation was determined to have occurred, the owner had to write a pledge not to repeat it. A second offense led to a one-day closure.
The Hisba Diwan was required to coordinate with the Education Diwan, the Dawa (Preaching) Diwan, and the mosques, to educate the public in the correct dress for men. It also coordinated with relevant authorities to prevent the import of unsuitable clothes to ISIS territory.
Muhtasibs combated the sins they found in men’s clothing shops using the usual tools of warning and “explaining”, and by seeking pledges of compliance. Repeat offenses resulted in seizures of goods and compulsory shop closures. Shopkeepers were responsible for mounting signs on their businesses explaining their guilt as the cause of the closure.
Surprise Hisba patrols inspected shops in search of violations. They were concerned in particular by three types of problematic clothing:
Several hadith state that a man should not wear his izaar, or lower garment, lower than the ankle. This directive is generally understood to relate to the specific cultural context of seventh century Arabia, and its observance is left to an individual’s discretion. But ISIS turned it to absolute law, and strictly prohibited men from wearing trousers or thobes which fell beneath the ankle.
The Hisba Diwan was responsible for mounting signs in public places to explain the ruling.
Shopkeepers were cautioned for a first offense, and their shops closed for a day each time they violated after that.
Clothes considered too tight – and therefore too revealing of body shape – were confiscated.
After a warning, the shop selling the offending articles was subject to enforced closures. These varied in duration, from a day for a second offense to seven days for a fourth.
If a shop offended on five occasions, it was closed permanently.
Muhtasibs were instructed to confiscate and destroy all items of clothing which depicted crosses, “the Jewish star”, or national flags. All states were considered ‘infidel states’, including the states existing in predominantly Muslim societies. Fidelity, according to ISIS, involved submission to ISIS rule, and therefore the dissolution of all other states.
This section of the “General Regulations” covers any problematic aspect of men’s behavior not already mentioned. Most points are concerned with appearance – but issues connected to pigeon fancying and music are also raised.
This was forbidden. The penalties were ten lashes for a first offense; 30 lashes, three days in prison, and enrollment in a sharia course for a second; and 90 lashes, a month in prison, and enrollment in a sharia course for a third. If a man was found to have plucked his eyebrows a fourth time, he was referred to a sharia court for sentencing.
The qazaa is a hairstyle in which the sides of the head are shaved clean while the hair grows long on top. At the time of the Prophet, some of the Quraishi enemies of Islam wore their hair like this. As a result, it became associated with unbelief. ISIS forbade it, as they forbade all “infidel hairstyles.”
When a man was found wearing this style, his whole head was shaved clean. If he wore the style again, he was flogged with 30 lashes and enrolled in a sharia course. For a third offense, he was imprisoned for three days and flogged with 90 lashes. For a fourth, he was imprisoned for 15 days, and again flogged with 90 lashes.
This was forbidden. Muhtasibs confiscated the offending item and demanded a pledge from the offender not to wear such things again. If the offender repeated the behavior, he was flogged with 30 lashes, and was enrolled in a sharia course.
If the confiscated bracelet or necklace was made of gold, it was returned to the miscreant after he had been sentenced.
Men were also prohibited from wearing gold. A first-time offender was warned, and had to write a pledge. If he wore gold a second time, he was flogged with 30 lashes, enrolled in a sharia course, and the gold was confiscated.
Men wearing trousers or thobes (long shirts) below the ankle were ordered to shorten the garment. If they did it again, they were obliged to write a pledge, were enrolled in a sharia course, and were flogged with ten lashes.
Tight trousers were confiscated. The owner was obliged to immediately buy a more suitable pair, and to pledge not to reoffend. He was also enrolled in a sharia course.
The offender was “treated violently,” the regulations were explained to him, and he was enrolled in a sharia course. Clothes and anything else “related to the sin” were confiscated. A Hisba sharia official could then decide how to further punish him – “by flogging or otherwise” – according to “the obscenity of the sin.”
It was forbidden to play music on devices such as CD players and mobile phones.
For a first offense, the offender was “treated violently” and the regulations were explained to him. The CD or cassette was confiscated, but the music-playing device was not. For a second offense, he was flogged with ten lashes and enrolled in a sharia course. This time the music-playing device was confiscated along with the music itself. Further offenses led to 30 lashes and a one-gram gold fine.
Men had traditionally kept pigeons on the roofs of buildings – from where they might potentially have seen uncovered women below. This was now forbidden. Pigeon fanciers had to conduct their hobby somewhere else.
The text instructs muhtasibs to distinguish between those who keep pigeons for the sake of trading or eating them, on the one hand, and those who use them for gambling or for “revealing the private parts,” on the other.
A first offense resulted in an obligatory pledge and enrollment in a sharia course. The penalty for a second offense was ten lashes and a sharia course. For a third offense, it was 30 lashes and a one-gram gold fine. For a fourth offense, it was 50 lashes. At this point the offender was prohibited from keeping pigeons.
Hisba patrols made surprise visits to shops and other commercial establishments in order to suppress the following crimes:
Muhtasibs looked out for and punished “outrageous iniquity in prices.”
As usual, a first offense resulted in the owner being warned, signing a pledge, and announcing the pledge to the employees. A second offense led to a three-day closure of the shop. Each offense after that led to a three-day closure as well as a fine of one gram of gold for each previous offense.
All fraudulent dealings with goods and products were of course prohibited.
The penalties were the same as for price gouging.
For a first offense, the workshop was closed for a month. The owner and any others involved were flogged with 70 lashes. The contraband was seized. If it happened again, the metal workshop was closed permanently, and all the metalworking equipment was confiscated. Those responsible were imprisoned for a month.
Names for shops which were foreign, “impolite,” or “not compliant with sharia” were banned. It was also an offense for the name of the establishment to be written only in a non-Arabic language. The original name had to be Arabic. It could then be translated into other languages.
Crosses and “symbols of infidel states” were banned, as were pictures of people or animals.
If a commercial establishment wished to hold any kind of competition, permission had to be sought from the Research and Studies Office. Games of chance such as lotteries were banned.
It was forbidden to show channels on shop or facility television sets which broadcast un-Islamic material.
All of these offenses led, in the first instance, to warnings and explanations, and to the shopkeeper writing a pledge to change behavior. A second offense led to a one-day closure of the shop. Each offense after that led to a three-day closure as well as a fine of one gram of gold for each previous offense. As usual, in the event of closure, shopkeepers were obliged to mount signs on their shop fronts admitting their guilt.
Muhtasibs patrolled hospitals, dispensaries and clinics to ensure compliance in the following areas:
The “General Regulations” warns against the sin of a medical professional being alone with a patient of the opposite sex, or of a male doctor being alone with a female nurse. It also prohibits male doctors from “unnecessarily” uncovering or undressing women.
It calls for the establishment of a women-only hospital.
The text is concerned with the problem of female health workers wearing make-up or otherwise adorning themselves. It insists that they must be properly covered up and unadorned at all times.
It was forbidden to show channels on hospital or clinic television sets which broadcast un-Islamic material, particularly music. Channels dedicated to Quran recitations were to be broadcast instead.
Hospitals and clinics were obliged to provide separate prayer rooms for men and women.
Representations of people or animals were strictly forbidden “unless they are of medical use.”
Tayammum is the ritual act of ‘dry washing’ with clean sand or soil. Muslims wash in this way before prayer if no water is available or if a health condition prevents them from using water. Hospitals and clinics were therefore responsible for providing clean sand or soil to their patients.
If a public hospital violated any of these regulations, Hisba officials had to report the matter to the Health Diwan. If the violations occurred in a private hospital, both the owner and the offending health worker had to pledge before a Health Diwan representative that the situation would be remedied.
With regard to pharmacies, muhtasibs were concerned by four issues:
No product could be displayed until images of women had been erased from their packaging.
Muhtasibs coordinated with the Health Diwan to determine if pharmacists had permission to examine their customers. In any case, men were never in any circumstances permitted to touch women.
The image of a snake has long been used as a symbol for healthcare and a logo for pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies. The Hisba Diwan banned the symbol, presumably because of its connection to the ancient Greek myth of Asclepius, the god of healing.
Hisba officials were responsible for prohibiting the sale of substances identified as harmful by the Health Diwan.
Enforcement began with the extraction of written pledges from pharmacists and shop owners. Surprise field patrols checked compliance.
If a pharmacy violated after being warned, it was closed for a day. Further violations resulted in longer closures as well as fines of a gram of gold or its equivalent in cash each time. The pharmacy had to display a sign explaining the sin that had led to the closure.
Those guilty of displaying the snake symbol were fined half a gram of gold for each day it remained visible.
Before closing down a pharmacy, Hisba officials had to consult the Health Diwan.