The Shaitat Massacre

Documenting the Events and Reshaping the Narrative

 

By: Sasha Al-Alou and Ayman Allow

 

Introduction

Since 2011, Syria has witnessed systematic violence committed by multiple actors. International humanitarian law has been violated again and again. Violence has been exacerbated by the complexity and longevity of the conflict, the involvement of many parties – each with competing interests – and the central government’s major role in practicing or sponsoring violence.

The massacre ISIS committed against the Shaitat clan^[1] in Deir ez-Zor province in August 2014 was one of the most serious of the many massacres committed throughout the country. The documented civilian casualties exceeded 558 within a few weeks. The number later increased by at least 90. This makes it the second-worst massacre in Syria in terms of numbers (the worst was the 2013 sarin gas massacre committed by the Assad regime in the Ghouta suburbs of Damascus) and the worst committed by ISIS in Syria.

The crime shows the characteristics of a genocidal act committed with deliberate intention; an order was issued, then it was carried out against the tribe within a specific time.

The uniqueness of the Shaitat massacre is determined by its specific circumstances, yet it emerges from a larger context of violence in Deir ez-Zor in particular, and in Syria in general. ISIS arrived suddenly on the scene in Deir ez-Zor early in 2014, and immediately clashed with the ideologically diverse Syrian opposition factions. Fierce battles raged throughout the province for more than six months, but eventually ISIS came out on top.

Brigades formed by the Shaitat clan were among the first to fight against ISIS. The areas where the Shaitat lived – Abu Hamam, Kishkiyya, and Gharanij – were the last parts of the province to fall under ISIS control. ISIS concluded the fighting with a series of massacres that had a long-lasting impact on the families of the victims, the entire clan, and the collective Syrian memory.

Ten years after the massacre, and despite worthy efforts, some aspects related to documentation and narrative remain problematic. The massacre has not been systematically documented or studied to the depth it demands. Insufficient attention has been paid to the direct cause of the events, to the context before and after, to the details of the events, or to establishing a clear timeline of the massacres supported by relevant documents and testimonies. The number of casualties requires further research and clarification, as different sources provide varying estimates.

In this context, the research presented here aims to document the events and to reshape the narrative of what happened.

First, it reviews the political and military context of Deir ez-Zor province when it slipped Assad-regime control, as well as the role of the Shaitat clan in the armed conflict.

Next, it covers the ISIS subjugation of the province in general and the Shaitat areas in particular, and the initial agreement that established ISIS control.

Following this, it investigates the events following the breaching of the agreement on July 30, 2014, including a 12-day battle that precipitated, in one way or another, the massacres. Each day of the battle is documented in detail, especially as the massacre, in effect, started during the battle.

The study then seeks to reshape the narrative of the incident by reviewing the timeline and details of the massacre, including mass killings, arbitrary detentions, forced displacement, looting, and the destruction of homes. It also examines attempts by local dignitaries to negotiate an end to the killing and displacement.

Finally, it examines the period after the return of displaced people to their homes, the punitive measures that led to more killing, and the discoveries of mass graves. The study provides an initial survey of the graves discovered by residents from late 2014 until 2020. It analyzes data and numbers provided by the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association, which conducted a 2020 survey to determine the number of casualties. Despite some gaps in its coverage, that survey remains the most comprehensive count of Shaitat casualties.

The research relies on primary and secondary data sources, including interviews with relatives of the victims and the missing, former detainees, former fighters, and tribal elders. The ISIS Prisons Museum (IPM) has conducted interviews with many individuals from diverse groups connected to the events. These include the following.

• Families of the victims. Interviews were filmed with 27 relatives of casualties and missing people; 21 were filmed between January 1 and May 30, 2021, and the rest were filmed between April 1 and June 20, 2024. The interviews were filmed in the Shaitat towns of eastern Deir ez-Zor. The interviewees were chosen carefully to represent, as much as possible, the geographic areas of Abu Hamam, Kishkiyya, and Gharanij. The majority of the interviewees are women from the victims’ families.
• Former detainees. Interviews were filmed with 26 former detainees who were held in different ISIS prisons during and after the massacre; 10 were filmed between January 1 and May 30, 2021, and the rest were filmed between April 1 and June 20, 2024. The interviews were filmed in the Shaitat towns of eastern Deir ez-Zor. The subjects were again chosen to represent, as much as possible, the geographic areas of Abu Hamam, Kishkiyya, and Gharanij.
• Former fighters. Interviews were filmed with 27 former fighters; 17 were filmed between January 1 and May 30, 2021. The subjects were a sample of Shaitat fighters who were involved in the battle against ISIS, during which the massacre began. The interviews were filmed in the Shaitat towns of eastern Deir ez-Zor, and the subjects were chosen to represent the areas of Abu Hamam, Kishkiyya, and Gharanij; 10 interviews were conducted by phone or in the field between April 1 and June 20, 2024. The subjects included former Shaitat fighters who had fought in the battle against ISIS.
• Clan chiefs and elders. Interviews were filmed with six Shaitat clan elders who were involved in the negotiations with ISIS during and after the massacre; two interviews were filmed between January 1 and May 30, 2021, and the other four were conducted between April 1 and June 20, 2024. The interviews were filmed in the Shaitat towns in eastern Deir ez-Zor. The subjects were chosen to represent, as much as possible, the areas of Abu Hamam, Kishkiyya, and Gharanij.
• Activists and journalists. Interviews were conducted with 10 activists and journalists from the Shaitat tribe who witnessed and covered the battles and witnessed the massacre. The interviewees are also relatives of the victims. Six of the interviews were conducted between January 1 and May 30 2021, and the remaining interviews were conducted between April 1 and June 20, 2024. All were conducted in the Shaitat settlements in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.

The research presented in this study also makes use of the following sources:

• Documents. The study uses more than 150 documents related to the massacre, including ISIS correspondence, circulars, and orders, texts of agreements imposed by ISIS in the area, photos and video footage of the massacre obtained from various sources – some shared by ISIS at the time and others captured by activists or other civilians – as well documents that were leaked or found in buildings abandoned by ISIS after its defeat in the area.
• The Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association. The IPM relied on this association as a source of data on the victims and their numbers. The IPM viewed the association’s documented data from January 1, 2014 until the date of the last documented victim, August 15, 2021. The total number of dead is 814. The data were reviewed and then analyzed with multiple levels. The IPM also worked with the association in surveying the locations of the discovered mass graves until 2020.
• ISIS official social channels. During the writing of this study, the team reviewed the video and text content of ISIS social channels and accounts for the time of the massacre to collect more footage and data on the massacre and the battle and to understand the nature of ISIS media discourse at the time. The research team also conducted a long interview with a former ISIS security agent in the Shaitat area, who was released by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in exchange for a sum of money and on the condition that he stays in his village. The interview was conducted on June 15, 2024.
• The media. Local, Arab, and global media and news agencies were important secondary sources for understanding what happened in some events and in checking the timeline and dates of the battles fought to control the villages, towns, and cities of Deir ez-Zor.
• Papers, studies, and human rights reports. Research papers and human rights reports published by local or Western organizations were important secondary sources for the study. They included documentation of the massacre, study of the ISIS movement in Syria at the time, and the political and military context of the developments in Deir ez-Zor.

 

All of the interviews were conducted with the interviewees’ informed consent after the aims of the research had been explained to them. The interviews and documents are cataloged and kept in the IPM archive. The names of most sources have been anonymized in the study at the sources’ requests due to the security conditions in the area, in which ISIS cells remain active.

The Rise of ISIS in Deir ez-Zor

In 2014, ISIS expanded to control areas in Raqqa, Hasakah, eastern Aleppo province, and Idlib. This development disrupted the political and military calculations of the various local, regional, and international players and quickly reshaped the map of the military conflict in Syria, especially in Deir ez-Zor.

Origins and Early Battles

 

The original nucleus of ISIS in Deir ez-Zor lay within Jabhat al-Nusra, which had entered the province in early 2012. To start with, individual fighters and small groups fought in the province under the radar; however, by mid-2012, Jabhat al-Nusra had declared its existence, and quickly became an important player among the armed groups in Deir ez-Zor and in Syria more widely.^[2]

The first ISIS fighters appeared in Deir ez-Zor after the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ was announced on April 9, 2013.^[3] The announcement caused a split in Jabhat al-Nusra, which had originally been conceived as a Syrian branch of the Iraq-based ‘Islamic State’. Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani, Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader, rejected the decision to merge his group with the new entity, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Some Jabhat al-Nusra fighters remained loyal to Jowlani, while others joined ISIS. The disagreement between the two groups remained merely ideological-organizational to start with, and did not escalate to a military confrontation as it did in other regions of Syria. Al-Baghdadi’s supporters gathered in villages in the east of the province, primarily in Khasham and Jadid Akidat, where they set up bases.^[4]

A complicated array of militias operated in Deir ez-Zor. The factions of the Free Syrian Army had been founded by defectors from the Assad-regime army, as well as by civilians who took up arms. Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra were primarily Syrian Salafi-Jihadi militias with transnational connections. The Assad regime’s forces, meanwhile, still controlled parts of Deir ez-Zor City and strategic military locations in the countryside, such as the Deir ez-Zor air base – though they had been expelled early on from most of the Deir ez-Zor countryside.

ISIS first clashed in Deir ez-Zor with the Ahfad al-Rasoul (Descendants of the Prophet) brigades, a coalition of local armed groups supported by the staff committee of the Free Syrian Army, led by Maher al-Nuaimi, a defected officer from the Assad regime’s army. The battles began in Raqqa and quickly spread to Deir ez-Zor. ISIS accused Ahfad al-Rasoul groups of “receiving Western support to fight Islamist groups,” and in mid-September 2013 attacked their bases, managing to capture most of their weapons and detain a number of their leaders and fighters.^[5] ISIS continued to pursue members of Ahfad al-Rasoul until the end of October 2013. Its victories over the group allowed it to accumulate more weaponry, which in turn strengthened it militarily in its operations against Assad forces in the province, especially at the Deir ez-Zor air base.^[6] Eventually, Ahfad al-Rasoul was disbanded. It became known in ISIS propaganda as Ahfad Iblis (Descendants of Satan). Later on, some former commanders of Ahfad al-Rasoul, such as Abu Seif al-Shaiti and Saddam al-Jamal, pledged allegiance to ISIS and became active players in the takeover of the province and the Shaitat issue.^[7]

After Ahfad al-Rasoul, ISIS clashed with Ahrar al-Sham and its allies. Clashes broke out intermittently in the areas of Syria where both groups were present. The first spark was on December 2, 2013 in the Deir ez-Zor countryside.^[8] This fight had complex dimensions. In addition to the ideological differences between the two Jihadi groups and the struggle for control and influence, the fight reflected tribal divisions in the area. Both groups tried to attract leaders from the powerful tribes, and this led to social division. For example, the most prominent ISIS commanders in the battle were Amir al-Rafdan, who had defected from Jabhat al-Nusra,^[9] and Kamal al-Raja, also known as Abu al-Muntasser al-Bariha, after his birthplace of Bariha village.^[10] On the other hand, Abu Ishaq, the leader of Liwa al-Ahwaz, who was also from Bariha, fought against ISIS alongside Ahrar al-Sham, even though he belonged to the same tribe (the Bekayyir branch of the Akidat tribe) as al-Rafdan and al-Raja.

Jabhat al-Nusra remained neutral for around a month at the peak of the fighting between ISIS and Ahrar al-Sham. The fighting depleted Ahrar al-Sham’s military capabilities. Al-Nusra’s neutrality, which provoked all the armed groups in the area, remained in effect until February 2014,^[11] when ISIS attacked its bases in the oil-rich town of Shadadi and Tal Hamis in Hasakah. At the same time, ISIS launched an attack led by Amir al-Rafdan on the oil and gas fields of Koniko and Jafra held by Jabhat al-Nusra, capturing them on February 2, 2014.^[12] Jabhat al-Nusra fought hard for the fields. This was the first time that it had engaged in the fight against ISIS, which led many to believe that wealth-producing resources were Jabhat al-Nusra’s main concern.

Recognizing the increasing danger posed by ISIS, other militias joined Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham in the fight. ISIS had already attacked most of them while it was laying siege to the Deir ez-Zor air base in mid-January 2014, and had captured heavy weapons sent from the Aleppo countryside to help in the battle to liberate the air base.^[13] Consequently, a number of militias formed an alliance to confront ISIS. The alliance included Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Ahwaz/Bariha, Liwa Mouta/Shahil, Bashair al-Nasr/Ashara, the Shaitat Brigades, Liwa Jafar al-Tayyar, armed groups from Gharanij/Shaitat, Free Syrian Army groups that worked under the Mohasan military council, and individuals who volunteered to fight against ISIS.

In early February 2014, the alliance fought against ISIS in the countryside, recapturing many areas, including oil fields. It also blew up the house of the ISIS governor and commander in charge of the ISIS offensive, Amir al-Rafdan. He was chased with the remaining ISIS fighters to southern Hasakah.^[14] These battles were the first time that the Shaitat brigades had clashed with ISIS.

After fierce battles that continued for days, the alliance succeeded in expelling ISIS from most of Deir ez-Zor on February 11–12, 2014, and chased its remaining fighters out of the villages of Khabour toward the southern countryside of Hasakah.^[15] ISIS retained one position in the area of the salt mines in Tabanni village in Deir ez-Zor’s western countryside. The position proved to be hard to capture for geographic and military reasons.^[16] After February 12, the battles moved to Markada in Hasakah’s southern countryside, and continued raging there for over two months. Hundreds from both sides were killed and wounded. Around 80 of the dead were from Shahil, the main stronghold of Jabhat al-Nusra in Deir ez-Zor at the time. Dozens from other militias and villages in Deir ez-Zor were also killed. The battles continued until mid-April 2014. Both sides used heavy weapons. Jabhat al-Nusra brought reinforcements from Aleppo, Idlib, and Homs. The armed groups used revenue from most of the oil fields in Deir ez-Zor to fund and arm their fighters.^[17]

A week after ISIS withdrew to southern Hasakah, it started sending car bombs to areas of Deir ez-Zor’s countryside, most notably one in Shahil that killed dozens.^[18] Meanwhile, Jabhat al-Nusra and other militias dedicated their efforts to chasing fighters who were suspected of being loyal to ISIS or collaborating with it. Jabhat al-Nusra began taking these steps in early 2013, when it accused a number of people in leadership positions of conspiring against the group and working either for ISIS or for the West. The most prominent name among those under suspicion was Saddam al-Jamal, a former field commander of the Free Syrian Army’s joint staff committee of the eastern region. He disappeared in Abu Kamal in mid-2013 after pressure from Jabhat al-Nusra, which blew up his house and assassinated his brother. At the end of the year, he appeared in a video pledging allegiance to ISIS. He later appeared in the battles of Markada, where he joined Amir al-Rafdan and the defeated ISIS fighters.^[19]

After pledging allegiance to ISIS, al-Jamal was appointed as security officer of the Furat province in Iraq. He was also appointed as a commander during the Markada battles. He was in charge of planning a surprise attack on his hometown of Bukamal, launched on April 11, 2014. ISIS named the operation the “Liberating the Captives Raid.” The attack targeted the headquarters of Jabhat al-Nusra’s sharia committee in the city, killing those inside.^[20]

The opposition and Islamist militias did not expect the attack on Abu Kamal because ISIS had been weakened after its previous defeat. The attack caused a shock, but it was absorbed within two days. A decisive counteroffensive was then launched. ISIS fighters were surrounded and defeated, with approximately 150 of them dead and wounded, including Nadir al-Rakhita, the second brother of Saddam al-Jamal. The main militias who participated in the battle were: Jabhat al-Nusra; Ahrar al-Sham; Liwa Omar al-Mukhtar; the Shaitat brigades; the Free Syrian Army brigades of western Bukamal; and Bashaer al-Nasr.

After the battle, ISIS was completely expelled from Bukamal. ISIS fighters withdrew and took up positions in the Syrian desert within the T2 oil pumping station (a station that pumps crude oil from Iraq and the oil fields in Deir ez-Zor toward the T3 station near Palmyra). The area, known as al-Kum, is 85 kilometers south of Bukamal.^[21]

The withdrawal from Deir ez-Zor and the failed attack on Bukamal were the most significant setback for ISIS since it was founded on April 9, 2013. ISIS lost control of the Qa’im border crossing with Iraq and most of the oil fields. ISIS members longed for revenge. The defeat in Deir ez-Zor limited their movement and geographic connection to Iraq. It isolated them in Raqqa and Aleppo’s eastern countryside. It also depleted their military and human resources, with hundreds killed, wounded, or captured.

ISIS Advances through the Province

 

The battle in Markada continued for approximately two months until mid-April 2014, when ISIS defeated the alliance led by Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Free Syrian Army brigades – including the Shaitat brigades – and took control of the area.

ISIS capitalized on the revival of military morale after Markada to recapture Deir ez-Zor. It brought in enormous military reinforcements from Aleppo, Raqqa, and Iraq, and it devised a plan – engineered by Omar al-Shishani – to assault the province from five axes on three fronts simultaneously.

First, ISIS attacked the province’s northern countryside from two axes in the southern Hasakah countryside – to the east and west of the Khabur River. Second, it attacked the western countryside from two axes – the Jazira line starting from Raqqa, and the Shamiyya line starting from the town of Maadan. Third, it launched an attack from the direction of the Syrian desert. This assault was led by Abu Ayman al-Iraqi. Several foreign and local leaders led the other assaults, most notably Omar Al-Shishani.^[22]

Map 2: ISIS Attack Axes on Deir ez-Zor Countryside

 

ISIS launched its fiercest attack from the south of Hasakah province toward Sawar in the north of Deir ez-Zor province. Here, it engaged in “bone-breaking” battles against the opposition militias that left over 150 men of the militias dead and wounded in a short time, and even more ISIS fighters.^[23] Nevertheless, ISIS took control of the town on April 16, 2014.^[24] After that, it attacked the east of the province while launching another attack from Raqqa toward the west. The Euphrates divides the area into two; the western bank is called Shamiyya, while the eastern side is called Jazira. ISIS was able to surround and capture most areas in Shamiyya without much resistance, except for some sporadic battles with Ahrar al-Sham in Madan and Tabanni.^[25]

At the same time, ISIS launched an attack on western Deir ez-Zor from the Syrian desert/Damascus road. It clashed with Jabhat al-Nusra in Kabajeb village, forcing it to withdraw. ISIS also fought and defeated Ahrar al-Sham in Joula. The two sides reached an agreement guaranteeing the safe withdrawal of Ahrar al-Sham fighters, but ISIS reneged on it, and killed approximately 51 men. ISIS then completed its offensive on the Jazira part of Deir ez-Zor’s western countryside, fighting on different fronts until it took full control on May 10, 2014.^[26] After that, intermittent fighting continued in certain areas. ISIS was eventually able to capture these too, and established full control in early June 2014.^[27]

The fall of most of Deir ez-Zor’s western countryside had a direct effect on the military scene in the rest of the province. ISIS approached Deir ez-Zor city and laid partial siege to its neighborhoods, especially after it managed to block the roads leading to the Siyasiyya bridge and other river crossings. These were the main connections between the countryside and the city. As a result, the Free Syrian Army and Jabhat al-Nusra brigades in the city found themselves squeezed between ISIS and the Assad-regime forces. The siege and the fighting caused great suffering for civilians. It is estimated that more than 100,000 fled during that period.^[28]

Meanwhile, ISIS was fighting Jabhat al-Nusra and the Free Syrian Army in the eastern countryside. The heaviest fighting was on the Jazira side of the Euphrates, an area rich in oil and gas resources. Both Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS benefited from cooperation with powerful tribes. Jabhat al-Nusra set up a stronghold in Shahil, and forged an alliance with most of the al-Boujamil clan of the Akidat tribe. ISIS had previously established strongholds in the villages of Jadid Akidat and Bariha, and forged an alliance with most of the Bekayyir clan of the Akidat tribe.^[29]

The ISIS offensive on this front continued after the capture of Sawar on April 16, 2014. It targeted Jadid Akidat, where battles continued for around a month, from mid-April to mid-May. Hundreds were killed and wounded on both sides. There were around 30 casualties in the Shaitat brigades, and dozens in other militias.^[30] As the clashes expanded, there were initiatives to stop the fighting, especially between the two Jihadi groups fighting in Deir ez-Zor, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. The most important was an initiative called for by al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. There were also initiatives made by local tribes. All these attempts failed, and fighting continued to rage.^[31]

On May 9, 2014, during the battles around Jadid Akidat, ISIS managed to capture the Koniko gas field and several nearby oil fields. At the same time, the fighting spread to the edges of Khasham.^[32] ISIS finally captured Jadid Akidat in mid-May 2014.^[33] After that, other villages fell one after the other. ISIS captured Jadid Bakkara, Dahla, Sabha, and Zir. In Sabha and Zir, ISIS was able to capitalize on tribal disputes. It attracted some military commanders, chief among them Ahmad Obeid al-Daham, also known as Abu Dujana al-Zir, commander of the military sector in the north of Deir ez-Zor province.^[34] Now, the ISIS strategy had brought it to the edges of Basira, which connects the eastern countryside to the city of Deir ez-Zor.

Amid this increasing threat, the anti-ISIS militias gathered in the eastern countryside under a unified military command called the Mujahideen Shura Council. The formation of the council was announced on May 25, 2014, and included: Jabhat al-Nusra; Jaish al-Islam; Ahrar al-Sham; Jaish Mouta al-Islami; Bayareq Shaitat; Jabhat al-Asala wa al-Tanmiya; Harakat al-Jihad wa al-Bina;^[35] and others. The new alliance fought ISIS in the eastern countryside in late May 2014. It also intermittently targeted positions in the western and northern countryside and was able to recapture some villages and towns.^[36]

Despite the fierce resistance, ISIS continued to put pressure on the eastern countryside. Basira became the next line of defense after Jadid Akidat. The fighting here reached its peak in late May,^[37] and ended in early June 2014, when ISIS took control.^[38] ISIS then targeted villages controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, such as Tabiyya Jazira. ISIS deployed reinforcements from the Libyan al-Battar Battalion, forcing its opponents to withdraw around June 9, 2014. Before that, ISIS had managed to neutralize Khasham and the surrounding area after an agreement with some of the militias there.^[39] It established full control on June 10, 2014.^[40] But ISIS reneged on the agreement it had made with the militias. It carried out summary executions and, on June 23, 2014, it forcibly displaced the residents of Khasham and Tabiyya – about 30,000 civilians.^[41] Tens of thousands were fleeing, and the local councils in the area at the time declared most of the eastern and western countryside of Deir ez-Zor as a disaster area.

After this advance and the fall of Basira, ISIS reached the outskirts of Shahil, Jabhat al-Nusra’s main stronghold in Deir ez-Zor. ISIS wished to capture the town in order to cut off the supply route from Bukamal. It had momentum, and was further boosted on June 10, 2014 by the news of the Iraqi Army’s collapse and the ISIS capture of most of Mosul.^[42]

ISIS benefited from the momentum and high morale. Reinforcements arrived from Iraq, strengthening the organization in Deir ez-Zor. While continuing to fight in the Jazira part of Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside, ISIS used different tactics in the Shamiyya part. Here, it worked hard to win over some of the local militias, and received pledges of allegiance both in secret and in public. The militias were generally given three options: to pledge allegiance, to fight, or to leave the area. The militias in the villages around Deir ez-Zor air base in particular were hard-pressed as they fought on two fronts simultaneously, against the Assad regime’s forces as well as ISIS. Regime forces continued to bomb militia positions in Mari’yya and al-Buomar. ISIS gave the armed groups there the options of pledging allegiance to ISIS, disbanding, or withdrawing. Most commanders chose to withdraw.

On the other hand, ISIS was able to strike a secret agreement with a limited group in the town of Muhasan that the town would be handed to ISIS but some militia would be permitted to remain in their positions near the air base.^[43] ISIS took control of Muhasan and Boulil without a fight on June 20, 2014,^[44] and executed a number of Free Syrian Army officers and commanders who rejected the agreement.^[45] The agreement paved the way for the fall of many villages and towns on this front.

As well as the agreements in the countryside, ISIS managed to force allegiance from some militias based in the city, after it had besieged them. Some of these militias now transformed into ISIS cells. Other militias withdrew from their positions in the city, among them the Shaitat militias, which withdrew on June 15, 2014. On June 20, 2014, they also withdrew from their positions near Deir ez-Zor air base, after being attacked by ISIS cells in Muhasan. They returned to take up positions in the Shaitat villages. This defense had become urgent since ISIS was laying siege to Shahil and edging closer to the Shaitat villages.^[46] By the end of June 2014, a new phase had started in which ISIS captured the rest of the province through negotiations and forced pledges of allegiance.

The First ISIS–Shaitat Agreement

 

On June 26, 2014, as news spread of negotiations brokered by the local tribes between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra for the handover of Shahil, there were rumors too that the Shaitat brigades might hand over their areas. But Shaitat fighters quickly released a video statement denying the rumors, stressing that they would not pledge allegiance to ISIS.

Shaitat fighters were deployed on June 28, 2014 to areas around Shahil town.^[47] They met Jabhat al-Nusra’s leaders at the Omar oil field to devise a combat plan and to allocate positions for the fight against ISIS.^[48] According to the plan, the Shaitat fighters’ role was to protect Bukamal, given that intelligence indicated that the Jabhat al-Nusra commander in Bukamal, Abu Yousuf al-Masri, intended to hand it over to ISIS. The Shaitat brigades moved toward Bukamal via Mayadin, in order to boost the morale of the militias on that front. They planned an attack on Qouriyya, near Mayadin. The local commander Mahmoud al-Matar was based at Qouriyya, and he had pledged allegiance to ISIS.

The Shaitat brigades advanced on Qouriyya, but were stopped by an ambush. They were forced to return to Mayadin before continuing to Bukamal. Here, they ran into another ambush because the Jabhat al-Nusra commander there, Abu Yousuf al-Masri, had pledged allegiance to ISIS.^[49] The two sides fought for hours. Eventually, the Shaitat forces were forced to withdraw to their villages.^[50]

On June 29, 2014, the world awoke to the news that ISIS had declared itself ‘the Islamic caliphate,’ with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph. ISIS released a video showing its official spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, and some military commanders watching the demolition of a section of the border between Iraq and Syria.^[51]

On July 1, 2014, ISIS seized control of Bukamal.^[52] The town is strategically placed on the Iraq–Syria border. Only a few pockets of resistance remained in the countryside: Jabhat al-Nusra in Shahil; Bashair al-Nasr in Ashara; and Bayareq al-Shaitat in the Shaitat villages. There was no other option left to these militias than to join the negotiations that ISIS had started in Shahil in late June.

ISIS negotiated with the Jabhat al-Nusra commanders in Shahil from the position of a victor. The terms it dictated were: the town and both heavy and light weapons were to be handed over. Fighters and residents would declare their ‘repentance.’ The residents would leave their homes for 10 days, but could return after that, once ISIS had secured the area.^[53] Those who declared allegiance to ISIS would have their weapons returned.

When the terms became clear, Jabhat al-Nusra decided to withdraw its fighters, commanders, and heavy weapons during the night, in coordination with other groups, including Bashair al-Nasr and the Shaitat brigades. Some Shaitat fighters were involved specifically in the plan to withdraw the heavy weapons.

Jabhat al-Nusra withdrew into the desert with its heavy weapons on June 1 and 2, 2014, accompanied by fighters from Liwa Omar al-Mukhtar, Bashair al-Nasr, Ahrar al-Sham, the Shaitat brigades, and others. They then moved in two directions. Fighters from Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Asala wa al-Tanmiya, Liwa Omar al-Mukhtar, the Shaitat brigades, and Bashair al-Nasr headed to the Qalamoun region in central Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra fighters, meanwhile, headed to southern Syria,^[54] where they joined up with groups in Daraa and Quneitra.^[55]

In a video statement dated July 3, 2014, the militias remaining in Shahil, along with local dignitaries, declared their allegiance to ISIS and their total break with its enemies.^[56] ISIS then occupied Shahil and displaced its residents – approximately 30,000 people – for 10 days, in accordance with the agreement.^[57]

The handover of Shahil marked the end of Jabhat al-Nusra’s presence in Deir ez-Zor province. ISIS took control of Mayadin too (also on July 3, 2014) once Jabhat al-Nusra fighters had left. In Ashara and the nearby villages, some militias withdrew, while others – along with some local dignitaries and tribal chiefs – pledged allegiance to ISIS. Qouriya town avoided a battle when some of the fighters and dignitaries there – influenced by the ISIS commander Mahmoud Matar – released a video in which they pledged allegiance to ISIS.^[58] (The Omar oil field fell at the same time as Qouriya.)

It is worth noting that the militias and local dignitaries did not pledge allegiance because they endorsed the ISIS ideology. They did so, rather, as a pragmatic response to the military reality that ISIS had imposed on the region. They joined after being effectively defeated. ISIS demanded public, filmed pledges of allegiance as an admission of this defeat. But even that submission did not save many. ISIS executed and imprisoned its former opponents in Mayadin, Bukamal, Qouriya, Ashara, and other towns, targeting in particular former Jabhat al-Nusra fighters and commanders, as well as officers of the Free Syrian Army brigades.

ISIS captured village after village in the countryside without a fight. When it took Abu Hardoub village, it had reached the edge of the Shaitat areas that contain the towns of Abu Hamam, Gharanij, and Kishkiyya. On July 4, ISIS captured Biqrus, west of Mayadin, and the Tanak oil field in the Shaitat desert.^[59]

ISIS picked up negotiations for the handover of the Shaitat areas on July 7, 2014. In effect, these negotiations had begun during the negotiations for Shahil. Some of the Shaitat commanders met local dignitaries and other residents to decide on a unified response regarding either resistance or withdrawal. Then the Shaitat sent a military delegation to Shaddadi to negotiate with ISIS. In a meeting brokered by local figures, the Shaitat delegation – led by Abdul Baset al-Muhammad, a commander in the Katibat al-Hamza militia – met the ISIS governor of Hasakah, a Saudi national called Abu Jabal.^[60] The negotiations at that stage were general and did not touch on specifics. However, ISIS leaders made clear that the Shaitat would not have a similar status to Jabhat al-Nusra in the negotiations.

When detailed negotiations for the handover of the Shaitat areas began, ISIS divided the talks by village and militia. It conducted separate negotiations with the militias of Abu Hamam and Kishkiyya (Katibat al-Hamza). At the negotiations in Abu Hamam, ISIS was represented by Abu Saif al-Shaiti. Negotiations were held in the Laiz neighborhood of Gharanij with the town’s militias (Liwa Ibn al-Qayyim and Katibat Ahfad Aysha) and local dignitaries.

The demands of the Shaitat were: that ISIS would not set up military bases in the Shaitat towns; that ISIS would provide work opportunities for the youth in the oil fields of the Shaitat desert; and that a local would be put in charge of the area.

The terms presented by ISIS, on the other hand, were: that the Shaitat’s weapons would be handed over under supervision, and Shaitat commanders would declare their repentance – those who did so would be spared, no matter how many ISIS fighters they had killed, but they would be kept under house arrest; that those who chose to leave would be permitted to do so; and, finally, that the Shaitat towns would come under the full control of ISIS. It would raise ISIS flags and be patrolled by ISIS fighters.^[61]

The Shaitat militias had no choice but to accept the terms. An agreement was reached on July 8, 2014. It began to be implemented between July 9 and 12, 2014, when the Shaitat started handing over weapons in the Tanak oil field. In most cases, however, old weapons and 4×4 cars were handed over. Many light and medium weapons, such as 23-mm anti-tank guns and 57-mm artillery, were hidden instead.

ISIS was not happy with either the quantity or type of weapons that were handed over. ISIS had fought these militias for more than six months, so knew very well that they possessed heavier weapons. In this context, news about threats to some of the militia commanders began to circulate. This and other matters caused them to leave the three Shaitat towns. With ISIS in control, and local issues seemingly in the hands of local dignitaries, the military commanders considered their task complete. Most left for Turkey or for areas in Aleppo province controlled by the Free Syrian Army between July 12 and 20, 2014. They moved immediately after ISIS declared full control of the Shaitat areas on July 12, 2014. ISIS had given its former opponents a grace period until July 17 to complete their ‘repentance.’^[62]

On July 14, 2014, two days after the Shaitat had handed over their weapons, ISIS entered the areas controlled by the opposition militias in Deir ez-Zor city without a fight.^[63] After Jabhat al-Nusra’s withdrawal and the fall of the countryside to ISIS, the opposition militias had no other option but to come to terms. Some pledged allegiance to ISIS, while those who refused were ejected and headed to Aleppo and Idlib provinces. At that point, ISIS had control over the entire province of Deir ez-Zor except for the Assad regime’s remaining positions, which comprised two neighborhoods in the city and the military air base in the countryside.

ISIS now changed the name of the province to Wilayat al-Khair (Province of Goodness). It later delineated new administrative borders for the province, after announcing the creation of Wilayat al-Furat (Province of the Euphrates) in Iraq, which included the Syrian town of Bukamal.

The battles that ended in ISIS controlling more than 95 percent of Deir ez-Zor province left a huge number of civilian and military casualties. Human rights monitors estimate that a total 7,000 people, civilians and fighters, died in less than six months of fighting between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. The figure covers all of Syria, without breaking down the specific numbers for Deir ez-Zor, which was the main stage of battle.^[64] As well as the dead, hundreds of thousands were displaced by the ISIS takeover, with the total number estimated to be over 350,000. Some moved to nearby provinces or further afield in Syria, while others sought refuge in Turkey and other countries.^[65]

The Municipality Incident: The Catalyst of the Massacre

 

Amid a widespread sense of demoralization in Deir ez-Zor province after the ISIS takeover, there was at first a cautious calm in the three Shaitat towns. However, almost immediately, ISIS violated the agreement it had reached with the Shaitat. Before a week had passed, the organization set up a military base in Kishkiyya. Then it set up a checkpoint on the main road and began harassing people there with regard to their beards, dress, or smoking habits. And it repressed former fighters in the opposition militias.^[66]

Many Shaitat men who had fought with Jabhat al-Nusra were detained and tortured – part of a wider purge of former Jabhat al-Nusra fighters.^[67] Others were forced by increasingly visible ISIS security agents to once again declare their repentance, and once again hand over one Kalashnikov and eight magazines per man. The men had no choice but to comply if they wished to avoid prosecution in the future. The same measures were applied to anybody who had formerly worked with the opposition militias in any way, and all former media workers.^[68]

The Shaitat understood these violations of the agreement as a punishment imposed by the victor on the vanquished. They had no choice but to adapt.

The gravest violation occurred on July 30, 2014, when an ISIS patrol raided a house in Abu Hamam in order to arrest a man from the al-Nahhab family. The eight-man ISIS patrol came in a 4×4 car. They included foreigners (a Belgian and a Moroccan) and locals, three of whom were men of the Shaitat tribe. According to witness testimonies, these local ISIS members bore a grudge against the man whose house was raided. They used their attachment to ISIS to exact their revenge.

The patrol headed to the al-Nahhab family home in Abu Hamam, intending to arrest a number of people there on account of a report filed by a family that had secretly pledged allegiance to ISIS. In particular, they wanted to arrest 40-year-old Hamdan Hamid al-Alyan, who was back home on vacation from his job in Kuwait. When al-Alyan refused to cooperate, the ISIS patrol shot him dead, then started to leave. But as they were going, a neighbor – Muhammad al-Nasser al-Faraj, 22 years old – came out to see what was happening. Hearing shooting next door, he had brought a personal weapon with him. He was arrested, and summarily executed. Then his corpse was mutilated in the market area of Abu Hamam.^[69]

The incident shocked the Shaitat. Within hours, people gathered to protest. An improvised militia was rapidly put together by civilians and former fighters – around 50 men – in Abu Hamam.^[70] The militia set out immediately and attacked an ISIS military vehicle on the town’s main road. The vehicle was carrying two ISIS members. One was a local commander named Akla al-Burjes; he was killed on the spot. The other was released.^[71]

Next, the militia headed to the military base that ISIS had set up in Kishkiyya in violation of the agreement. The ISIS base was located in the town’s former municipality building. Shaitat fighters clashed with the ISIS fighters in the base, killing two (a local and a Belgian immigrant) and capturing four others (three locals and a Moroccan).^[72] The captives included the ISIS sharia officer responsible for the Shaitat areas, a man known as Abu Juleibib.^[73] A few hours later, relatives of one of the murdered Shaitat men killed the Moroccan and one of the local ISIS captives. The remaining two ISIS members, one of them the ISIS sharia officer, were handed into the custody of a local dignitary.^[74]

News of this attack quickly reached the ISIS leadership. The closest ISIS position to Kishkiyya was in the Tanak oil field. The same day, ISIS arrested 26 Shaitat civilians who had been employed at the Tanak oil field according to the agreement. These civilians knew nothing about the incident in Kishkiyya.^[75]

An atmosphere of tense apprehension covered the Shaitat areas on the evening of July 30, 2014, as news of the incident spread. It soon became known as the ‘Municipality Incident’. In an attempt to defuse the situation, meetings were held between local dignitaries and the hastily formed Shaitat militia. The militia had rapidly increased in size to around 100 men at that point, most in Abu Hamam. They divided into groups manning three fronts (the desert, Abu Hardoub, and the river) to ward off potential ISIS attacks.

Some claim that certain men joined the new militia out of personal interest, often connected to the oil trade. Nevertheless, the main reason most of the men joined was their outraged tribal identity. The men were provoked by the killing and mutilation of their kinsmen. The sense of solidarity with the tribe was strong in the Shaitat community.

The militia carried light weapons (Kalashnikovs, PK machine guns, RPGs, and sniper rifles) in addition to some medium weapons (anti-tank guns and Shilka) that had been hidden rather than handed over to ISIS at the time of the agreement.^[76] But despite their possession of these weapons, the power imbalance between the militia and ISIS was enormous. The Shaitat’s military leadership had left the area, all their heavy weapons and most of their light weapons had been handed over, and there was an ammunition shortage.

It appeared to the Shaitat that ISIS had limited its response in the first days to detaining the oil employees. Unbeknownst to them, however, some ISIS sharia officers had actually taken further steps. The most prominent among these officers was Abu Abdullah al-Kuwaiti, who issued a notorious fatwa that day describing the entire Shaitat tribe as “violators of the agreement and mutineers against the rule of sharia” as represented by ISIS. The fatwa classified the tribe as “a group rebelling with force,” that is, a group that refused to submit to the rulings of ‘the sharia,’ and one that did so with force, that is, with weapons and from defensive positions. Therefore, the fatwa ruled, the Shaitat in general were: “An apostate group that must be declared as such, and must be fought as the disbelievers are fought, by the consensus of the scholars, even if they submit to the ruling of sharia and do not reject it. It is not permitted to make pacts or truces with them, nor peace. Those of them detained must not be released or exchanged for money or men. Their slaughtered animals must not be eaten. It is not permitted to marry their women or to enslave them. It is permissible to kill those of them who are detained. It is permissible to kill those fleeing and those wounded. They must be fought, even if they did not attack us first.”^[77]

Even though no official ISIS document carries the text of the fatwa – ISIS fighters were usually informed of them by word of mouth – its implementation is documented in official correspondence sent by the ISIS leadership in Wilayat al-Khair (Deir ez-Zor) to the provincial sharia officer, Abu Farouq al-Tunisi. A copy of the correspondence was published by the Daily Mail. The British newspaper reported that it had been leaked by former ISIS members. The correspondence comprised two short lines: “To brother Abu al-Farouq al-Tunisi… Please abide fully by the fatwa of the scholar Abu Abdullah al-Kuwaiti in the matter of the Shaitat apostates, point by point. It is for the sake of Allah, and may Allah reward you my honorable brother.” The document is dated Shawwal 3, 1435 hijri, which corresponds to July 30, 2014. It bears the seal of Wilayat al-Khair and the signature of the sender.^[78] As the date of the document shows, the fatwa was delivered and the order to carry it out was given within hours of the Municipality Incident.

A copy of the correspondence sent by the leadership of the Islamic State in Wilayat al-Khayr (Deir ez-Zor)

to Abu Farouk al-Tunisi, the sharia official in the Wilayat, bearing the text of the fatwa

 

This provided an ideological/sharia justification for the abuses that were to come, and served to mobilize ISIS fighters. The text of the fatwa would be translated into actions on the ground, point by point, as required by the implementation order, and would spark a 12-day battle.

Detailing the developments of each day of the battle contributes to our understanding of how events unfolded, and the context of the massacre against the Shaitat tribe.

From July 30 on, ISIS propaganda referred to the tribe as “the Shaitat apostates.”The following is a chronological rundown of the days of the battle that followed.

Day One, July 31, 2014

ISIS launched its first attempt to storm the Shaitat areas at dawn. It started on the edges of Abu Hamam because this town was closer to its forces based in Abu Hardoub, and because most of the Shaitat fighters were concentrated in the town. It was more difficult to attack Kishkiyya first in any case, as ISIS fighters risked being surrounded by forces from Gharanij and Abu Hamam. The ISIS leadership in the area thought that the battle was going to be easy, especially since heavy weapons had been confiscated from the Shaitat, most light weapons had been handed over, and most Shaitat commanders had left for other areas.

Contrary to ISIS expectations, however, its first incursion failed. ISIS used light and medium machine guns and mortar shells^[79] and it relied on local militia that had only recently pledged allegiance. On the other hand, the Shaitat fighters quickly moved from defense to offense, especially after receiving reinforcements from other Shaitat areas. By evening, they had managed to advance with help from local residents, taking full control of Abu Hardoub. There were fierce clashes as ISIS shelled the village, setting the local mosque on fire.^[80] By the end of the first day, ISIS had retreated to al-Jarzi village, with around 14 of its fighters dead or wounded. Four Shaitat fighters had been killed, and others were wounded, in addition to dead and wounded among the fighters of Abu Hardoub.

ISIS shared on its social channels, meanwhile, photographs of the civilian oil employees who had been detained the previous day. They appeared handcuffed in some of the photographs. Others showed them being tortured. All the photos were captioned with the following words: “Hyenas of al-Sharqiyya… in the grasp of the caliphate’s lions.” The photos heightened tensions in the Shaitat areas and increased fears about the fate of the captives.^[81]

Day Two, August 1, 2014

On the second day, the two sides fought fiercely on the edges of al-Jarzi town. The Shaitat fighters advanced, capturing al-Jarzi al-Sharqi near Abu Hardoub. During this advance, a group composed of residents from the nearby Sweidan village attacked ISIS fighters, burned their main base in the village, and forced them to retreat from there and the neighboring village of al-Jarzi al-Gharbi.^[82] Fighters on both sides were killed.

The Shaitat fighters continued their advance, and this encouraged many in the nearby areas. Militias in Ashara composed of former Free Syrian Army fighters attacked the main ISIS checkpoint in the town, expelling the fighters.^[83]

As the fighting expanded to more locations, many civilians fled. Both sides suffered casualties, meanwhile, and tried to reorganize their fighters. The Shaitat fighters reorganized their militias, with Abdul Baset al-Muhammad taking military leadership. A former commander in the Hamza brigade, al-Muhammad fought many battles against Assad-regime forces before joining the fight against ISIS in Deir ez-Zor. Unlike other commanders, he hadn’t left for Turkey or northern Syria. He had field experience and was well known to the Shaitat.^[84]

Abdul Baset al-Muhammad taking the Shaitat fighters leader (Local Sources)

 

Also on this day, dignitaries decided to release the two remaining ISIS captives without negotiations. The freed captives headed to the Tanak oil field.

Day Three, August 2, 2014

Surprising military developments occurred at dawn. ISIS fighters made a partial retreat from the Jazira/eastern-countryside front (the area stretching from the Shaitat towns to Baghouz on the Iraqi border) but kept on patrolling there. They also withdrew from some oil fields in the Shaitat desert, gathering at the Tanak oil field, which became a battle command center. This strange retreat had multiple aims, most notably to mass ISIS fighters in the battle zone and to secure the largest oil field. This was especially important as ISIS had captured the area only recently and had not yet established strict control. Another goal was to open up a route for those Shaitat who wished to retreat. ISIS did not want to lay full siege to the area for fear that the entire tribe might rise against it. At the time, it was trying to limit the battle to the militias in Abu Hamam.

Battles continued simultaneously in the al-Jarzi desert, Abu Hardoub, and Sweidan, causing many people to flee their homes. ISIS launched a fierce attack on the Abu Hamam desert and Shaitat fighters rushed from the fronts in nearby villages to repel this attack. ISIS also set up artillery in the Dweir area, opposite Abu Hamam, and began shelling the town. ISIS fighters advanced toward Ashara, which had risen the previous day, and recaptured it.

During the day, news spread that ISIS had killed the oil employees at the Tanak oil field, but nobody had yet seen any proof.

Day Four, August 3, 2014

ISIS brought a military column from al-Qa’im in Iraq into Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside;^[85] 4×4 cars carrying fighters and weapons moved through the villages and towns of the area in an intimidatory display of power. The column contained heavy weapons such as Gvozdika artillery, tanks, as well as the American Hummers that ISIS had captured in Mosul.

As the battles continued, meanwhile, ISIS fighters recaptured Sweidan Jazira. The Shaitat fighters retreated to the edges of Abu Hardoub and al-Jarzli amid fierce clashes on the Abu Hamam desert front.^[86]

The most significant event of the day was that improvised civilian groups (former oil traders, people who worked at the burners or in transportation, and others) took control of some of the oil fields in the Shaitat desert. Because ISIS had redeployed its fighters from these fields to the Tanak oil field, the civilians thought that it had lost the area and would not return. They sought to take advantage of the situation, but some would ultimately meet their end by the oil installations.^[87]

Day Five, August 4, 2014

After bringing in reinforcements and intensifying the shelling, ISIS managed to recapture al-Jarzi al-Sharqi and al-Jarzi al-Gharbi.^[88] The Shaitat fighters retreated to Abu Hamam. Most of the clashes occurred on the Sanour front. After capturing al-Jarzi, ISIS fighters arrested and summarily executed civilians as they were moving about the village. Some residents of Sweidan Jazira who had been displaced by fighting in the previous days, meanwhile, returned to their homes now that ISIS had regained control.^[89]

On this day, rumors spread that the Shaitat militias that had retreated to Qalamoun when ISIS captured Deir ez-Zor might return to support their relatives, and might bring heavy weapons with them. This would remain a false hope. The rumor may have started because the Shaitat and other militias that had withdrawn from Deir ez-Zor had formed a new alliance in Qalamoun – Jaish Osoud al-Sharqiyya – which declared that its main goal was to fight against ISIS.^[90]

Day Six, August 5, 2014

ISIS brought further reinforcements from Shaddadi in Hasakah, and attacked fiercely.^[91] New clashes occurred on the edges of al-Jarzi al-Sharqi. However, the fiercest battles were in Abu Hamam. Here, ISIS fighters tried to infiltrate via the Euphrates from Abu Hardoub, but the Shaitat were able to repel them. Heavy shelling caused many more people to flee the Shaitat areas, especially Abu Hamam.

The important role of ISIS foreign fighters became clear in these battles. The organization fielded fighters from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, and elsewhere, as well as the Libyan al-Battar militia, which was notorious for its brutality. It appears ISIS chose to deploy the Libyan militia as a result of its local forces’ failure over the previous days.^[92] ISIS also waged a propaganda battle to spread fear about the strength of the al-Battar militia.

This day marked the first deployment of ISIS suicide bombers in the battle. Also on this day, ISIS published photographs of the Shaitat civilians it had executed in al-Jarzi village the day before. Their heads had been cut off and displayed on the main road.^[93]

ISIS also prevented the displaced residents of Abu Hardoub and al-Jarzi al-Sharqi from returning to their homes, because some fighters from those villages had joined the Shaitat offensive. The displaced were only allowed to return in mid-September 2014,^[94] on the condition that each village provided ISIS with a specific amount of weapons.

Meanwhile, the Assad regime’s air force bombed an ISIS position in al-Jarzi. Regime media and loyalist social media channels suggested that the strike was carried out in support of the Shaitat fighters. In reality, it was part of a series of attacks launched by the regime against ISIS since the local militias had been defeated. At the time, ISIS was preparing to attack regime positions at the Deir ez-Zor and Tabqa air bases. The airstrikes therefore aimed to weaken ISIS throughout the province and the eastern region as a whole, not just in the Shaitat areas. A review of regime airstrikes on this day shows that they targeted ISIS positions in multiple towns and villages far from the Shaitat areas, in Zir, Qouriyya, Basira, Bukamal, and elsewhere.^[95]

A day earlier, regime forces had targeted Deir ez-Zor’s western countryside with heavy airstrikes and artillery shelling, causing the displacement of 5,000 residents, mostly women and children, from the villages of Ayyash al-Kharita and Hawayij Ziyab toward the areas of al-Zighir Shamiyya and Shamitiyya, near the Euphrates. The bombing also targeted ISIS positions in Tayyana, causing the death of civilians, including children.^[96]

The regime would continue to attempt to win over the tribes of Deir ez-Zor in general and the Shaitat in particular – to make them a first line of defense for its belated fight against ISIS.^[97]

Day Seven, August 6, 2014

Early in the day, lines of communication were opened between the two sides. These were brokered by local Shaitat dignitaries, notably Abu Seif al-Shaiti and Jaafar al-Khalifa, who had pledged allegiance to ISIS and were biased in the organization’s favor. ISIS demands at the time were: that the names of those who had participated in the fighting were to be given to ISIS; that the civilians were to leave their homes for some days while ISIS combed and secured the Shaitat areas; and that residents would guarantee that no support would be given to the fighters, and that no new volunteers would join them.

The negotiations failed. Shaitat dignitaries and fighters rejected the ISIS demands, particularly concerning the displacement of civilians and the handing over of fighters’ names. There were around 200 Shaitat fighters at the time, 100 of them active on the front lines, and the rest guarding the rear or their own neighborhoods.^[98]

More civilians chose to leave their homes, especially after heavy shelling targeted Abu Hamam from the desert and the Euphrates.

Day Eight, August 7, 2014

ISIS released photographs purporting to show the execution of the 26 civilian oil employees arrested on July 30, 2014. The 26 were shot dead or had had their throats cut in an open space in the desert.^[99] The precise location of the massacre was discovered six years later.^[100]

The photographs provoked a lot of anger and motivated more people, especially the relatives of the murdered oil workers, to join the militias in Abu Hamam.

ISIS continued its indiscriminate shelling of Abu Hamam. It hit battle positions, houses, and schools, causing civilian casualties and a new wave of displacement from Abu Hamam to the villages around Bukamal or on the other side of the Euphrates/Shamiyya.^[101] Under cover of the shelling, the ISIS forces advanced. They included foreign fighters marching on foot. They were spearheaded by the Libyan al-Battar militia, but the Libyans were ambushed, and suffered around 20 casualties. Around 15 ISIS fighters were captured, including minors.^[102]

A few hours later, ISIS launched another attack, using Hummers and armored vehicles. This assault broke the Shaitat’s first line of defense. As the Shaitat fighters retreated and ISIS advanced, efforts were made to mobilize support for the fighters in Abu Hamam. The mosques of the Shaitat areas and social media accounts broadcast appeals for help. In response, a group of volunteers headed from Gharanij toward Abu Hamam.^[103] The group was shelled by ISIS midway. This made some turn back, but others reached Abu Hamam. This increased the number of Shaitat fighters in Abu Hamam to approximately 250. Together, they set up a second defensive line.

During the day’s battles, the Shaitat fighters used 57-mm artillery for the first time, but it did not make much difference, due to a shortage of ammunition.^[104]

Day Nine, August 8, 2014

The clashes continued amid heavy shelling of Abu Hamam. By this point, around 70 percent of residents had fled, and the remaining 30 percent were sheltering on the outskirts of the town, away from the front line.

During the day, increasing numbers of people fled from other Shaitat areas toward Bukamal. ISIS patrols arrested some of them in al-Bahra village. Later, it became known that ISIS had executed these people on the spot.^[105] From this day on, displaced Shaitat were arrested in and around Bukamal.

The most significant event of the day was ISIS attacking multiple oil fields, including Bir al-Milh. ISIS had withdrawn from these fields on the third day of the battle. On the fourth day, groups of Shaitat civilians had moved in and taken control of them. Now, ISIS captured around 20 civilians who were operating the oil field machinery. Most managed to escape, however. For a few weeks, the fate of the detainees remained unknown. Later, ISIS released video footage showing some of them being executed near Bir al-Milh.^[106]

Day Ten, August 9, 2014

The developments of the tenth day were critical. ISIS intensified its shelling and launched a new attack on Abu Hamam from two fronts. The Shaitat defenses collapsed. The fighters lost control of half the town and retreated to the Qahawi area in the town center.

The defenses collapsed for many reasons, including: the shortage of heavy weapons and of ammunition; an insufficient number of fighters to cover every front or to properly rotate so that they could rest; insufficient medical supplies to treat the rapidly rising number of casualties; and the fact that fighters sometimes had to leave the battlefield to assist their fleeing families.^[107]

A loss of morale had a big impact too. After 10 days of fierce fighting, no local or international body had offered significant support. Certainly, some limited support came from neighboring tribes, such as the Shaitat’s relatives in the Akidat tribe. Shafa village secretly provided weapons and ammunition, and the villages of Abu Hardoub, al-Jarzi, Sweidan, and Ashara had risen. But this was not enough to change the tide of battle. The Shaitat did not receive active, organized military support from the neighboring tribes. ISIS had been working hard to win over prominent figures in various tribes, which caused great division. Beyond that, ISIS had recently combed and purged the villages of the region. Their residents were afraid of being persecuted.

The ISIS advance and the Shaitat retreat provoked another wave of displacement from Abu Hamam. The town emptied almost completely after the fighters warned the civilians that their ammunition was running out and they might not be able to continue fighting. Fearing the battles might spread, many people left Kishkiyya and Gharanij too. Most fled to villages near Bukamal, such as Shafa, Sousa, Hajin, and Bahra.^[108]

At this point, the Shaitat fighters received news of a possible ISIS attack on Gharanij, aiming to besiege the Shaitat fighters in Abu Hamam. This led them to set up checkpoints around Gharanij facing the desert and Bahra.

The first ISIS attack came in the evening, with a car bomb driven by a man bearing the nom de guerre Abu Mujahed al-Jazrawi. The car bomb blew up at a Shaitat checkpoint on the Bahra road, killing six fighters and wounding a number of civilians.^[109] The chaos of the mass displacement, with the roads crowded, exacerbated the destruction of the car bomb.

Meanwhile, the Assad regime’s air force launched two airstrikes on locations around the Shaitat areas. One hit an ISIS base at Marwaniyya school. The other hit artillery pieces in Dweir. These strikes, like the previous ones, were part of a series of attacks on ISIS locations throughout Deir ez-Zor. This time, however, the Shaitat residents found leaflets in the streets shortly before the strikes. They contained words of support and encouragement to continue fighting, and were signed by the Syrian armed forces. The leaflets were dropped over many other villages and towns in Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside. One leaflet encouraged the various clans of the eastern countryside to rise up against ISIS. It reminded them of their history of struggle and called on their tribal solidarity.^[110] Some residents think that helicopters dropped the leaflets, but the majority think the Assad regime’s informants in the area had secretly dropped them in the streets.

The leaflets had little impact on the Shaitat or the other clans of Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside. People knew that the regime had attacked them with various weapons over the previous years. Moreover, most of the clans in these areas were overwhelmingly opposed to the Assad regime.

Nevertheless, the leaflets, and the activities of Assad-regime agents in the area, created some confusion. A few Shaitat fighters in Abu Hamam suggested flying the Syrian flag used by the Assad regime in an attempt to receive air support. But the suggestion was rejected by the majority, who were implacably opposed to the regime; many had in the past fought against the Assad forces. For ISIS, though, the leaflets served to paint the Shaitat fighters as agents of the Assad regime.^[111]

The regime did not succeed in winning over the area’s population. Neither did it influence the battle between the Shaitat fighters and ISIS.^[112]

Day Eleven, August 10, 2014

In the afternoon, ISIS fighters managed to sneak behind the Shaitat fighters into Gharanij and Kiskhiyya. They set up mortar cannons and positioned snipers on the high buildings of these towns. This greatly complicated the situation. The Shaitat fighters in Abu Hamam were now surrounded on all sides, except for the River Euphrates, their only remaining retreat route.

This led to their collapse. They retreated in groups from Kishkiyya and Abu Hamam to Gharanij and the villages around Bukamal. Fighters led by Abdul Baset al-Muhammad took positions in Gharanij, but the majority sought refuge around Bukamal. There was no possibility of success, so they got rid of their weapons and hid among civilians.^[113]

A delegation of Shaitat dignitaries now headed to Qa’im, just across the border in Iraq, to meet the ISIS governor and to try to set up a meeting with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in order to seek pardon for the civilians. However, after it had been made to wait, the delegation was not offered meetings with those leaders. Instead, an ISIS field commander informed the delegation that any attempts to intervene were rejected, and that the Shaitat areas would be stormed. He then told them to leave immediately.^[114]

Some media outlets reported that ISIS had already re-established control over the Shaitat areas.^[115] ISIS stormed schools in Shafa where displaced Shaitat civilians were sheltering. Dozens were arrested and around seven were executed. The rest were taken to prisons in Iraq, according to eyewitnesses.

Day Twelve, August 11, 2014

After the withdrawal of the Shaitat fighters, ISIS entered Kishkiyya and Abu Hamam and started searching every house. Nobody remained in the towns except imams taking refuge in their mosques, and some women, elderly people, and disabled people who had stayed to protect their homes. ISIS filmed itself summarily executing some of these people and the videos were later leaked.^[116]

In the afternoon, ISIS attacked Gharanij from the desert. Three small Shaitat groups remained in the town – 40 fighters at most, who had retreated from Abu Hamam. They tried to resist, but in vain. They retreated toward Hajin after burying some weapons and throwing others into the Euphrates.^[117]

A group of Gharanij dignitaries released a video and a written statement later that day. They disowned the fighters and asked for the civilians to be pardoned.^[118] This had no effect. Huge numbers fled from Gharanij toward Bukamal’s villages. The town was almost completely emptied.

ISIS declared control of the Shaitat areas after 12 days of battle. Its victory did not conclude the events, however. It actually led to more bloodshed.

Approximately 23 Shaitat fighters were killed in the battles, and tens more were wounded, according to testimonies of Shaitat fighters who were present. No information is available concerning the number of ISIS casualties. (ISIS did not announce its battle losses.)

Most of the fighters left for other areas. A small group led by Abdul Baset al-Muhammad was surrounded in the desert. This made them decide to cross into the Assad regime’s areas. They continued their fight against ISIS thereafter under the banner of the Assad regime and Russia. Another group of fighters later joined the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in their US-sponsored fight against ISIS. Still others joined the Shaitat militias in the opposition brigades that fought against ISIS in Qalamoun, the Syrian desert, and elsewhere.

Massacre and Displacement: Elements of Genocide

 

After ISIS had taken control of their region, the displaced civilians of Shaitat were concentrated in the towns and villages of Bukamal. They were overwhelmed by fear as ISIS began targeting them with arrest campaigns during the last days of the battle, and as images and accounts of summary executions began to arrive.

On August 12, 2014, ISIS brought large numbers of fighters into the Bukamal villages, set up checkpoints and roadblocks, and pursued any Shaitat fighters who had fled to the area.

The largest proportion of the displaced civilians were concentrated in the villages and towns of Bahra, Shaafa, Sousa, Hajin and others, where they sheltered with relatives, with families who had opened their homes to them, in schools, tents, and damaged buildings, and by the sides of the roads. A smaller number of women and children were displaced to a camp in the Abu Hamam desert, where conditions were harsh.^[119]

In the first two days after the fighting ended, a relative calm prevailed in the villages of Bukamal. This was short-lived, however. ISIS launched an arrest campaign on August 14, 2014. Led by the Libyan Battar Battalion and local ISIS security groups, the campaign targeted displaced civilians, particularly in Hajin and Bahra, where most were concentrated. Many civilian men, young and old, were arrested randomly. Several were summarily executed before they had reached the places of detention. They were charged with nothing other than being from the Shaitat.^[120]

The campaign escalated. Places where displaced civilians had gathered – schools, tent camps, and private homes – were targeted. Many were also arrested at the checkpoints deployed by ISIS on the main roads – especially the Jaabi checkpoint between Hajin and Bahra, the Shaafa checkpoint, and the Salhiya–Shamiyya checkpoint, where Shaitat civilians trying to flee to Damascus were arrested. Those arrested either carried identity cards showing they came from Gharanij, Kishkiyya, and Abu Hamam, or they were pointed out by local ISIS informants.

According to testimonies by the relatives of victims, these arrests were often followed by summary executions. Executions occurred in various locations, including in schools repurposed by ISIS as temporary detention centers for those arrested at nearby checkpoints. For instance, at the Shaafa checkpoint, numerous Shaitat civilians, including women and children, were abducted and taken to a nearby school. Many of the men and boys were summarily executed. At other ISIS checkpoints, detainees were taken to nearby open areas for execution. ISIS patrols also raided the tents of displaced civilians, taking individual males or sometimes all male family members to locations about a kilometer away to be killed. In some cases, the victims’ bodies were left at the execution site. This forced their families, especially those who had heard the gunshots minutes after the arrest and at close range, to wait until sunset to sneak to the execution sites, retrieve the bodies of their loved ones, and secretly bury them.^[121]

Such incidents, whether experienced directly by the displaced civilians or indirectly through conversation and ‘leaked videos,’ put most males in a state of apprehension. This led them to either flee these areas or go into hiding. They hid in houses, in the desert, or in farmland on both sides of the Euphrates River. They fled by side roads and using false papers. Some mothers even dressed their men up as women during raids.^[122]

During the first two days of the campaign, more than 500 people from the Shaitat clan, including minors, were detained, and dozens were executed. ISIS published photos of large numbers of detainees being held in various places or being loaded into ISIS vehicles. Some were transferred to detention centers set up in empty Shaitat towns or to other areas under ISIS control in Deir ez-Zor province, such as the Omar oil field.^[123]

A video leaked by an ISIS member shows prisoners from the Shaitat

tribe (a copy is preserved in the IPM archive)

 

The arrest campaigns continued to expand beyond the towns of Bukamal to target members of the Shaitat clan living in various ISIS-controlled areas throughout Deir ez-Zor province, such as the towns of Mayadeen, Ashara, and others. ISIS also issued orders to arrest the Shaitat at checkpoints in other Syrian provinces under its control, such as Raqqa and the countryside of Hasakah and Aleppo, where a number were arrested while trying to escape. ISIS also warned drivers heading to Damascus not to transport wanted Shaitat men carrying forged papers, threatening to burn their vehicles and kill them if they did.

The word Shaitat itself had become a serious accusation. Anyone who dealt with the tribe’s members by covering for them or harboring their wanted males was at risk of being killed. This was especially true after ISIS warned some towns – such as Shaafa – against harboring the Shaitat, threatening to kill anyone who covered for them.

ISIS detainees from the al-Shaitat tribe (Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association)

 

Several incidents were reported in which civilians from other clans and towns were arrested and killed simply for hosting displaced or wanted individuals belonging to the Shaitat clan. Some of these hosts, adhering to their tribal customs, refused to hand over their Shaitat guests and clashed with ISIS members. This resistance led to their arrest or killing along with their Shaitat guests, as well as the demolition of their houses.^[124] On the other hand, many families were afraid to take in those who had fled due to the potential threat that might pose.

As the raids continued, the number of detainees and missing persons increased, and the number of mass killings documented by eyewitnesses or filmed by civilians, or seen in videos leaked by ISIS members, escalated. Local human rights observatories and international news agencies estimated the number of victims to be around 700 dead and more than 1,800 missing.^[125] That harsh reality forced more than 40 Shaitat elders from Kishkiyya and Abu Hamam to appeal in a video recording to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, to stop the killing of innocent civilians.^[126] The appeal fell on deaf ears and the massacre continued to escalate.

The suffering of the displaced people was compounded by the scarcity of food and medical supplies, the high temperatures during that period, and the lack or cramped nature of housing due to multiple families being forced to share small spaces. In addition, the majority of civilians experienced displacement many times, as they moved from one town to another in search of safety in a short period of time. These difficult conditions forced some of them to sneak back to their towns in desperation to retrieve belongings like blankets. They were often caught and executed, particularly after ISIS had declared the Shaitat towns a military zone.^[127]

The tragedy was exacerbated by the grief and despair that gripped the families of the missing and the deceased. While the majority of families remained unaware of the fate of their loved ones, those who knew the location of their bodies buried them at night, and did so in haste and fear due to the threat of ISIS patrols. Women suppressed their screams and cries to avoid being discovered during these swift, secret burials, and families were prevented from holding mourning congregations or publicly expressing their grief.

The Shaitat women bore the greatest burden during this period. They had to search for their sons and husbands by visiting various ISIS bases, inquiring about them, and seeking any information they could, always to no avail. They also bore responsibility for securing basic daily needs, as the men were detained or hiding, fearing being arrested or killed.^[128]

While arrests and raids took place in many Bukamal towns, the empty Shaitat towns became another place of massacre. ISIS converted abandoned schools and houses in Gharanij, Kishkiyyah, and Abu Hamam towns into prisons in which people transferred from other Bukamal towns were detained, tortured, or executed. Many photos and videos were leaked that showed beheaded bodies scattered on the streets. A group of these images was leaked on August 19, 2014 by civilians who had sneaked into the Maadan neighborhood in Gharanij. Other pictures were later spread by ISIS members from the neighborhoods of Abu Hamam and Kishkiyya, or from the outskirts of Badia.^[129]

In those areas, ISIS seized abandoned houses and sold their contents in other towns as “spoils from the apostates.”^[130] Other houses, particularly those belonging to wanted persons, were either blown up or demolished, and the destruction was filmed and broadcast by ISIS.^[131]

On August 20, 2014, tribal delegations composed of notable Shaitat figures intensified their efforts to stop the massacre. They did so in response to the ongoing arrests, which now exceeded 2,000 detainees, and the violent practices, which bore the characteristics of a genocide. Several elders and sheikhs traveled to the ISIS strongholds in Deir ez-Zor province, such as Mayadin, Bukamal, Hajin, Jadid Akidat, Tayanah, and others, as well as to the Karama area in Raqqa governorate and to Mosul in Iraq.^[132] On August 24, 2014, Deir ez-Zor tribal figures and sheikhs issued a video statement calling on al-Baghdadi to pardon the Shaitat clan.^[133]

Although the intensive tribal efforts from August 20 to August 25, 2014 were unable to halt the killing and random arrest campaigns, they were relatively successful in creating divisions between ISIS commanders in the region. The commanders reacted differently to the delegations’ demands to stop the killings and lift the “severe apostasy” sentence on Shaitat’s Muslim civilians. Some ISIS commanders asked the delegations to provide lists of everyone who had fought against them during the battle so that the campaign could be eased. However, the delegations replied that they did not know those people and could not provide their names. Other foreign commanders asked the delegations to photograph the bodies in the streets in the Shaitat towns, as well as the mosques in the towns, so the matter could be reconsidered. This was intended to act as proof that the Shaitat were indeed Muslims, and therefore to cancel the apostasy charge against them.^[134] For that purpose, ISIS provided some of the delegates with official tasks. The order to undertake these tasks facilitated the delegates’ movement and prevented attacks against them. This was especially useful due to the declaration of the Shaitat towns as a military zone at that time.

By late August, disagreement among ISIS leaders in the region about whether to continue the campaign was evident. This led to arguments, witnessed by the tribal delegations, between some local and foreign ISIS leaders. They were divided between those who supported limiting the campaign and lifting the “severe apostasy” verdict, and those who wished to continue the campaign.^[135]

This disagreement was more evident in the new administrative divisions created by ISIS for Deir ez-Zor province. Most of the commanders who supported the continuation of the campaign were affiliated with the Wilayat al-Khair division, led by Abu Ayman al-Iraqi, who was appointed governor at that time, while some commanders who rejected the campaign were affiliated with the Wilayat al-Furat division, led by Abu Anas al-Iraqi. This dispute manifested in the pace of killing and the nature of the treatment of detainees. Shaitat detainees in Wilayat al-Khair –where the Battar Battalion and some local leaders such as Aamer al-Rafdan, Abu Hamam al-Tayana, Abu Saif al-Shaiti, Jafar al-Khalifa and others were present – were often killed immediately or subjected to severe torture. In Wilayat al-Furat, on the other hand, the level of violence against detainees was lower. However, both sides were guilty of killing Shaitat civilians, and the difference in treatment only became apparent in late August 2014.^[136]

The disagreement expanded to include ISIS leaders in Iraq, especially after Wilayat al-Furat had sent reports to the ‘Diwan of the Caliph’ explaining, “the Shaitat are Muslim civilians. Those who fought ISIS were only 10 percent of them, and they were in fact collaborators of the Syrian regime.” These reports were accompanied by photos of mosques and bodies of civilians in the streets. That prompted the ISIS leadership to send an investigation committee, led by Abu Suhaib al-Iraqi, who arrived in the area in early September, tasked with examining the situation. He met with ISIS military, security and religious leaders, as well as local figures, and reported directly to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on the Shaitat issue. In the meantime, orders were issued to ease the campaign of indiscriminate killing until the committee had completed its work and the matter had been decided upon.^[137]

While that decreased the frequency of ISIS raids on displaced civilians’ gatherings, homes, and schools, arrests at checkpoints never ceased, targeting in particular those wanted or suspected of having fought against ISIS, or the relatives of those who had done so. However, images of individual and mass executions that had taken place in previous days continued to emerge, whether from ISIS members themselves, civilians who had sneaked into Shaitat towns, or residents of the surrounding towns. One such video was published on August 30, 2014. It showed ISIS members torturing and then burning a group of Shaitat males on the bridge in Jarthi town. That crime was likely carried out between August 12 and 18, 2014.^[138]

With the investigation committee’s arrival in early September 2014, there was an expectation that a new, less harsh phase would begin for the Shaitat. However, this did not quite materialize, especially considering the significant number of detainees who remained in detention from before the committee’s arrival. The Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association estimated the number of those arrested from the tribe between August 8 and early September 2014 to be around 3,000. ISIS distributed these people among different prisons in its areas of control in Deir ez-Zor province. For that purpose, several prisons had been established in the Shaitat towns of Gharanij, Kishkiyya, and Abu Hamam. Many were also detained in prisons in Mayadin-Baloum, Bukamal, Shaafa, Baghouz, Bahra, Tayana, Dhiban, Hajin, the Tanak oil field, and the Omar oil field. Still more were detained in prisons further afield, in Raqqa and Hasaka, and Anbar in Iraq.^[139]

ISIS subjected the detainees to various types of psychological and physical torture in order to extract confessions concerning those who had fought the organization and the location of weapons. The poor food, insufficient health care, and compulsory prison work constituted another form of torture.^[140] The fate of the majority of detainees would remain unknown for a long time. A large proportion were also killed.

In addition to the detainees, the displacement of civilians from the towns of Gharanij, Kishkiyya, and Abu Hamam, with no prospect of return, was a continuation of the catastrophe. That fact had dictated several courses of action for different actors since the beginning of September 2014. First, while the Shaitat families continued their efforts to find out the fate of their missing loved ones – whether they were detainees or had reportedly been killed and their bodies never found – wanted men and others from the Shaitat towns were escaping by bribing ISIS members, forging identity papers, or smuggling themselves out through secret routes. As for tribal figures and sheikhs, the efforts of their delegations to release the detainees, retrieve the bodies, and return the displaced to their homes did not stop. These efforts were mediated by some local ISIS leaders and Shaitat members who, taking advantage of the events, portrayed themselves as the saviors and protectors of their clan. ISIS continued to consolidate its control in the area, pursuing wanted individuals, carrying out executions, and preventing displaced civilians from returning. Meanwhile, the ISIS committee from Iraq had begun its work, meeting both ISIS fighters in the area and elders of the Shaitat.

Negotiations for the Return: Conditional Amnesty

 

The negotiations between Shaitat figures and ISIS leaders never stopped during the massacre, and intensified after the investigation committee’s arrival from Iraq.

The committee held several meetings in different areas of Deir ez-Zor, reaching a ‘final agreement’ following negotiations in Raqqa on September 24, 2014. According to the transcript of the agreement, the meeting was attended by the committee sent by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, figures of the Shaitat clan representing the three towns, in addition to Abu Ali al-Shaiti and Jaafar al-Khalifa al-Shaiti – ISIS representatives from the Shaitat clan. The meeting focused on displaced persons and on finding a mechanism to ensure their trouble-free return. It resulted in an agreement that stipulated, according to the document, the following nine clauses.^[141]

• “The clan must surrender all weapons except for pistols.
• They must disown those who fought against ISIS and pledge not to harbor or help them, and to report them to ISIS.
• They must pledge never to fight ISIS at any time, with this pledge to be written personally and guaranteed by the clan elder or the tribal sheikh.
• Each of the clan figures and elders must pledge and guarantee the individuals they vouch for, even if it is only two people, not the entire clan. Ultimately, each person must pledge for themselves.
• Detainees will be released after the displaced people return. Those who fought ISIS will file ‘repentance’ documents seeking forgiveness.
• Return will not be realized unless the Shaitat clan demonstrates goodwill and commitment [to ISIS].
• Return will be in stages, starting with Gharanij, moving on to Kishkiyya, and ending with Abu Hamam.
• If the required conditions are met, the return will happen before or after Eid al-Adha, depending on how quickly they are fulfilled.
• These decisions take effect as of today, allowing people to begin working on the pledges.”

ISIS called the clauses an ‘agreement,’ although they were clearly imposed by ISIS. The representatives of the Shaitat had no choice but to accept the conditions to secure the return of the displaced people and alleviate their worsening tragedy. Their subsequent meetings with ISIS focused on refining the agreement, and seeking to ease its conditions and establish detailed implementation mechanisms.

After a cautious calm descended on the region following the agreement, news spread among the Shaitat about an ‘amnesty’ issued by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, allowing the clan to return to their villages ahead of Eid al-Adha in early October 2014. The news was actually promoted by ISIS fighters in the region, though no document confirmed the amnesty or specified its exact date. All that existed was a statement recorded during a meeting between Abu Suhaib al-Iraqi and Shaitat figures on November 5, 2014 that, “Al-Baghdadi’s orders were to return the Shaitat Muslims to their homes, but we delayed until we settled matters with the military brothers and ensured that you did not clash with them.”^[142] That meeting, which was held at the house of Abu Hamad al-Baqaani, a leader of the Baqaan clan, established the mechanisms for the return of the displaced. However, the return did not materialize until the beginning of November 2014.

ISIS presented the amnesty as “a favor from the Emir of the Believers” to the displaced Shaitat, but it did not alter the terms imposed for the return of the displaced. The only exceptions were the releases of some detainees at the beginning of October 2014, especially elderly people who had been arrested during the weeks of the massacre. Most of these releases were secured by bribing ISIS members or securing guarantees from local ISIS affiliates.

The families received no clarification regarding the more than 2,000 missing detainees or those who were killed but whose bodies remained lost. Subsequently, as stipulated in the agreement, larger waves of releases would continue after the return of the displaced. The releases of hundreds of detainees continued until the beginning of 2015. It should be noted, however, that the data later collected by the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association indicated that at least 558 Shaitat had been killed as of October 1, 2014.

ISIS initially insisted that weapons had to be handed over as a prerequisite for return. For instance, one piece of weaponry had to be handed over for each individual who wanted to return. The individual in question also had to make a declaration of ‘repentance.’

Negotiations on these terms continued until a new clause was finalized on November 5, 2014, following a meeting at the house of Abu Hamad al-Baqaani between Abu Suhaib al-Iraqi and prominent figures of the Shaitat.^[143]

The final conditions for return included the handing over of one Kalashnikov and four magazines for each household or family, not for each individual. Additionally, each homeowner seeking to return was required to officially declare ‘repentance.’ That served as a form of ‘settlement’ whereby individuals received an official document proving their ‘repentance,’ signed and stamped by the ISIS official in charge of the repentance office in Wilayat al-Khair.^[144]

However, the displaced people who wished to return did not possess any weapons. Most civilians had never owned weapons, and those who did had buried them before leaving their homes, making it difficult to retrieve them. Others feared being interrogated on suspicion of having fought against ISIS if they surrendered their weapons now.

Displaced civilians aiming to return home therefore started buying the required weapons. To finance this amid their challenging circumstances, they either borrowed money, sold possessions, or sought gift contributions from expatriates.

 Form for the return of al-Shaitat residents (the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association)

ISIS appointed private dealers to sell weapons to the Shaitat under its supervision.^[145] Essentially, ISIS engaged in indirect financial extortion against the Shaitat, selling them the weapons that it would later seize.

Abu Suhaib al-Iraqi, who led the meetings with Shaitat figures, was himself in charge of the arms surrender and the ‘repentance’ process.

It was agreed that each clan of the three towns would assign a person to collect weapons and supervise their surrender to ISIS.^[146] Accordingly, residents of each town began collecting and handing over weapons and completing the rest of the paperwork imposed by ISIS in preparation for their return. That process unfolded across successive phases, beginning in Gharanij, passing through Kishkiyya, and concluding in Abu Hamam, in the following chronological order.

Gharanij

Gharanij was the first of the three towns to begin the days-long process of collecting weapons.^[147] The tribal figures delegated by each clan handed over the weapons in two phases. The largest portion was handed over at the house of Abu Hamad, while the remainder was handed over at the headquarters of the ISIS ‘sharia commission’ in Hajin. The two phases ended around November 15, 2014. The number of weapons handed over was estimated at approximately 630 Kalashnikovs, with four magazines per weapon.^[148] After each phase, residents who surrendered the required weapons were given repentance papers authorizing them to return to their homes. Each person had to keep these papers as they served as confirmation of their ‘reconciliation,’ and as protection from subsequent raids. Ten days after completing the collection of weapons and issuing the return papers, on November 25, 2014, ISIS allowed the residents of Gharanij to return to their homes.^[149]

Kishkiyya

Kishkiyya followed Gharanij with a similar agreement and by a similar process, carried out over several days, and in two phases. The first and largest batch of weapons was handed over on December 5, 2014 at the house of one of the clan figures. The other batch was handed over at the Gharanij police station, which had been converted into a major ISIS base. The entire process ended on December 7, 2014.^[150] The number of weapons handed over in Kishkiyya was estimated at between 1,000 and 1,200 Kalashnikovs, with four magazines per weapon.^[151] After each phase, the displaced civilians who had surrendered the required weapons were given repentance papers authorizing them to return to their homes, with the actual return starting on December 16, 2014.^[152]

 Form for the return of Al-Kishkiyya residents

(the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association)

 

Abu Hamam

Abu Hamam was different to the rest of the Shaitat towns for three reasons: it had been the first town to fight against ISIS; ISIS had established major bases and barracks there after it had seized control; and ISIS had settled many of its foreign fighters and their families there. This complicated the return process and the negotiations surrounding it.

ISIS leaders held several meetings with delegations from Abu Hamam before the process of collecting and handing over weapons began in early February 2015, following previous models. It was also carried out in two phases, the first at the home of Nasser al-Tarami, one of Abu Hamam’s leading figures, and the second at the Gharanij police station, where most of the weapons were handed over.^[153] The two phases concluded on February 15, 2015, with an estimated 1,300–1,500 weapons handed over, with four magazines for each weapon.

Unlike in Gharanij and Kishkiyya, the handover of weapons did not secure the immediate return of Abu Hamam’s displaced people. ISIS obstructed their return until June 1, 2015, and then it allowed only an estimated half of Abu Hamam’s population to return, via the desert,^[154] having previously prevented their return through the main roads. Despite having already handed over their weapons in the first batch, the other half of the town’s population were not allowed to return until September 17, 2015.^[155] It took over a year from their expulsion in October 2014 for Abu Hamam’s residents to return. During this period, the residents were also prevented from settling in other Shaitat towns. They remained in displacement camps in the desert and in the villages along the Bukamal line.

It is worth noting that data from the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association indicates that by that date, the number of documented victims had reached 648. This means that at least 90 victims died between the date of the ‘agreement/amnesty’ of October 1, 2014, intended to halt the killing, and September 17, 2015, when the second and final part of Abu Hamam’s displaced people were allowed to return.

Form for the return of Abu Hamam’s residents(the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association)

 

After the Return: Mass Graves

Grief overwhelmed the Shaitat as they returned to their homes; many families had left intact but returned with one or more members missing. ISIS, meanwhile, did not hesitate to spin events – which drew attention from local, Arab, and international media – to fit its own narrative purposes. Days before the return of the Gharanij civilians to their homes, ISIS media was mobilized to film “cleaning and repairing the streets in preparation for receiving the families,” and showing “their joy at the return, while praying for the long life of the Emir of the Faithful, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.” This telling masked the realities that residents encountered on their return to all three towns.

They were shocked to find their houses looted. The nature of the looting varied from house to house and from village to village. Over 80 percent of the houses in Gharanij were affected. In some homes, only the most valuable belongings had been stolen, but in most, everything was gone – doors, windows, even the most basic kitchen items.^[156] In addition, dozens of houses had been burned or demolished, especially those belonging to wanted individuals or the relatives of fighters. ISIS had already released several videos showing its fighters blowing up houses.^[157] And several photos and videos emerged showing houses being looted, and their contents, including furniture and other items, being loaded onto vehicles. These vehicles headed west to Raqqa or north to Hasakah/Shadadi, and then the booty was sold in markets. Stolen goods were also carried off to villages elsewhere in the Deir ez-Zor countryside by ISIS members belonging to neighboring tribes. The theft was not limited to private homes. Shops had been ransacked. Trucks, cars, and livestock had been taken too. The pattern repeated itself in Kishkiyyah and particularly in Abu Hamam.^[158]

These losses were only a prelude to more severe horrors. Within days of the return to Gharanij, residents began finding bodies. Some corpses had been dumped at the edges of waterways or buried quickly in shallow graves alongside roads or beside houses, covered only by a thin layer of dirt. Most of these bodies belonged to civilians who had been detained during the massacre. During the first two weeks after the return to Gharanij, residents found at least 10 corpses. Some were identified, while others could not be identified due to their state of decomposition.

Corpses were discovered so frequently that people expected to come across them. When one was found, residents went to the site, attempted to identify the body and to ascertain if it was one of the missing, and then buried it properly. However, amid the security measures imposed by ISIS after the return, families were unable to hold funeral receptions.

Not limiting itself to the terms of the previous agreement, ISIS imposed another set of rules that resembled a ‘state of emergency.’ This remained in operation for two months from the date of return to each village. ISIS announced the new rules through leaflets and posters pasted in the streets. The rules included: no gatherings, even for funerals or wedding celebrations; a curfew from 8 pm to 5 am; a ban on the possession of weapons for any reason; anyone who fought ISIS would be recognized as an apostate; anyone proven to be a traitor or inciting others to fight ISIS would be killed.^[159] ISIS also restricted Friday prayers to one mosque per town, banning them in all other mosques. It imposed repentance courses on those who admitted to being apostates, and sharia courses for former fighters of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), some of whom were coerced into pledging allegiance to ISIS under threat of exile or investigation.

Translated version of the original document- Restrictions on Al-Shaitat returnees (the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association)

 

These punitive measures later evolved to include stopping education and closing schools under the pretext that the Assad regime’s curriculum had been rejected and ISIS had not yet issued its own. They also included recruiting minors into the so-called ‘Cubs of the Caliphate,’ “banning the Internet and restricting access to it in ISIS centers,” and expropriating some houses.^[160]

Several factors made life even more difficult for civilians: the strict security measures; the imposition of zakat on an already-struggling population; the closure of businesses; the depletion of financial resources during the displacement; the purchase of weapons needed for the return; and the absence of family breadwinners, who were either dead, detained, or missing, leaving thousands of families without support.^[161]

An Image shows the wall of a house in the Shaitat tribal area

labeled “Property of the Islamic State” after it was seized by ISIS fighters

(the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association)

 

Gharanij residents continued to find dozens of corpses during the first month of their return. When people returned to Kishkiyya and Abu Hamam, the numbers rose to the hundreds. Then mass graves began to be discovered, scattered across different locations in the three towns, whether in neighborhoods, desert areas, or on the outskirts of surrounding villages.

On December 21, 2014, ISIS allowed residents to enter a site under the Abu Hamam bridge where nearly 100 corpses lay. ISIS had turned the site into a dumping ground for bodies from various areas.^[162] Pressure from families led ISIS to publish a list of names on May 6, 2015, by which it admitted the killing of nearly 400 Shaitat people.^[163] ISIS did not hand over their bodies or provide any information concerning their burial sites. Neither did it account for the rest of the disappeared. The number of missing people exceeded the number ISIS provided information about, and a significant number were not released in the waves of detainee releases that continued until mid-2015.

Mass graves continued to be discovered throughout the period of ISIS rule over Deir ez-Zor, which ended in 2019, and beyond. The last mass grave was discovered in 2020. It contained the remains of 26 civilian oil workers executed by ISIS during the Shaitat uprising. Many sites may remain undiscovered at the time of writing, and a significant number of people are still missing.

Table 1 shows the dates of discovery of the most important – but not all – mass graves, spanning from the first return of residents to Gharanij on November 25, 2014 to the last discovery in 2020. Based on the data available, all the sites are believed to contain civilians of the Shaitat tribe who were killed by ISIS in various ways between August 3 and early September 2014.

This table relies on several data sources, including field interviews with dozens of relatives of the victims, who discovered their loved ones’ bodies at these sites; interviews with activists and journalists who documented some of the incidents; and the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association, which participated in the relocation and reburial of bodies from certain sites.

Data are also drawn from analysis of dozens of photos and videos that document and locate some of the crimes constituting the massacre. Recordings and images depicting killings during that period were released by ISIS or leaked by civilians. These help to verify the dates of the crimes and the methods of killing employed. The table is organized into six columns detailing: the name and geographical location of the site; the date of discovery; the number of victims found; the methods of killing employed; the estimated date of the crime; the types of documentation available (photos, videos, testimonies); and notes on the identification and relocation of bodies found at the site.

	Site name and location	Date of Discovery	N. of Victims Found	Methods of Killing	Types of Documentation Available	Notes: Regarding the Identification of Victims and the Relocation of Bodies to Other Places
1	Maadan neighborhood, east of the town of Gharanij	Between November 25, 2014, and December 10, 2014	Seven	Throats cut, and shot, based on photos and eyewitness accounts of the retrieval of the bodies.	Six leaked photos from the presumed date of the crime are available (August 12-14, 2014), showing three unburied people with their hands and their heads severed from their bodies.	Residents discovered several bodies clustered together, and others scattered in the Maadan neighborhood. Some had been crudely buried while others were unburied and partially decomposed. Some of the deceased were identified from photos taken between August 12-14, 2014, showing the faces of some of the victims. These were likely taken by civilians sneaking into the village to inspect their homes. The bodies were later relocated and buried in private cemeteries by their relatives and local residents.
2	Gharanij neighborhoods	From November 25, 2014, until the start of 2015	10	Shot dead, based on the photos available	Three photos show five corpses, one of which belonged to the imam of Gharanij Mosque.	Some bodies were found scattered, while others were crudely buried close together. Most of them were identified by their personal ID cards or by their mobile phones. The corpses were reburied in private cemeteries by their families.
3	Around the Wasl School in Gharanij	November 29, 2014	15	Throats cut, and shot, based on accounts of those who discovered the bodies	Not available	The bodies were found crudely buried close together. All were identified by their clothing or possessions. They were reburied in local cemeteries.
4	The area around the Milh Oil Well, located 5 km from the Iraqi border	November 30, 2014	Three	Throats cut and shot, based on the video available	An ISIS video release filmed at their arrest on August 8, 2014, shows the men being led to execution. It shows Abu Talha al-Almani and Abu al-Hareth carrying out the execution.	Based on the location of arrest, and the video of the executions at the same site, the relatives of the victims immediately headed to the location upon their return. However, they didn’t find the three bodies.
4	Abu Hardoub desert, beside the railway	December 5, 2014, as reported by local Shaitat pages.	Four	Unclear	Unavailable	The bodies were found and identified in a mass grave. Their names were circulated in news pages. They were transferred later to the Gharanij cemetery.
5	The Shweila neighborhood in the town of Gharanij, near the company road separating Bahra and Gharanij.	December 11, 2014, as reported by local Shaitat pages	Six	Unclear	One photo shows the six bodies as they were found, wrapped in blankets.	Some of the bodies were identified. Others remained unidentified due to their state of decomposition. They were reburied by local people. It is suspected that a local who sneaked back to the area during the expulsion of the Shaitat buried the bodies, as they were found wrapped in blankets – unlike the other victims.
6	Kishkiyya neighborhoods	From December 16, 2014, to early 2015	15	Throats cut and shot dead, according to witnesses of the retrieval of the bodies.	Three photos are available, showing seven of the victims some days after they were killed, not after they were found. Two of the photos were published by ISIS on its official websites. They show six people shot dead, some of them handcuffed and blindfolded.	Most were found buried in a crude manner, and scattered about. Some were identified by various means, while others remained unidentified due to their state of decomposition. All were later reburied by the residents in the town’s cemeteries.
7	Kishkiyya, the main street, next to Abdul Wahab’s mill.	December 20, 2014	Five	Shot dead.	One photo shows five bodies scattered on the main street near the burial site shortly before the burial.	Only some bodies were identified (by various means), as their faces did not appear in the photo. They were all transferred to the Abu Hamam cemetery.
8	Abu Hamam Bridge, al-Rei (Irrigation) Canal, below the bridge	December 21, 2014, when ISIS permitted residents to enter the site and search for their relatives among the corpses	About 100	Throats cut and shot dead, according to videos and witnesses to the retrieval of the bodies.	A video shows families searching among the corpses for their loved ones. Another video shows dozens of bodies scattered at the site.	Locals identified some of the bodies by various means, and reburied them, while others remained unidentified due to their state of decomposition. It is worth noting that most of the bodies found at this site had been killed at various other locations and were later transferred here.
9	Al-Bahra desert, near the railway.	December 29, 2014, based on news published by local Shaitat pages.	Nine	Shot dead, based on witnesses to the retrieval of the bodies.	Unavailable.	The bodies were found crudely buried in the same location. Some were identified by their clothing and belongings, while others could not be identified due to their state of decomposition. All were later reburied in private cemeteries by their relatives and local residents.
10	The area surrounding the Gharanij power station, next to the railway track.	December 29, 2014, based on photos taken that day.	12	Shot dead, based on photos.	Eight photos of the site are available, showing some of the bodies and people disinterring them.	The bodies were found in a mass grave. When disinterred, most were identified by their personal belongings and identification cards. They were all reburied in local cemeteries by their relatives.
11	Abu Hamam neighborhoods	From June 1, 2015 to early October 2015, dates marking the phased return of the displaced people of Abu Hammam	20	Burnt and shot dead, based on photos.	Seven photos are available. They show nine bodies lying in the streets days after they were killed and before the return of the residents.	The bodies had been crudely buried, some together and others scattered in suburban areas or alongside irrigation channels. Some were identified by their clothing, phones, or personal belongings, while others remained unidentified.
12	The area around the Tanak oil field in the Abu Hamam desert	After June 1, 2015, following the return of the first group of displaced people to Abu Hammam.	11	Slaughtered and shot dead, based on photos.	Three photos are available, showing 11 bodies dumped at the site. The photos were taken some days after the victims were killed, not after they were found.	The bodies were found at the same location where the photos had been taken. Despite their decomposition, most were identified based on the photos. They were later reburied in private cemeteries by their relatives.
13	The area around the Abu Hamam school.	September 20, 2015, following the return of the second group of displaced people to Abu Hamam.	Five	Shot dead, based on witnesses to the retrieval of the bodies.	Unavailable	Discovered by civilians, the bodies had been buried crudely. Some were identified by their personal belongings, including an ID card found in the pocket of one person. They were later reburied elsewhere.
14	Haji’s Road Cemetery in the Asima neighborhood of Abu Hamam.	Late September 2015, after the return of the second batch of the Abu Hamam displaced.	12	Throats cut and shot, according to witnesses to the retrieval of the bodies.	Unavailable	The bodies were found in a mass grave. Some were identified, using various means. Then they were reburied by their relatives.
15	Halawa neighborhood in Abu Hamam, next to the ‘Haffash’ telephone landline transformer	Late September 2015, after the return of the second batch of the Abu Hamam displaced.	Six	Throats cut, based on photos.	Two photos showing six beheaded bodies at this site are available. They were leaked by ISIS members in August 2014.	Some civilians of Abu Hamam visited the site because they had seen the leaked photos. Some bodies were found buried crudely near the site. They were identified using the leaked photos.
16	The Akkada Road in the Halawa neighborhood of Abu Hamam.	Late September 2015, after the return of the second batch of the Abu Hamam displaced.	12	Throats cut and shot, based on photos.	One photo leaked by ISIS members in August 2014 shows 12 bodies in a pit, with ISIS members standing nearby.	After the return of the residents, some of them headed to the site because they had seen the leaked photo. A few of those who appeared in the photos were identified, but other bodies could not be identified due to their state of decomposition. According to testimonies from locals, ISIS members later moved the bodies from this site and buried them in another cemetery near the desert, due to its proximity to a prison controlled by ISIS.
17	The area around the Naser Mosque in Abu Hamam	Late September 2015, after the return of the second batch of the Abu Hamam displaced.	Four	Unclear due to the state of decomposition of the bodies, based on witnesses to their discovery.	Unavailable	The bodies were found in a mass grave where they had been buried. Some were identified, by various means, while others couldn’t be identified due to their state of decomposition. They were later reburied in private cemeteries.
18	Abu Hamam, Zaqa Water Pump / the Makain	October 23, 2015, based on reports published by local Shaitat pages.	Three	Unclear due to the state of decomposition	Two photos are available, showing the site and the decomposed bodies.	The bodies were found buried crudely. Their identities couldn’t be determined due to their state of decomposition. They were subsequently reburied in the town’s cemeteries.
19	Mayadin – the Rahba Castle	February 7, 2019, based on reports published by Syrian regime media outlets.	Five from the Shaitat tribe, as well as others.	Unclear	A filmed report broadcast by Assad regime media outlets, as well as eyewitnesses.	Three individuals of the Shaitat were identified based on eyewitness accounts, while the others remain unidentified. They were reburied.
20	Abu Hamam desert, next to the primitive oil burners.	October 17, 2020, based on photos taken at the site on that date.	Four	Unclear	Three photos are available showing the remains of the bodies and some civilians holding digging tools and standing at the site.	None were identified. All were reburied in other graves.
21	Darnaj desert, next to Jamma livestock market.	October 27, 2020	26	Throats cut and shot, based on photos.	A video is available showing ISIS arresting and then killing 26 civilian oil employees. Another video was filmed by the resident of Darnaj who first found the bodies. Additional footage and photos were taken of the transportation of the bodies by The Shaitat Victims’ Families Association.	The 26 bodies were found in a mass grave. All were identified by matching the clothes they are wearing in the video of their arrest and murder with their clothes after the discovery. They were transferred by The Shaitat Victims’ Families Association to another cemetery in the desert of Abu Hamam – the Shuhada Cemetery, where they were reburied.
22	Jurthi, the main street, over the bridge.	Not yet discovered	Six	Burned	A leaked video of ISIS members committing the crime and burning the bodies is available.	The subsequent burial site is unknown, as it has not yet been located.
23	Conico oil field cemetery	Not yet discovered	Unknown	Unknown	–	The location was identified based on information obtained by the Shaitat Victims’ Families Association, but its location on the front line has prevented access to it so far.

Table 1: The most prominent sites where bodies and mass graves of victims from the Shaitat massacre were discovered, classified by date of discovery from oldest to newest.

 

 

Table 1 indicates that most of the locations where bodies and mass graves were found were in the Shaitat towns, which, during the period of the displacement, became notorious for arbitrary arrest and execution. A smaller proportion were found in the surrounding villages or in other areas controlled by ISIS. Notably, many of these sites, especially in the Shaitat towns, were near ISIS detention centers. One such was the Halawa neighborhood cemetery. This suggests that the executions were likely carried out close to these locations. It also implies that more sites might be discovered in areas near the buildings ISIS used as detention centers, or near key checkpoints where large numbers of Shaitat civilians were arrested.

ISIS members often documented their own crimes. This helped to some extent in locating some of the sites and identifying some of the victims by matching clothing on the bodies with clothing worn in ISIS photographs and videos.

More documentation of the killing must exist, and needs to be found and further researched.

All the sites were discovered, and the bodies reburied, by the individual efforts of locals, without any assistance from criminal or human rights organizations or governing authorities. This was true even after the end of ISIS rule over the area, when the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by the US-led Global Coalition, took control.

The numbers in the table above – totaling approximately 300 bodies found at these specific sites – are not a definitive count of the victims. Instead, they serve as an indicator of the number of victims who are still missing. The list released by ISIS confirmed the killing of nearly 400 people, and the actual numbers exceed that count by at least 160 victims. While this table covers the most prominent mass graves discovered so far, a full analysis of certain sites requires more than a documentary survey. It necessitates international forensic and human rights efforts to investigate and protect these sites, as well as any that may be discovered in the future.

The Shaitat Victims: Data and Figures

 

It has been challenging to methodologically and accurately document data on the victims and missing persons of the Shaitat massacre. Several factors contribute to the difficulty, including the circumstances surrounding the massacre itself. Most media workers and activists in the region were either killed, pursued, or displaced during the events. In addition, ISIS made some attempts to cover up information about the massacre. Consequently, local and international human rights organizations had to rely on rough estimates based on eyewitness accounts, photographs, and videos. During the first weeks of the massacre, those organizations reported casualty figures ranging from 700 to 900, with some news agencies and media outlets citing numbers as high as 1,200.

Although some local and international human rights organizations visited the region after ISIS had been ousted, most studies, reports, and documentation efforts were limited to gathering testimonies, studying samples of the victims, or conducting partial surveys.

In 2019, the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association, based in Abu Hamam, was established by a group of activists and relatives of the victims. By 2020, the association had conducted a survey to document the victims of the massacre, reaching out to families in the Shaitat towns and collecting extensive data about their relatives. This survey remains the most comprehensive to date in terms of documenting a large number of victims by name and demographic data, despite limitations caused by the organization’s limited support and lack of experience and expertise.

The Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association survey extends beyond the immediate victims of the massacre to encompass other Shaitat victims affected by the ISIS takeover and subsequent violations in the region. It includes approximately 814 names spanning from 2014 to 2021, covering the period of ISIS dominance in Deir ez-Zor until the organization’s transition to cell-based operations after it lost territorial control. However, the association acknowledges the limitations of its survey, noting that it does not encompass all the victims but focuses primarily on the missing, and that it does not differentiate between combatants and civilians. Many of the families of victims were not present during the survey period. Some had relocated completely from the area after losing their loved ones.

Therefore, the IPM research team, in cooperation with the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association, has reviewed and analyzed the existing documented data instead of conducting an additional survey, recognizing that any new survey would require substantial human rights efforts to ensure the highest levels of accuracy in the data and figures. Based on the existing data, the IPM research team first ensured that no names had been duplicated in the survey and that there were sufficient data for analysis. This was done in two stages.

Stage One: Analyzing Victim Data Based on the Timeline of Events

The association documented the date of each victim’s murder or disappearance according to the testimonies of their relatives. Subsequently, the IPM research team organized this data according to the adjusted timeline of sequential events, as detailed in previous sections of this text concerning the documentation and trajectory of the massacre. This effort aimed to categorize victims by specific time periods.

Stage Two: Analyzing the Demographic Data of the Victims

This was done after the total number of victims had been broken down by each time period. It focuses on those killed during the timeline of the massacre, retrieving the demographic data available about them, and then analyzing them.

Distribution of the Victims by the Timeline of Events

 

The Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association documented cases from early January 2014 to August 15, 2021, spanning the rise of ISIS and its initial battles with other armed factions in the province, including the Shaitat factions, leading up to the massacre, and continuing until after the ISIS withdrawal from the region. The association counted at least 814 victims from the Shaitat tribe killed during that period by ISIS, in various contexts.

By tracking the murder and disappearance dates documented for each name, the overall number can be distributed chronologically as follows.

Before the massacre: from the beginning of the survey on January 1, 2014 until the Municipality Incident of July 30, 2014.

The Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association documented at least 44 names of those killed from the first clashes with ISIS in Deir ez-Zor province in January 2014 until the incident at the municipality building in Kishkiyya on July 30, 2014 (the Municipality Incident). Considering these dates, it is likely that the smallest proportion of those killed were civilians. The largest proportion were Shaitat combatants killed in the battles with ISIS. It is important to note that this number is what the association was able to document, but the actual count may well be higher, both for civilians and fighters.

During the massacre: from the Municipality Incident until the return agreement/amnesty of October 1, 2014.

The actual massacre began with the events of July 30, 2014, that is, with the order to execute the fatwa against the Shaitat clan, and the launch of the battle. From this point on, civilians were targeted for arrest and random killings. This campaign continued at a varying pace until October 1, 2014, the date of the so-called ISIS ‘amnesty’ to the Shaitat. The amnesty was preceded by a semi-final agreement between ISIS leaders and Shaitat elders ‘guaranteeing’ the end of the arrest campaign and setting conditions for the return of the displaced. The Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association counted at least 558 victims between these two dates. This was the peak period of the killings.

The aftermath of the massacre: from the return agreement/amnesty of October 1, 2014 until the return of the last batch of displaced on September 17, 2015.

The Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association documented 648 victims killed from the start of the battle, through the period of displacement, and up to the return of the displaced. In other words, at least 90 victims were killed between the date of the agreement and the amnesty on October 1, 2014 – which were supposed to stop the killing – and September 17, 2015, when the second and final batch of Abu Hamam’s displaced returned home. Due to the lack of accurate data and based on the context of the time period and the cessation of battles during that period, it is likely that a large percentage of these victims were civilians who were killed by ISIS by various means and on various charges.

Continued attrition: from the return of the last batch of displaced on September 17, 2015 until the withdrawal of ISIS from the Shaitat areas on January 25, 2018.

During this period, the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association documented at least 86 victims, predominantly civilians, who were killed in various circumstances. ISIS persisted in its harassment, arrests, and field executions of the Shaitat on various charges following their return to the towns. This attrition of the Shaitat community continued amid battles led by the SDF and supported by the Global Coalition aimed at expelling ISIS from the area. During this period, ISIS raided the Shaitat, kidnapping and killing civilians. In addition, Global Coalition airstrikes on ISIS bases in the area led to casualties among detainees held there. Mines planted by ISIS also claimed the lives of several civilians.

ISIS cells: from the ISIS retreat until August 15, 2021.

Despite the expulsion of ISIS from the area by the US-backed SDF, the Shaitat population continued to suffer casualties. ISIS cells resumed their operations in Shaitat towns and other areas of Deir ez-Zor, targeting specific individuals for assassination, and conducting bomb attacks and other operations against SDF forces, which also resulted in civilian casualties. The Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association documented at least 36 victims killed during this period, the majority of whom were civilians.

Figure 1: Prepared by the IPM research team based on

data from the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association.

Demographics of the Victims of the Massacre

Based on the distribution of Shaitat victims during different time periods, the IPM research team selected a sample of the massacre victims and analyzed it across several variables. The focus was on a specific period marked by an intended genocidal act, which was subsequently halted by a decision. This emphasis does not disregard other victims who perished at different times, but rather aligns with the scope of this study on the Shaitat massacre.

The research team analyzed victim data between July 30, 2014 and October 1, 2014. The victims of this period totaled 558 individuals according to the survey conducted by The Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association. The analysis focused on the distribution of victims by gender, age group, birthplace, occupation, marital status, as well as the number of widows and orphans.

Figure 2: Prepared by the IPM research team based on data from

the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association.

 

Figure 2 shows that 98 percent of the massacre victims during the main timeline were male, while 2 percent were female, usually killed indirectly through such methods as shelling. The high percentage of male victims aligns with ISIS strategy during that period, which primarily targeted males through arrests and summary executions. This approach is consistent with the fatwa issued against the Shaitat, which specifically targeted males and excluded women. Beyond the fatwa, ISIS refrained from attacking women as a result of the region’s tribal dynamics and the widespread outrage such attacks would have provoked. Targeting women would have escalated the situation in a different manner.

Breakdown of the Victims by Age Group

Figure 3: Prepared by the IPM research team based on data from t

he Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association.

Figure 3 illustrates the age distribution of victims, with the highest percentage (65 percent) falling within the 18-to-35 age group. Minors (under 18 years old) accounted for 15 percent of the total victims, followed by people aged 36 to 50 years old, at 14 percent. Those over 50 years old represented the smallest group, comprising six percent of the total victims. This distribution across age groups reflects the indiscriminate nature of ISIS killing methods during the massacre, encompassing minors and the elderly, but focused particularly on men and youth.

Breakdown of the Victims by Birthplace

Figure 4: Prepared by the IPM research team based on data

from the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association.

 

Figure 4 depicts the distribution of victims based on their registered place of birth as documented by the Association, and shows that 42 percent hailed from Abu Hamam town, giving it the highest death toll among all locations during this period. Kishkiyya followed, with 40 percent of victims. Gharanij accounted for 18 percent of victims. The high percentages in Abu Hamam and Kishkiyya can be attributed to the ISIS focus on these areas, with Abu Hamam being the first battleground and the last town to which residents were permitted to return.

During this period, ISIS did not necessarily consider distinctions among victims based on their origin. Residents of the area were targeted as Shaitat, regardless of their birthplace. The birthplace was noted on ID cards, but ISIS only inspected these at checkpoints and during raids.

While these figures illustrate the distribution of victims by town, they may not accurately reflect their actual residence. For instance, many individuals born in Gharanij later moved to Abu Hamam or Kishkiyya, and vice versa, due to the proximity of villages, geographical overlap, and familial connections.

Breakdown of the Victims by Occupation

Figure 5: Prepared by the IPM research team based on data from

the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association.

 

Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of victims by occupation, and highlights that the majority of victims were workers, constituting 76 percent of the total. Farmers followed with 13 percent, while students, encompassing both secondary school and university students, accounted for 7 percent. Other professions collectively accounted for 3 percent, with university graduates, teachers, and engineers comprising 1 percent.

These figures broadly align with the predominant economic trends and age demographics in the region. Agriculture in Shaitat towns declined after 2000, giving rise to diverse local employment opportunities and significant expatriate numbers, particularly those who moved to Gulf states like Kuwait, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia. Interviews with victims’ families indicate that a substantial number of those killed were expatriate workers who had returned home to Syria for their holidays. Tragically, these coincided with peaks in the violence, resulting in the deaths of many civilians. The survey by the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association did not categorize victims by their place of work, so an accurate percentage of expatriate victims cannot be determined. However, testimonies suggest that it is a notable proportion.

Breakdown of the Victims by Marital Status

Figure 6: Prepared by the IPM research team based on data

from the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association.

 

Figure 6 shows that 68 percent of the total victims were married, while 32 percent were single. These percentages align with the age distribution of the victims. The high percentage of married victims has resulted in a significant number of widows and orphans in the region, as illustrated in Figure 7.

Numbers of Widows and Orphans

Figure 7: Prepared by the IPM research team based on data

from the Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association.

 

Married victims left behind at least 1,563 orphans and at least 385 widows. It should be noted that the number of widows here represents a minimum figure. The Shaitat Victims’ Families’ Association survey primarily records marital status (married or not) without consistently noting the number of wives per individual. Given the prevalence of polygamy in the region, the actual number of widows could be higher.

While these figures highlight the extent of the calamity for Shaitat families, they only represent a portion of the victims of the massacre. Considering the numbers of widows and orphans across various documented time periods, from the beginning of the survey on January 1, 2014 until the documentation of the last victim on August 15, 2021, we find that the number of orphans reaches approximately 2,275, with at least 541 widows – a minimum estimate.

Recommendations: Centering the Victims

Although ten years have passed since the massacre, its effects remain evident on various levels. These include the impact on the relatives of the victims and missing persons, the undiscovered mass grave sites, and the significant number of widows and orphans. These factors cause extra suffering against the backdrop of continual poor security conditions in the region. In this context, a set of general recommendations can be proposed.

• The forcibly disappeared file

This file is one of the most prominent unresolved issues of the Shaitat massacre. It is a particularly pressing matter given the absence of a systematic and accurate survey of the numbers of disappeared. These are based only on estimates of around 250 missing persons to date. In this context, it is imperative to rally efforts toward addressing the issue of the forcibly disappeared, particularly after the establishment of the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic. It is crucial to urge this foundation to fulfill its responsibilities and conduct a thorough investigation into the disappearances of Shaitat members, provide comprehensive support to their families, and foster communication with grassroots victim associations. This should be prioritized over relying solely on the offices of the missing within the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which may lack adequate data and direct access to the families of victims and missing persons.

• Families of the victims.

For a decade, families of the victims have endured an increasing sense of neglect and injustice as well as complex economic, humanitarian, and security challenges. It is imperative to intensify efforts aimed at supporting these families. This includes pressing the current authorities – the Syrian Democratic Forces – to grant human rights and humanitarian organizations access to the area.^[164] Such access is crucial for documenting the massacre, investigating its circumstances, and providing relief to the families. Furthermore, efforts should focus on connecting these families with organizations engaged in the pursuit of accountability, facilitating legal prosecutions for the Shaitat massacre, and offering comprehensive support, whether psychological, legal, or material.

• Mass graves

While many mass graves have been discovered, an unknown number remain undiscovered. International organizations should focus efforts on investigating these remaining sites, expanding the research, and gathering evidence from graves that have already been discovered. This includes urging local authorities to facilitate the access of qualified independent organizations to the area, so they can collect agreements from the relatives and then conduct thorough follow-up investigations. This is particularly important given past instances of relatives giving their agreement but then being ignored. Protecting the mass grave sites is crucial to prevent intentional or unintentional tampering with evidence. This necessitates public awareness campaigns to emphasize the importance of the sites.

• Victims’ associations

 Any documentation, human rights, or humanitarian efforts aimed at addressing the Shaitat massacre and supporting the families of victims and missing persons should prioritize victim-centered approaches that consider victims’ aspirations and needs. It is crucial to enhance support for local victims’ associations, which are currently leading documentation and data collection efforts, and which have direct access to most victims’ families. This support should include technical training, advanced skills development in managing such cases, and legal assistance.

• Widows and orphans

The massacre left approximately 1,563 orphans and over 385 widows, totaling 2,275 orphans and more than 541 widows by the time ISIS retreated from the area. Given this reality, Syrian and international civil society organizations working in humanitarian and educational fields must prioritize supporting these secondary victims. Many of these women lack a breadwinner and consequently live below the poverty line. Efforts should focus on securing education and health care for the orphaned children. Leveraging solidarity within the tribal and expatriate communities in the Gulf could facilitate organized community initiatives to support these families.

• Studies and research

 As important as this study is in presenting information on the Shaitat massacre and its associated contexts and data, it is essential to supplement and expand upon it to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of all aspects of the massacre. Researchers specializing in genocide and mass atrocities in Syria should be encouraged to research the Shaitat massacre. This could involve deeper analysis of victim numbers across different periods, investigations into missing persons and their documentation, and other relevant fields. Adequate support from human rights organizations and research bodies is crucial to expand such studies, not only in Deir ez-Zor but throughout Syria, and to encompass massacres perpetrated by various military actors, not only ISIS.

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Often referred to in English-language media as the Shaitat tribe, the Shaitat are in fact a clan, part of the much larger Akidat tribe. ↑

2. Jabhat al-Nusra’s Salafi-Jihadi ideology was alien to the local society. However, its effectiveness in fighting the Assad regime led many in the public as well as other militias to cooperate with it. Factions of the Free Syrian Army joined Jabhat al-Nusra in most military operations. Later, Jabhat al-Nusra and other Islamist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham established sharia courts in Mayadin and other areas of Deir ez-Zor province. The general outline here of ISIS taking control of Deir ez-Zor is based on a paper written by Sasha al-Alou in 2015, based on dozens of face-to-face interviews, and included as part of a book published by the Arab Center for Research and Public Studies. See The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh): Formation, Discourse and Practice, 1st edn, vol. 2, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Beirut, 2018, pp. 380-394. ↑

3. “What Does the Founding of the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ Mean?”, BBC News Arabic, April 9, 2013, https://2u.pw/DFxKfzTY. ↑

4. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh), 380-394. ↑

5. “After Azaz, IS in Iraq and the Levant Besieges and Attacks Free Syrian Army Bases in Deir ez-Zor,” Aks al-Ser, September 18, 2013, https://2u.pw/iivNHqCF. ↑

6. “ISIS sSizes Ahfad al-Rasoul Weapons at the Peak of the Air Base Battle,” Zaman al-Wasl, September 27, 2013, https://2u.pw/PFb1sgO7. ↑

7. In 2014, ISIS published a documentary on its media channels and social media accounts titled Majd Talid (Eternal Glory) as part of its narrative for the events that led to its control of Deir ez-Zor and its clashes with some armed groups such as Ahfad al-Rasoul. The film showed a number of former Ahfad al-Rasoul commanders who had pledged allegiance to ISIS, mainly Abu Seif al-Shaiti, Saddam al-Jamal, and Abu al-Walid. A copy of the documentary is kept in the IPM archive. ↑

8. The ISIS clash with Ahrar al-Sham and its allied groups started after the Bariha Incident on December 2, 2013. A muhajir (immigrant ISIS fighter) drove through an Ahrar al-Sham checkpoint in Bariha village. The fighter manning the checkpoint fired at the car, killing the driver and wounding the other passenger, another muhajir, who died afterwards. Some weeks later, Ahrar al-Sham tried to arrest Kamal al-Raja in Mayadin. Al-Raja was an ISIS commander in Deir ez-Zor known as Abu al-Muntaser. After the failed arrest, Abu al-Muntaser vowed to blow up Ahrar al-Sham in Mayadin, and indeed he sent a car bomb that blew up Ahrar al-Sham’s base in the town on January 8, 2014, killing four people. See “Ahrar al-Sham’s Headquarters in Mayadin Blown Up,” al-Hal Net, January 8, 2014, https://2u.pw/7wZxlrrX. At the same time, ISIS fighters surrounded Ahrar al-Sham in Madan village, and later attacked an Ahrar al-Sham checkpoint in Salehiyyat Abu Kamal. This raised tensions further and escalated the dispute between the two sides into a full-blown confrontation. See The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. ↑

9. Amir al-Rafdan hails from the village of Jadid Akidat. Before the Syrian revolution, he lived in the Jouza neighborhood of Deir ez-Zor. After the revolution started, he returned to Jadid Akidat. Al-Rafdan was known to be uneducated, with no religious knowledge. He was not devout and worked in smuggling between Iraq and Syria. He was also known to be taciturn, and ferocious in fighting. He started as a commander in Jabhat al-Nusra, then joined ISIS in pursuit of bigger ambitions. He was appointed an emir of a district, then was promoted to emir of Deir ez-Zor. Later, he was appointed as the governor of Deir ez-Zor – what ISIS called Wilayat al-Khair province – and then a member of the ISIS Shura Council. Al-Rafdan held a high position in ISIS despite having a bad reputation because he was a member of the Bekayyir clan, one of the biggest branches of the Akidat tribe in Deir ez-Zor. ISIS gave al-Rafdan a leadership position because it sought to woo his tribe. This resulted in splits within the Bekayyir clan that affected multiple villages in eastern Deir ez-Zor. Some fought with ISIS, some fought against ISIS, and others remained neutral. After the battles were over and ISIS was in control of all of Deir ez-Zor, there was a lot of talk among the public about the notorious individuals that ISIS relied on as commanders, including Amir al-Rafdan and later Saddam al-Jamal. ISIS promoted Amir al-Rafdan from Deir ez-Zor governor to member of the ISIS Shura Council. In theory, that was a promotion, but it actually froze out al-Rafdan. ISIS then appointed Kamal al-Raja, also known as Abu al-Muntaser al-Bariha, as governor of Deir ez-Zor. See The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. ↑

10. Kamal al-Raja hails from Bariha village in eastern Deir ez-Zor and has an undergraduate degree in agricultural engineering from Furat University. He participated in the peaceful protests in the province before taking up arms. He was known for his good moral character as a university student and for being a good friend. He was religiously devout but not extremist. He had little religious knowledge before receiving religious education from ISIS immigrant fighters in 2013 and 2014. After ISIS established its control over Deir ez-Zor, there was a lot of talk and disapproval among the public about the shameful history of ISIS emirs. To overcome this, ISIS tried to freeze out the controversial individuals and replace them with people who were more acceptable to the local community. One such was Kamal al-Raja, who was appointed as governor of Deir ez-Zor after Amir al-Rafdan. But ISIS stuck to its tribal criteria when selecting people for leadership positions. In the case of Kamal al-Raja, he hailed from the same tribe of Amir al-Rafdan (Akidat tribe/Bekayyir branch). ISIS changed people but not the criteria. ↑

11. Even though ISIS had killed Jabhat al-Nusra’s emir in Raqqa, Abu Saad al-Hadrami, and captured all Jabhat al-Nusra bases in the city of Raqqa, Jabhat al-Nusra in the Deir ez-Zor countryside did not get involved in the fight and did not send any reinforcements to Raqqa. It remained neutral, provoking all the armed groups and some of Jabhat al-Nusra’s fighters in Deir ez-Zor. See The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. ↑

12. “ISIS Captures Koniko Gas Field and Other Facilities in Deir ez-Zor,” al-Hal Net, February 2, 2014, https://2u.pw/nhh8cs3A. ↑

13. ISIS shelled the armed groups from Khasham village, killing some of their fighters, many of whom were from the Shaitat armed groups. This led the Khasham militias to join the alliance against ISIS in the area. Source: Face-to-face interviews conducted by the research team with Shaitat fighters who were involved in the siege of the air base. The interviews were conducted in May 2024. ↑

14. After fierce battles, the militia alliance was able to recapture the area of the windmills, grain silos, and factories on the Deir ez-Zor–Basira road on February 8, 2014. For more information, see “Al-Nusra Attacks ISIS in Deir ez-Zor, Aleppo Ablaze after Being Barrel-Bombed,” Annahar, February 8, 2014, https://2u.pw/u1l84v4d. On days 9 and 10, the alliance resumed its attack on ISIS locations in the oil and gas fields of Koniko and Jafra. It recaptured the fields, then the village of Khasham. The house of the ISIS commander in charge and governor of Deir ez-Zor, Amir al-Rafdan, was blown up on February 10, after he had fled with his fighters. See video footage showing the blowing-up of Amir al-Rafdan’s house, available at the following link: https://2u.pw/t3Yrdeje. Afterwards, ISIS cells were chased in some areas, including: Bariha village; the Saba Kilometer (Seven Kilometer) area; Mayadin; Jadid Akidat; Khasham; Bukamal; Qouriyya; the salt mines area in Tabanni village. ↑

15. “ISIS Withdraws from Deir ez-Zor after Fierce Battles with Armed Groups,” Asharq al-Awsat, February 11, 2014, https://2u.pw/wmLI23DW. ↑

16. Jabhat al-Nusra and other armed groups could not drive ISIS out of the area because the spacious tunnels of the salt mines provided ISIS with fortified positions. Moreover, the area is on a hill with the tunnels underground and an open area around it. This allowed ISIS fighters to barricade themselves in the hill and tunnels. In addition to being fortified and difficult to attack, the area was close to Raqqa, the ISIS capital, as well as the military bases of the Assad regime in Hajif and Ayyash, which included weapon depots and Brigade 117. Furthermore, the western countryside of the province had not been actively involved in the peaceful protests and did not have powerful armed groups. Jabhat al-Nusra and other Islamist groups did not have grassroots support there to help them in their fight against ISIS. See The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. ↑

17. The main armed groups that fought against ISIS in Markada were: Jabhat al-Nusra; al-Jabha al-Islamiyya; the Free Syrian Army; Jabhat al-Asala wa al-Tanmiya; Liwa Mouta from Shahil town; fighters from Masrib town; and others. For further reading on the battles in Markada at the time, see “Are ISIS and al-Nusra Battles in the East a Point of No Return?,” April 4, 2014, France 24, https://2u.pw/Q6QKIUXH. ↑

18. ISIS published a documentary film titled Majd Talid (Eternal Glory), which shows how it took control of Deir ez-Zor, and then the type of operations it carried out after it was expelled from the province. It shows the most important suicide bombings, the target locations, and some of the people who carried them out. A copy of the documentary is kept in the IPM archive. ↑

19. Saddam al-Jamal hails from Bukamal, from the al-Nader family. The family migrated from Aana in Iraq to Abu Kamal in Syria more than 100 years ago. Al-Jamal worked in smuggling before joining the armed fight against the Assad regime and leading a brigade in Abu Kamal. He received a lot of support from the staff committee and military councils of the Free Syrian Army because he was a simple individual and not ideological, he did not belong to any movement or party, and he had a lot of fighters under his command. He later led Liwa Allahu Akbar, which was part of Ahfad al-Rasoul, with support from the staff committee of the Free Syrian Army. He fought various battles against the Assad regime, most notably the battle to liberate Hamdan airport in Bukamal. See The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. After pressure from Jabhat al-Nusra in early 2013 – he was pursued, his house was blown up, and his brother was assassinated – he appeared in a video published in December 2013 pledging allegiance to ISIS and announcing a total break from the Free Syrian Army. His main motive for joining ISIS was to exact revenge on Jabhat al-Nusra and its allies. For further reading, see “The Enemies of Yesterday and the Friends of Today, a Commander of the Joint Staff Committee Becomes an ISIS Emir,” Zaman al-Wasl, December 15, 2013, https://2u.pw/l6eGNKFm. He was later appointed by ISIS as the security officer of the Furat (Euphrates) province in Iraq. He became a prominent ISIS leader before being captured by the Iraqi intelligence service in cooperation with the American intelligence service in 2018. See “Saddam al-Jamal, the Butcher of Furat, Captured by Iraqi Forces” (video), Ayn al-Madina, May 10, 2018, https://2u.pw/eqh3jSk2. After his arrest, al-Jamal appeared in filmed interviews and provided important information about the founding of ISIS and its control of Deir ez-Zor. For the most important testimonies of al-Jamal after his arrest, see “The Factory: A Biography of Saddam al-Jamal, from Smuggler of Tobacco to ISIS Commander, As Told by Him from His Prison to Daraj” (video), May 12, 2019, https://2u.pw/ehewPi2C. ↑

20. The attack was launched from Sukkariyya and Badiya (the Syrian desert). ISIS claimed that there were captives in the sharia committee’s prison. It surrounded the committee’s headquarters, then raided and killed the sharia officers and others inside, including the committee’s sharia judge in Bukamal, Muhammad Naji al-Majoul al-Rawi, who was beheaded. See The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. For further reading on the attack on Bukamal, see “What Happened between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in Bukamal?” France 24, April 11, 2014, https://2u.pw/zrpIW30k. ↑

21. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. ↑

22. Omar al-Shishani was in charge of drawing up and implementing the plan. Abu Ayman al-Iraqi was killed during the battles of Deir ez-Zor. For further reading on the ISIS offensive to recapture Deir ez-Zor, see the documentary Majd Talid (Eternal Glory). Also see The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. ↑

23. Source: Field interviews conducted in June 2024 with four commanders and fighters who fought in the battles to defend Sawar. ↑

24. “ISIS captures Sawar in Deir ez-Zor,” al-Arabia al-Hadath, April 16, 2014, https://2u.pw/MAXGlYTB. ↑

25. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. ↑

26. “ISIS Takes Control of Deir ez-Zor’s Western Countryside,” al-Arabiya al-Hadath, May 10, 2014, https://2u.pw/YHfs0JhO. ↑

27. “Jabhat al-Nusra Withdraws from Deir ez-Zor’s Western Countryside,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 5, 2014, https://2u.pw/yXhGKZqu. It is worth noting that the armed groups in the western countryside did not last long in the face of the ISIS offensive for reasons related to the difference in the composition of the local community compared to Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside. The western countryside was not heavily involved in the revolution (peaceful or armed), unlike the eastern countryside. It is also worth noting that the ‘liberation’ of most towns and villages in Deir ez-Zor’s western countryside from the Assad forces was done by Jabhat al-Nusra and armed groups from the eastern countryside. ↑

28. For further reading on the nature, developments, and effects of the battles in Deir ez-Zor, see “ISIS Amasses Troops for the Battle of Deir ez-Zor amid Mass Displacement, and Approaches Positions of the Assad Forces, and Aleppo is Thirsty,” As-Safir, May 12, 2014, https://2u.pw/NgQrfmGL. ↑

29. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. ↑

30. Source: Face-to-face interviews with two Shaitat fighters who fought in the battles in Jadid Akidat. The interviews were conducted in Gharanij on May 31, 2014. ↑

31. For further information about the al-Qaeda initiative, see “Jabhat al-Nusra Announces a Ceasefire in Deir ez-Zor” (video report), al-Jazeera, May 4, 2014, https://2u.pw/sWvMg0Vd. Also see “Renewed Battles in Deir ez-Zor between ISIS and al-Nusra after Failed Zawahiri Initiative” (video report), al-Jazeera, May 5, 2014, https://2u.pw/XEt30WLa. ↑

32. “ISIS Captures Koniko Gas Plant in Deir ez-Zor,” al-Arabiya, April 9, 2014, https://2u.pw/vKxURIy7. ↑

33. Source: Face-to-face interviews with two Shaitat fighters who fought in the battles in Jadid Akidat. ↑

34. For more on the personality of Abu Dujana al-Zir, see “Abu Dujana al-Zir, the Rise and Fall of a Local Salesman,” Ayn al-Madina, May 5, 2016, https://2u.pw/dhzOpVvk. ↑

35. To view the announcement of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Deir ez-Zor, see “Statement on the Establishment of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Deir ez-Zor,” al-Zakira al-Souriyya, https://2u.pw/rMSrqLkw. ↑

36. “Rebels Capture Vast Areas in Deir ez-Zor’s Countryside,” al-Arabiya, June 1, 2014, https://2u.pw/mKD9mY4j. Also see “Deir ez-Zor: Armed Groups Recapture Villages from ISIS North of the Province,” al-Zakira al-Souriyya, June 6, 2014, https://2u.pw/S3OdO6VR. ↑

37. “Deir ez-Zor: ISIS Tightens Siege on Basira,” al-Zakira al-Souriyya, May 1, 2014, https://2u.pw/mNPxtlpC. Also see “Deir ez-Zor: ISIS Captures Most Basira Neighborhoods,” al-Zakira al-Souriyya, May 31, 2014, https://2u.pw/BeU6Z3H2. ↑

38. “Syria: Battles in Aleppo and Rif Dimashq, ISIS Captures Basira,” al-Iraq al-Hur radio, June 2, 2014, https://2u.pw/ZjqIwGRq. ↑

39. ISIS reached an agreement with the militias of the Mujahideen Shura Council of al-Sharqiyya to keep Khasham in Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside out of the fighting. This was the result of an initiative by local dignitaries that stipulated that both sides would withdraw from the town, while the security of the town would be handled by Kataib Abdullah bin al-Zubair of the Free Syrian Army, which had remained neutral in the fight between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and others. See “Armed Groups Recapture Villages from ISIS North of the Province,” al-Zakira al-Souriyya. ↑

40. “ISIS Captures Khasham in Deir ez-Zor,” al-Sharq, June 10, 2014, https://2u.pw/F2qZxGDR. ↑

41. On June 23, 2014, the Syrian Network for Human Rights confirmed that ISIS displaced the residents of Khasham and Tabiya, totalling 15,500 and 14,000 people respectively. ISIS prevented their return for a while. See “ISIS Forcibly Displaces Residents of Towns in Deir ez-Zor’s Eastern Countryside,” Syrian Network for Human Rights, July 8, 2014, https://2u.pw/Xsf134yF. ↑

42. “How Does the Iraqi Army Fare against ISIS?” BBC News Arabic, June 10, 2014, https://2u.pw/20m1yeWo. ↑

43. Armed groups from the Free Syrian Army were positioned there, most notably Liwa al-Fath in Tabiya Shamiyya led by Abu Barzan, who is considered one of the most important commanders of the armed struggle in Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside. He decided to withdraw and refused to pledge allegiance to ISIS. ISIS reached an agreement with a small group of armed groups’ commanders that operated like an ISIS sleeper cell in Muhasan and appeared in public when ISIS captured Shamiyya. The group asked residents and other commanders to avoid clashing with ISIS under the pretext of a skewed balance of power and for the sake of dedicating efforts to the air-base front. It succeeded in persuading the armed groups in the town to make a truce with ISIS and keep the armed groups in their positions on the air-base front without pledging allegiance on the condition that they continue to carry out their combat duties and leave planning and securing ammunition to ISIS. See The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. ↑

44. “ISIS Captures Muhasan and Boulil in Deir ez-Zor’s Eastern Countryside,” Akhbar al-Aan, June 20, 2014, https://2u.pw/2GY7XRMP. ↑

45. “ISIS Executes Free Syrian Army Commanders in Deir ez-Zor,” al-Arabiya, June 22, 2014, https://2u.pw/asdOL1cv. ↑

46. Source: Face-to-face interviews conducted by the research team with Shaitat fighters who withdrew from the city of Deir ez-Zor at the time. The interviews were conducted in May 2014. ↑

47. “Undeclared Negotiations between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 28, 2014, https://2u.pw/iQ3bwV74. ↑

48. Source: Face-to-face interviews conducted by the research team in May 2024 with two fighters who were deployed at the time. It is worth noting that a copy of the Shaitat brigades’ statement and a video of the deployment to Shahil is kept in the IPM archive. ↑

49. “Al-Nusra Pledges Allegiance to ISIS in Abu Kamal Just Before an Impending Offensive on the Iraqi Border,” Asharq al-Awsat, June 25, 2014, https://2u.pw/kX7SCQqw. ↑

50. “Armed Groups Launch a Counteroffensive to Recapture Bukamal in Deir ez-Zor,” Asharq al-Awsat, June 28, 2014, https://2u.pw/UYSXtvWh. ↑

51. “ISIS Declares the Caliphate and Chooses Baghdadi as Caliph,” al-Jazeera, June 30, 2014, https://2u.pw/RsnVAWYt. ↑

52. “ISIS Takes Full Control of Bukamal,” al-Jazeera, June 1, 2014, https://2u.pw/F2vf0lq6. ↑

53. After accepting the ISIS terms, the dignitaries and commanders informed the residents. The IPM archive includes a video from that time showing a local dignitary explaining the terms of the agreement to residents. ↑

54. Jabhat al-Nusra fighters took with them to Daraa the American journalist Peter Theo Curtis, whom they had held hostage for two years. After international mediation, Curtis was later released to the UN mission on the Golan Heights. See “The Return of the American Journalist Curtis to his Country,” France24, August 27, 2014, NzXJOMai/pw.uhttps://2. ↑

55. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 380–394. ↑

56. The statement was on behalf of the residents of Shahil, Nimliyya, and Hariji, as well as the following armed groups: Jaysh al-Islam/Hussein al-Rajab; Jaysh Mouta/Abu al-Haytham; Liwa al-Ikhlas/Muhammad al-Bash; and Harakat Taliban/Abu al-Ghamid. For further reading, see “ISIS Expands in Deir ez-Zor,” al-Jazeera, July 3, 2014, https://2u.pw/ExeQUmyu. ↑

57. “ISIS Forcibly Displaces Residents of Towns in Deir ez-Zor’s Eastern Countryside,” Syrian Network for Human Rights, July 8, 2014, https://2u.pw/wwhmrWt6. ↑

58. Also Hawayij, Thubyan, Tayana, Daranj, Sweidan Jazira, and al-Jarzi al-Sharqi, the most significant Jabhat al-Nusra stronghold after Shahil. For further reading, see “ISIS Controls Most of Deir ez-Zor’s Countryside,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, July 3, 2014, https://2u.pw/QBRXeNsl. Also see “Deir ez-Zor’s Countryside Falls to ISIS after al-Nusra’s Withdrawal,” Zaman al-Wasl, July 3, 2014, https://2u.pw/hWUqlt6B. ↑

59. “ISIS Captures the Tanak Oil Field in Syria” (video), al-Arabiya, July 4, 2014, https://2u.pw/dL86GoyK. ↑

60. According to statements by Abdul Baset al-Muhammad in an interview with Syrian state TV after he moved to the Assad regime areas, https://2u.pw/9tTYkM7J. ↑

61. This was revealed in face-to-face interviews conducted in May 2014 by the IPM team with dignitaries and former fighters who had been involved in the negotiations. ↑

62. The IPM archive includes a copy of the ISIS circular addressed to Shaitat fighters to complete their repentance at the general headquarters, after ISIS took full control of the Shaitat areas. ↑

63. “ISIS Takes Full Control of Deir ez-Zor,” al-Jazeera, July 14, 2014, https://2u.pw/PrQA8hFo. ↑

64. “7,000 Dead Due to Opposition Internal Fighting,” BBC Arabic, June 30, 2014, https://2u.pw/eiMR1Wfv. ↑

65. Suqrat al-Alou, “Returnees without Identity: The Crisis of Losing Personal Documents in the Self-Governing Areas in Deir ez-Zor,” Justice for Life and Impact for Impact Research, June 2022, p. 10. ↑

66. The checkpoint was set up on the main road in Kishkiyya. ISIS members manning the checkpoint appeared in multiple videos they filmed themselves. The IPM archive includes a copy of a video that shows the checkpoint and its members in a relaxed, everyday situation. The video was filmed by ISIS members themselves at the time and shared on social media. ↑

67. A later video shows ISIS arresting and torturing members of the Shaitat clan on charges of being former members of Jabhat al-Nusra. The video was filmed by ISIS and shared later. The IPM keeps a copy of the video in its archive. ↑

68. Source: Multiple face-to-face interviews conducted by the research team with dignitaries, activists, and former fighters. The interviews were conducted between April 3 and June 29, 2024 in the Shaitat areas of Kishkiyya, Gharanij, and Abu Hamam. ↑

69. The IPM keeps photographs of the two men who were killed by the ISIS patrol. These were provided by the men’s families. The details of the incident were verified by eyewitness accounts from residents, relatives, and dignitaries who were interviewed face-to-face in Kishkiyya between April 3 and June 29, 2024. ↑

70. Source: Video footage showing members of the first armed group hours before their attack on the ISIS base. It also shows civilians gathering. This video and other videos were captured on July 30, 2014 by activists and local residents. A copy of the video is kept in the IPM archive. ↑

71. Source: Video footage showing Akla al-Burjes dead. It also shows the burning of the car he was riding. The video was captured by one of the attackers. It was shared on local social media pages, but it was later removed because its content violated online content publishing policies. A copy of the video is kept in the IPM archive. ↑

72. The IPM archive keeps photo and video footage that documents the incident. One video shows the first moments of the militia attack on the ISIS base in Kishkiyya. It also shows part of the consequent fighting. Another video shows the ISIS members being captured in the municipal building. It also shows the burning of the ISIS vehicle. The last video shows crowds of civilians and fighters in the streets of Kishkiyya after the incident. It also shows some of the captured ISIS members. ↑

73. Source: A local member from Boulil in Deir ez-Zor. A video shows the moments when he was captured. He appears handcuffed and surrounded by Shaitat fighters and dignitaries, who question him. A copy of the video is kept in the IPM archive. ↑

74. Source: Multiple face-to-face interviews conducted by the research team with dignitaries and former fighters. The interviews were conducted in Kishkiyya between April 3 and June 29, 2024. ↑

75. ISIS later published photographs and video footage of the civilian employees at the Tanak oil field being arrested. Copies are kept in the IPM archives. ↑

76. Source: Multiple face-to-face interviews conducted by the research team with dignitaries, activists, and former fighters. The interviews were conducted between April 3 and June 29, 2014 in the Shaitat areas of Kishkiyya, Gharanij, and Abu Hamam. It is worth noting that the type of weapons used by Shaitat fighters can be seen in the video footage of the municipality incident, and later in the footage taken during the battle. ↑

77. “Did Abu Abdullah al-Kuwaiti Issue a Fatwa to Execute Hundreds of the Shaitat Tribe?” al-Rai (Kuwaiti newspaper), February 19, 2015, https://2u.pw/IBYP2COI. ↑

78. A copy of the correspondence with the order to carry out the fatwa is kept in the IPM archive. ↑

79. Source: Video footage showing clashes on the first day of fighting between the two sides. It was captured by a Shaitat fighter in Abu Hamam. A copy of it is kept in the IPM archive. ↑

80. The IPM archive includes copies of two videos showing part of the clashes on the first day and one showing the mosque burning. ↑

81. Copies of the photographs are kept in the IPM archive. ↑

82. “Tribes Burn an ISIS Base in Sweidan Village in Deir ez-Zor, ISIS Fighters Withdraw from their Positions in al-Jazri al-Gharbi” Al-Aalam TV, August 1, 2014, https://2u.pw/CS5kRmd4. ↑

83. See: “Video Footage Shows Free Syrian Army Armed Groups Capturing Ashara after Expelling ISIS” (video), YouTube, August 1, 2014, https://2u.pw/zEH72tC7. ↑

84. Abdul Baset Hamdou Khalaf was born in Kishkiyya in 1977. He was a farmer before the Syrian revolution. In early 2012, he joined al-Hamza brigade and became a commander. He led the battle during the 12 days of fighting. Eventually, he was surrounded with a small group of fighters in a location in the Syrian desert. On August 11, 2014, he retreated to a base in Palmyra controlled by the Assad regime. He was later recruited by the Assad forces and Russia to fight against ISIS in Deir ez-Zor, especially in the battles of the Deir ez-Zor air base. He formed an armed group called Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiyya to fight against ISIS. He was killed on August 5, 2015 by a land mine in the Tharda Mountains in Deir ez-Zor. ↑

85. “ISIS Withdraws from Villages in Deir ez-Zor and Brings Reinforcements from Iraq,” al-Anaba (Kuwaiti newspaper), August 3, 2014, https://2u.pw/ZDilatE8. ↑

86. The IPM archive keeps two short videos of the battles in the Abu Hamam desert. The first shows Shaitat fighters repelling an ISIS offensive with artillery guns. The other, released by ISIS, shows Shaitat fighters behind earthworks as they clash with ISIS fighters. ↑

87. ISIS later published a video showing the killing of civilians it arrested at this site. The IPM archive keeps stills taken from the video showing some of the victims as they were being taken to execution. Others show Abu Talha al-Almani executing two people. ↑

88. “Opposition Militias Form an Alliance in Qalamoun after Retreating from Deir ez-Zor,” Kuwait News Agency (Kuna), August 4, 2014, https://2u.pw/KnDQSYKN. ↑

89. Ibid. ↑

90. It included many militias that had withdrawn from Deir ez-Zor, such as Katibat Ahfad Aysha/Shaitat, Katibat Hamza/Shaitat, and Liwa Ibn al-Qayyim/Shaitat. See “12 Militias form Jaysh Osoud al-Sharqiyya,” Zaman al-Wasl, August 4, 2014, https://2u.pw/nHw66YXX. ↑

91. Source: Photographs published on ISIS social channels showing military reinforcements moving from Hasakah toward the Shaitat areas. Copies of the photos are kept in the IPM archive. ↑

92. In a TV interview after his arrest by the Iraqi security forces, Saddam al-Jamal, a prominent local commander of ISIS at the time, confirmed the role of foreign fighters in raiding the Shaitat area and committing the massacre, especially the group of Omar al-Shishani and the Libyan al-Battar militia, among others, after the failure of local fighters to make military gains. For further reading, see “What Did Saddam al-Jamal Say about the Shaitat Massacre,” Daraj Media, May 24, 2019, https://2u.pw/Lv6YEW0O. ↑

93. ISIS shared those photos on its social channels. For further reading, see Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 5, 2014, https://2u.pw/xBgODOb5. ↑

94. ISIS allowed the displaced residents to return with conditions on September 16, 2014. For further reading, see Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 16, 2014,https://2u.pw/xVmDHYhR. ↑

95. “Syrian Air Force Bombs ISIS Positions in Deir ez-Zor,” al-Hurra, August 5, 2014, https://2u.pw/gwdMM1hU. ↑

96. See “The Uprising Against ISIS Expands East, New Council to Lead the Syrian Revolution, Two Massacres by the Assad Forces Near Damascus,” Lebanese Center of Research and Consulting, August 5, 2014, https://2u.pw/lEE0JMSH. ↑

97. It is worth noting that the Assad regime’s airstrikes on August 4–5, 2014 were not limited to Deir ez-Zor and the eastern region. Multiple locations in different regions of Syria were also targeted. The regime air force committed two massacres in Kafr Batna and Douma in eastern Ghouta, killing 32 civilians with barrel bombs. It also bombed opposition positions in Idlib, Hama, and Homs. It dropped barrel bombs on the outskirts of Aleppo and its countryside, after advances by opposition forces in those areas, causing dozens of civilian casualties. See ibid. ↑

98. Source: Estimates provided during face-to-face interviews by fighters who were on the front lines. Volunteers often took turns manning the front lines. They would fight there for a day or two, then return home. Others took up arms only to defend their neighborhoods. Older people who chose to take up arms remained on the rear guard.↑

99. “ISIS Carries Out Mass Execution in Deir ez-Zor,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 7, 2014, https://2u.pw/jd8069nQ. The observatory’s report on that day says that the murdered workers were arrested on July 3, 2014, which is inaccurate. They were arrested on July 30, 2014. Copies of the photographs showing the executions carried out by ISIS are kept in the IPM archive. ↑

100. See Table 1. ↑

101. ISIS shared on its social channels multiple photographs bearing the logo of Wilayat al-Khair (Deir ez-Zor) and showing the shelling of Abu Hamam with heavy artillery. Copies of the photos are kept in the IPM archive. ↑

102. The Shaitat fighters published photographs of the ISIS fighters captured on that day. They included locals and foreigners, some of whom were under 18. Copies of the photographs are kept in the IPM archive. ↑

103. Source: Video footage shared on social media showing volunteers from Gharanij. It shows dozens of young men and 4×4 cars leaving Gharanij on August 7, 2014 to support Abu Hamam. A copy of the video is kept in the IPM archive. ↑

104. Source: Face-to-face interviews conducted by the research team with volunteer fighters who joined the battles that day. The interviews were conducted between April 3 and June 5, 2024 in Gharanij. ↑

105. Source: Recorded face-to-face interviews with relatives of the victims who were arrested in Bukamal at the time. The interviews were conducted between January and May 2021. Copies of the interviews with the victims’ families are kept in the IPM archive. ↑

106. ISIS published an official video late in August 2014 showing civilians detained at Bir al-Milh oil field on the ninth day of battle. The video shows three civilians being taken to execution. They were shot and beheaded by Abu Talha al-Almani and Abdullah al-Abboud, who was also known as Abu al-Hareth (a local). A copy of the video is kept in the IPM archive. ↑

107. Source: 20 face-to-face interviews with Shaitat fighters, activists, and journalists who witnessed the battles. The interviews were conducted between January and May 2021. Copies of the interviews are kept in the IPM archive. ↑

108. The IPM archive keeps photos captured by activists at the time of the battle showing the Shaitat residents leaving the area and others showing some living in tents in Bukamal’s villages. ↑

109. ISIS published photos of the car bomb before the operation and the name of the man driving it. Residents took photographs of the scene after the car bomb had exploded. Copies of the photographs are kept in the IPM archive. See “ISIS Car Bomb Targets Shaitat Fighters in Deir ez-Zor, Ultimatum to Families of Omar Employees to Leave,” Zaman al-Wasl, August 9, 2014, https://2u.pw/qqdtEvNB. ↑

110. The IPM archive keeps photographs of two leaflets obtained from residents who found them on that day in Gharanij and Abu Hamam. ↑

111. In the video titled “Illa man Taaba wa Aaman” (Except Those who Repent and Believe), ISIS presents its narrative regarding the Shaitat matter; ISIS classified the fighters into four categories: oil thieves, Sufis, bandits, and Assad-regime agents. ↑

112. The airstrikes on Deir ez-Zor and other areas came in a complex political context. There was an international mobilization to fight ISIS in Syria and Iraq. American warplanes were hitting ISIS positions in northern Iraq. The Syrian opposition was asking the US to intervene militarily. On August 15, the UN Security Council endorsed a resolution calling on states to confront the danger of ISIS, paving the way for international efforts to that effect that later resulted in the Global Coalition. In this context, the Assad regime’s airstrikes were an attempt to establish sovereignty as a government and a way of presenting itself as an important partner in the fight against terrorism within future international efforts to eliminate ISIS in Syria. Commenting on the Assad regime’s intensifying airstrikes on ISIS positions in Deir ez-Zor and other areas of Syria, the director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Rami Abdul Rahman, said: “The Assad regime wants to show the Americans that, like them, it is capable of hitting ISIS.” He added, “The regime is hitting secure ISIS positions. However, in areas where the opposition is fighting against ISIS, the Assad regime does not intervene, hoping that both enemies will be weakened. When one side prevails, airstrikes follow.” For further reading, see “Assad Regime Launches Airstrikes against ISIS Positions in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, ISIS Advances Near Tabqa Air Base and Marches toward Mare’ and Azaz,” Asharq al-Awsat, August 17, 2014, https://2u.pw/D5SPecOP. ↑

113. Source: 20 face-to-face interviews with Shaitat fighters, activists, and journalists who witnessed the battles. ↑

114. The meeting was held in the house of Am’oum al-Karbouli in Qa’im, according to Ali al-Ismail al-Jazza, one of the dignitaries of the delegation, who was interviewed face-to-face. ↑

115. “ISIS Captures Shaitat Area in Deir ez-Zor’s Eastern Countryside,” al-Aan TV, August 11, 2014, https://2u.pw/TIm2cd7p. ↑

116. The IPM archive keeps copies of photographs and video footage published by ISIS members at the time. The material shows ISIS members carrying out summary executions of some residents, including some disabled individuals. It is believed that the executions in Abu Hamam were carried out either on this day or the next day. ↑

117. The IPM archive keeps copies of photographs showing weapons thrown in the Euphrates. ISIS released the photos as a form of ridicule and a show of triumph. ↑

118. The IPM archive keeps a copy of the hand-written statement, which includes the names of the dignitaries from Gharanij’s clans and the date of the statement. ↑

119. ↑

120. This section on the massacre was constructed based on over 50 field-recorded interviews conducted with various groups across the Shaitat regions, particularly in Kishkiyya, Abu Hamam, and Gharanij. These groups included relatives of victims and missing persons, people displaced in the Bukamal villages at the time, elders, and former detainees in ISIS prisons. All interviews are preserved as audio and video recordings in the IPM archive. ↑

121. Ibid. ↑

122. Ibid. ↑

123. The IPM archive includes several images released by ISIS during that period. One shows over 100 detainees crowded into a room believed to be in a house in Abu Hamam, while another depicts dozens of detainees being loaded into cars for transfer to detention centers. Videos also show detainees held at the Omar oil field. Others depict ISIS taunting detainees in various locations. ↑

124. ↑

125. “‘The Islamic State’ Executes Hundreds of Sunni Shaitat Tribesmen in Eastern Syria,” France24, August 16, 2014, https://2u.pw/XzDWt4rF. ↑

126. “Shaitat Figures Appeal to Al-Baghdadi to Pardon the Innocent,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 16, 2014, https://2u.pw/DLVH9w9h. ↑

127. Source: Based on over 50 field-recorded testimonies; see fn. 120. ↑

128. Ibid. ↑

129. The IPM archive contains photographs of civilians executed in the Maadan neighborhood of Gharanij town, captured by individuals who slipped into the area. Other photos depict numerous bodies strewn across the streets of Kishkiyya and Abu Hamam, some leaked by ISIS and others taken by civilians. ↑

130. “‘The Spoils of the Apostates … The Best of Halal’ Shaitat Properties are Sold at the Cheapest Prices Amidst Media Marginalization,” Enab Baladi, October 12, 2014, https://2u.pw/BtYXuxVP. ↑

131. The IPM archive includes several photos published by ISIS media outlets during this period, featuring the emblem of ‘Wilayat al-Khair’ with the caption: “Bombing the homes of apostates in Shaitat.” Additionally, there is a video showing a group of ISIS members blowing up houses while threatening the Shaitat and other tribes. ↑

132. Source: Field interviews conducted by the IPM research team with several Shaitat figures who accompanied the Tayana and Mosul delegations in June 2024. The IPM archive contains copies of the recordings, which have also been transcribed. ↑

133. “Sheikhs and Tribal Leaders in Deir ez-Zor Appeal to al-Baghdadi to Pardon the Shaitat Tribe,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 25, 2014, https://2u.pw/JG00LML1. ↑

134. Source: Audio testimony from a tribal figure, Ibrahim al-Huwaish, who was tasked by a Tunisian leader to photograph the mosques and corpses in the streets to document the situation. The recording is preserved in the IPM archives. ↑

135. Ibid. ↑

136. In addition to the field-recorded testimonies of detainees in ISIS prisons, the IPM research team conducted an interview with a former ISIS security officer in the Shaitat area. Released by the SDF after a large sum of money was paid, he remained in his village. The interview, conducted in Gharanij on June 15, 2014, confirms the dispute between ISIS leaders during that period and explains the resulting events. ↑

137. Ibid. ↑

138. A copy of the recording is preserved in the IPM archives. ↑

139. The places of detention were documented through filmed field interviews with 26 former detainees in ISIS prisons during this period. These interviews are preserved in the IPM archive. ↑

140. Ibid. ↑

141. The terms of the agreement were obtained from tribal figures who attended the meeting, including Ibrahim al-Huwaish. These terms were initially recorded by the tribal figures and later shared with the residents of Shaitat areas. Their accuracy was confirmed by multiple attendees of the meeting and through the subsequent events. ↑

142. The ISIS video release titled “Except Those Who Repent” shows a segment of this meeting at 7:15, featuring Abu Suhaib al-Iraqi speaking to a group of Shaitat figures. ↑

143. The date and details of the meeting were confirmed by identifying some of the figures who appeared in the previously cited video and conducting subsequent field interviews with them. ↑

144. The IPM archive holds several samples of ‘repentance’ papers obtained from civilians who signed them during that period in Gharanij, Kishkiyyah, and Abu Hamam. ↑

145. Of the IPM interviewees, all who had been civilians displaced during that period purchased weapons, as did all residents of Shaitat towns, through arms dealers proliferating in the area under ISIS sponsorship and control. ↑

146. The ISIS video release titled “Except Those Who Repent” features footage of the return procedures and the signing of settlement papers at 8:30. It also includes scenes showing tribal figures representing each clan, with weapons they were responsible for handing over shown at 9:30. A copy of the video is preserved in the IPM archive. ↑

147. The IPM archive preserves a video recording and several photos documenting the process of assembling the weapons handed over by Gharanij. ↑

148. Source: Field interviews conducted by the IPM research team with two Gharanij tribal figures who handed over weapons on behalf of their clans. ISIS forced each of the nine clans of Gharanij to hand over 70 Kalashnikovs, with the final number totalling 630 pieces. ↑

149. The IPM archive contains a video recording and photos taken by the people of Gharanij during their return. For more information, see “Thousands of Shaitat Tribesmen Return to Their Areas Controlled by ISIS after It Executed Hundreds,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, November 25, 2014, https://2u.pw/RpeqGUiA. ↑

150. The IPM archive includes a photo showing the weapons handed over on that date, obtained by some Kishkiyya activists. Another photo shows people gathering in front of the Gharanij police station during the handover of the second part of the weapons. ↑

151. The exact number is unknown, as each clan handed over its own weapons in batches through a tribal leader. However, the figure provided is an approximation based on the estimates of the tribal leaders. ↑

152. The IPM archive contains a copy of the ‘repentance form’ signed by Kishkiyya residents. It also includes photos and videos showing the return of Kishkiyya residents, taken by local Kishkiyya activists on the same date. ↑

153. The IPM archive contains a photo showing residents and tribal figures gathered in front of the police station on that day. ↑

154. The IPM archive contains photos showing the return of Abu Hamam residents through the desert region, taken by activists during that day. ↑

155. The IPM archive contains photos and a video showing Abu Hamam residents returning to their town on that day. ↑

156. Upon their return, all interviewees from various segments of the population found their homes completely looted. The percentages were estimated for the three towns based on field interviews conducted with tribal figures, activists, and victims’ families in Gharanij, Kishkiyya, and Abu Hamam. ↑

157. ISIS members published several videos showing the bombing of houses in Abu Hamam, Gharanij, and Kishkiyya, accompanied by warnings to other tribes of similar consequences. Some of these photos and videos are documented in the IPM archive. ↑

158. “The ‘Looting’ Scenario Repeated in Shaitat Villages in Deir ez-Zor,” Zaman al-Wasl, August 16, 2014, https://2u.pw/RvvY3leu. See also “‘The Spoils of the Apostates … The Best of Halal’ Shaitat Properties are Sold at the Cheapest Prices Amidst Media Marginalization,” Enab Baladi, October 12, 2014, https://2u.pw/BtYXuxVP. ↑

159. ISIS posters on walls explained rules regarding assembly, curfew, and other measures during that period. Residents took pictures of these posters, which are preserved in the IPM archive. ↑

160. The IPM archive includes several photos showing civilian homes seized by ISIS, marked with the words “Property of the Islamic State.” Additionally, the archive holds a document issued by ISIS during that period, announcing the suspension of education and schools in the area until special curricula are printed. ↑

161. The IPM research team conducted field interviews with a number of young fighters who underwent sharia courses. These interviews took place between June and July 2024. A photo from that period, showing a group of young men gathered in front of the ISIS repentance center, is preserved in the IPM archive. ↑

162. During that period, ISIS members, under pressure, permitted all residents to search for the bodies of their loved ones at the site. This included Abu Hamam residents who were still displaced at the time; they were granted access to the site for several hours. However, they were still not allowed to return to their homes. ↑

163. The IPM archive contains a copy of the list of victims’ names announced by ISIS on that date. ↑

164. As of December 2024, following the fall of the Assad regime, the situation in eastern Syria is fluid. At present, control of the Shaitat areas is disputed between the SDF and the Military Operations Administration, the de facto authorities in Damascus. ↑